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Abstract 
 
 
The study’s aim is to provide new evidence on the role of a family firm’s specific 
characteristics, enshrined in the concept of socio-emotional wealth (SEW), in firms’ 
capital structure decisions with reference to agency and stewardship theories. Family 
firms in Indonesia rely mostly on banks and short-term debt as a source of funding to 
meet long-term financing requirements. This situation collectively calls for an 
investigation into the factors affecting capital structure decision. The study provides new 
empirical evidence on the determinants of capital structure during the period 2011-2015, 
covering 160 family firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange.  
 
The general results indicate that SEW dimensions can explain capital structure decisions 
of family firms in Indonesia. A family’s influence on a firm’s decisions represents the 
members’ long-term commitment to maintain the sustainability of the company across 
generations through control and influence. The desire to pass the business to the next 
generation encourages the families to apply risk reduction strategies to financing 
decisions by avoiding exposing the business to risk in order to preserve SEW. However, 
once the control over the firm passes from the founder to the next generation of family 
members, the desire to maintain the firm within the family has no significant effect on 
capital structure decisions.  
   
This study contributes to knowledge by examining the determinants of the capital 
structure specific to family firms in South-East Asia. The financing decisions taken in 
situations when different generations of the controlling family are in charge as a new 
approach that distinguishes this study from previous studies. It reveals that financing 
decisions, apart from being the product of a firm’s general characteristics such as age, 
size, etc., also reflect family goals focused on preserving the firm’s SEW, resulting in 
relatively low long-term debt levels sustained protracted period of time and across 
generations. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Background  
 
Family firms are the main force behind economic growth in many developing countries. 
In Indonesia, more than 95 percent of corporations in the Indonesian private sector are 
family owned. The number of family firms listed through an initial public offering (IPO) 
has increased significantly since the Indonesia Financial Services Authority (OJK) was 
founded in 2011 and started operating in 2012. The OJK drives financial reform in 
Indonesia through increasing firms’ access to capital market and increasing the spectrum 
of financial option available to them, including access for family firms. For example, as 
the end of 2018, there were 612 listed companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). 
This number increases from total of 520 listed companies in 2015. Thus, efforts were 
made by OJK and IDX to promote access of financial sources.     
 
Financing decisions are essential for family firms’ long-term survival, daily operations 
and growth. They are influenced by many internal and external factors. The managers of 
family firms have to make capital structure decisions that reflect not only conventional 
business logic, but also incorporate some specific objectives that follow from the fact that 
these are enterprises run by families. What follows is that family firms are likely to pursue 
non-economic goals (Chrisman et al., 2005; Sharma et al.,1997) and strive to maintain 
the so-called socio-emotional wealth imbedded in their firm to be passed on the next 
generations of family members (Berrone et al., 2010). Family involvement may require 
family firms to consider a trade-off between increasing the value of the firm through 
investment and diluting family control (Molly et al., 2012).  
 
 
1.2. Previous Studies on Family Firms and Capital Structure  
 
Capital structure is one of the argumentative issues in corporate finance since there is no 
universal theory of the debt-equity choice, and no reason to expect one (Myers, 2001). 
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The literature investigating capital structure decision of family firms are still spare. There 
are several different approaches that have been used in studies of capital structure, but 
none of them so far seems to have prevailed in practice. The empirical evidence continues 
to be contradictory regarding their validity. For example, family firms tend to have an 
excessive risk avoidance (Shleifer and Vishy, 1986) and have such a mechanism to reduce 
agency costs between the owners and managers (Villalonga and Amit, 2006) that may 
lead to use less debt due to decrease the risk of bankruptcy and the need for interest 
payments as a disciplinary management device. However, family firms have a long term 
commitment (Casson, 1999) and need to control their firms (Harris and Raviv, 1988) that 
reflect in high level of leverage. Empirically, some researchers focus on the prediction of 
how debt responds to the cash flow and investment components of the financial deficit 
(Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003; de 
Jong et al., 2011). Other researchers are more concerned with factors affecting debt ratio 
analysis (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Titman and Wessel, 1988; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Frank and Goyal, 2009; Ampenberger et al., 2013).  
 
Discourse about capital structure decision in family firms has been greatly influenced by 
two important theories; namely agency theory and stewardship theory. Rooted in 
economics with its fixation on rational behaviour, agency theory maintains that managers 
will pursue own opportunistic self-interested objectives rather than those of the principal. 
This will create a conflict of interests and make monitoring of the agent by the principal 
necessary (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The underlying assumption of agency theory is 
that ‘managers cannot be trusted’ (Donaldson, 1990). In family firms this realization may 
encourage the family to put one of their own at the helm of the company. 
 
In turn, stewardship theory is based on the assumption that there is no inherent problem 
with a manager’s motivation (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Stewardship theory argues 
that strategic decisions (such as capital structure decisions) are a device to maximise 
organisational performance and shareholders’ returns, as long as the fundamental 
coalition between managers and owners is intact. Both agency theory and stewardship 
theory believe that goal alignment is a winning strategy to reduce a potential conflict of 
interest between owners and management within a firm.  If the goal alignment is strong, 
monitoring becomes less important.  
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Previous studies considered that stewardship theory is applicable to analysing family 
businesses due to facilitation of social satisfaction through involvement of family 
members (Davis et al., 2010; Pearson and Marler, 2010; Corbetta and Salvato, 2004). 
Empirical studies on how family involvement can impact financing decisions, tend to 
focus primary on ownership with minimum attention given to the role of strategic 
positions such as CEOs or chair/board membership. Some argue that ownership has a 
negative relationship with leverage (Santos et al., 2014; Schmid, 2013; Mishra and 
McConoughy, 1999). Others found that ownership concentration has a positive impact on 
a firm’s debt level (Croci et al., 2011; Ellul, 2010; Margaritis and Psillakis, 2010; King 
and Santor, 2008). However, yet another group of researchers argue that ownership 
concentration is of no significance in relation to leverage (Ampenberger et al., 2013; 
Anderson and Reeb, 2003) and there is a non-linear relationship between ownership and 
debt levels (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Schulz et al., 2003). Thus, these studies have 
mostly focused on the impact on ownership concentration levels, without distinguishing 
between the different generations such as founders and descendants in family businesses. 
 
In family firms corporate governance will lead to the degree of an involvement-oriented 
management system that can change if the situation alters, such as succession-related 
issues. This is because descendants may not be as committed to the business as the 
founders and they may be more likely to have different priorities in running family 
business. For this reason, a number of studies suggest that differences in family 
involvement at different stages of the life cycle of family firms may shape social-
emotional wealth priorities (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2013; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2011). In turn, the differences of involvement can influence the degree of family 
involvement when making a capital structure decision.  Family’s engagement with the 
business can change with the dispersion of ownership among generations. Family firm 
may consider financial goals a priority, when and where they are consistent with non-
financial goals or socio-emotional enhancement. Therefore, when making capital 
structure decisions, family firms may follow the dimensions of socio-emotional wealth 
(SEW) and are controlled by financial characteristics. 
 
Although the theories are not developed with a specific focus on family firms, it would 
seem logical to follow the factors claimed to have some influence on corporate finance, 
since this study concerns about publically listed family firms. Following the previous 
studies regarding firms’ characteristics is therefore necessary in order to make 
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judgements about connections between the observable studies in family firms and 
relevant theories. The empirical literature notes several financial characteristics 
including: 
 
(a) asset tangibility (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Ozkan, A., 2001; Chen, 2004; Laery, 
2009); (b) profitability (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Chen , 2004; Leary, 2009; 
Ampenberger et al., 2013); (c) firm size (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 
1995, Myers and Majluf, 1984; Fama and French, 2002); (d) growth opportunity (Shyam-
Sunder and Myers, 1999; Laery, 2009); (e) non-debt tax shield (Titman and Wessels, 
1988); (f) firm’s age (Deesomsak et al., 2004; Anderson and Reeb, 2003); (g) earning 
volatility (Fama and French, 2002) and (h) liquidity (Deesomsak et al., 2004).  
 
A new move in the studies of family firms and capital structure has been to investigate 
the effect of control considerations on family firm’s capital structure decision. Control 
consideration may be related to a typical combination of concentrated ownership and 
control that is common in family firms. This approach may take away resources from 
profitable projects in order to satisfy the owner family’s interests. This action can occur 
when managers have excessive power enabling them to take decisions to satisfy their own 
interests. Several studies suggest that control motives can shape a firm’s capital structure 
decisions (Israel, 1991; Harris and Raviv, 1988; Stulze, 1988). These views are supported 
by empirical findings such as those from Croci et al. (2011), Elul (2010) and Mishra & 
McConaughy (1999) who found that control considerations exert a far greater influence 
on debt over equity financing. Thus, it is possible that family firms will not put their 
control at risk and dilute their powers due to their desire to preserve the family’s goals.  
 
Other studies have investigated the effect of risk reduction strategy on capital structure 
decision in family firms (Mishra and McConoughy, 1999; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Santos et al., 2014). Family firms are assumed to have, and belong to, large and 
undiversified shareholders. This structure of shareholders leads family firm to be a risk 
avoider. The shareholders may face a high exposure to a single asset, which is the family 
firm itself.  Therefore, they have an incentive to reduce risk at the firm level. The risk can 
be financial and/or non-financial, such as family reputation damage and financial distress 
(Schmid, 2013). Family firms will avoid the risk that potentially can damage their goals 
to preserve the socio-emotional wealth of such businesses. Moreover, the firm can be seen 
as a family asset which the members expect to be bequeathed to the next generation. Such 
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an expectation means the members may be averse to any decisions that can harm their 
stakes in the business.  
 
 
1.3. Research Gaps 
 
This thesis aims to examine the determinants of capital structure on family firms in 
Indonesia. It is motivated by lack of comparative studies on the role of such family firm 
specific characteristics as ‘socio-emotional wealth’ or SEW. SEW could be considered 
as one of the most typical features that define the family firm and make it different from 
non-family firms. While there have been studies that examine the determinants of firms’ 
capital structure in developing countries, very little research has been done on the 
dimensions of SEW and capital structure in the context of family firms. The studies about 
capital structure in family firms are dominated by traditional agency models and fail to 
address the domain of behaviour of the decision makers in the agency model. This study 
addresses a gap in existing literature on the determinants and the relationships between 
the dimensions of SEW and capital structure in the context of Indonesia listed family 
firms.  
 
The aspect that makes family firms unique is the connection of such key elements as 
ownership, management, government and succession. All of these issues influence goals 
and objectives, strategy, financing structure and dynamics of family firms (Chua et al., 
1999). The implications and significance of family involvement, in relation to capital 
structure decisions, have not been addressed adequately in the literature. This omission is 
somewhat puzzling as the topic is an important issue to investigate, particularly from the 
perspective of protecting the interests of shareholders who are not family members. 
 
Agency theory and stewardship theory make different assumption about the goals of 
family firms. As a result, there is an ongoing debate regarding the predictive ability of 
each theory in the context of family firms. The relationship between corporate governance 
and managers’ behaviour in family firms may resulting dynamic outcomes of agency and 
stewardships theories in a way not as separate and opposing lenses for viewing the family 
firms. A dynamic perspectives that I implemented in this study can benefit theory by 
explaining why behaviours change relative to capital structure decisions over time. This 
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perspective helps investigate behaviour patterns based on the non-economic goals (SEW) 
and would possibly alter predictions made about capital structure decisions in family 
firms. 
 
Agency and stewardship theories both presume that the principal and managers will 
become more aligned. However, over time in family forms ownership concentration 
becomes more dispersed, with friction among family members being more likely when 
family firms pass from one generation to the next. That conflict is basically the essence 
of the problem described by agency theory. The necessity to align managers’ behaviour 
and owners’ interests becomes important to reduce the conflict between the two roles.  
 
At first, agency problems were not expected in family firms because of their converged 
ownership and management, resulting monitoring is unnecessary (Chrisman et al., 2004; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, it is now believed that research in family firms 
previously overlooked agency problems in family firms such as management or 
ownership entrenchment (Schulze et al., 2001). Thus, agency problems can exist in family 
firms. In other words, if managers do not share the same individual motivation and 
interest as the owners, that dissonance becomes a problem. Control and monitoring 
become the key elements to govern the company and to ensure that managers act on behalf 
of shareholders’ interests. These previous research endeavors result to bring agency 
theory into family firms in the context once to be irrelevant to agency theory.   
 
The unique aspects of family firms such as non-economic goals and family involvement 
has lead the research in family firms to deviate from agency theory and turn to 
stewardship theory. Stewardship theory assumes that agents act in the best interests of 
their principals (Donaldson and Davis, 1989, 1991), with a steward’s behaviour being 
empowered to facilitate continued alignment of interests. By working for an organisation, 
personal satisfaction and needs are met. The structure of the organisation basically 
facilitates and empowers the manager’s ability to act as a steward. Controlling and 
monitoring can be counterproductive if managers are to be trusted, yet at the same time 
are being closely supervised. The fact is that in family firms, not all family members 
become managers or are actively involved in the firm’s business. Some family firms hire 
managers from outside the family, working on behalf of the family towards organisational 
goals. They have organisational commitment. Thus, this situation pushes the boundaries 
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of agency theory in family firms that use institutional approaches, rather than personal 
approaches, as a basis of influence with managers and owners.    
 
Leverage may be interpreted as the possibility of growth in size or in profit, but also the 
capability of managers to use the availability of information set. Agent behaviour tend to 
predict performance outcomes based on the agent’s risk preference (Mc Guire, 1988; 
Rees, 1985) or their frames about expectation (Baker et al., 2004). Therefore, it is 
reasonable that managers decide to use a low level or high level of leverage, depending 
on how they compare the anticipated outcomes from the available options in terms of loss 
aversion. In the case of family firms, the motivation of a family manager will be to 
preserve the non-economic goals especially as financial behaviour theory values 
maintaining long-term reproduction, growth and the safety of the firm itself (Vasiliou and 
Daskalakis, 2009).   
 
To connect the family firm and capital structure, the determinants of capital structure will 
be drawn from the non-economic goals of family firms, which is preserving 
socioemotional wealth for a long term. Socio-emotional wealth preservation has two 
implications: i) capital structure might be loaded to maximise the SEW for long term 
survival, instead of just maximising a business’s economic wealth; and ii) capital 
structure might be an instrument to keep business control due to the priority of protecting 
the socio-emotional wealth of family firms. These implications could disadvantage the 
other shareholders, such as those with minority holdings and non-family members 
(Berrone at al., 2012). Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that pursuing SEW might cause 
the firm to pay a premium to those investors from outside the family firm (Schulze et al., 
2003). The reason for this conclusion is the assumption that the financial objectives of 
the investors will have less priority than the socio-emotional wealth of the family firm. It 
can be argued that the family goal to preserve SEW gives sufficient emphasis to the SEW 
dimension of family firms when it comes to making strategic decisions. Following on 
from this point, I draw considerably on the aspects of agency and stewardship theories to 
examine the determinants of capital structure in family firms, rather than putting them in 
a static perspective. To this extent, what follows is as much a critique of dichotomous 
agency and stewardship theories as it is an explanation. It is my endeavour to fill any 
knowledge gaps the context of family firms.  
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To illustrate this point, I will present the determinants of capital structure by explaining 
the dimensions of SEW, taken from the existing literature. According to Berrone et al., 
(2012), there are five major dimensions of SEW: i) family control and influence; ii) family 
members’ identification with the firm; iii) binding social ties by excluding non-family 
members from key managerial and board positions; iv) family emotional attachment to 
the firm; and v) renewal of family bonds in the firm through dynastic succession. Capital 
structure decisions could be a mechanism for family firms to achieve the following 
strategic objectives, which is preserving SEW (Berrone et al., 2010; Berrone et al., 2012; 
Naldi et al., 2016). From this point of view, the dimensions will be broken into more 
operational measurements in order to make the dimensions of SEW sharper in their 
characterisations, especially in the context of capital structure decisions.  
 
The study uses a total of 322 family firms that were listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange until the end of 2015. From these family firms, only 160 family firms met the 
requirement of having issued consecutive financial reports over the 5 years from 2011 to 
2015. These data represent a considerable number of the total population, contributing a 
total of 800 observations for each variable. The quantitative analysis model uses panel 
data which combines cross sectional and time series information with two model 
measurements of leverage: a) long-term debt to total assets (LTD) and b) short-term debt 
to total assets (STD). The quantitative approach relates to the determinants of capital 
structure as a proxy for three main categories based on SEW dimensions: (i) family 
control and influence over the firm’s operation; (ii) renewal of family bonds through 
dynastic succession; and (iii) binding social ties by excluding non-family members from 
key managerial and board positions. The three categories involve a total of six categories 
which are: (i) family ownership; (ii) the firm founder act as the CEO; (iii) family members 
are represented on the Board of Directors; (iv) a member of the family is both the CEO 
and a member of the Board of Directors; (v) a descendant of the family firm founders acts 
as the CEO, and (vi) Board independence. 
 
Thus, the research answers the following research question: 
 
What are the determinants of capital structure decisions of Indonesian family firms? 
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1.4. Objectives and Contributions 
 
This thesis analyses the different factors that shape capital structure decisions in Indonesia 
family firms, how these factors relate to the unique characteristic of socio-emotional 
wealth and its implications regarding the preservation of a family business sustainability. 
The thesis explores the following issues:  
1. The determinants of capital structure decisions derived from the socio-emotional 
wealth dimensions which underpin a family firm’s decisions.   
2. The ways in which capital structure decisions in general relate to the corporate 
strategies of Indonesia’s listed family firms.  
3. The implication of this study towards the series of reform policies to regulate public 
listed companies, including family firms that can implemented to strengthen the 
Financial Services Authority (OJK)’s functions in Indonesia.  
 
There are two main contributions by this study to the body of literature: theoretical and 
the methodological. The theoretical contribution is in its attempt to test the validity of 
hypotheses based on the concept of socio-emotional wealth dimensions of capital 
structure, applied to the financing decisions of family owned businesses in a developing 
country. Motivated by the growing attention to financing decisions in family business, 
this study brings highly relevant research fields of family business and finance critically 
reviews by study of Michiels and Molly (2017), Motylska-Kuzma (2017) and Payne 
(2018). In the situation, when the determinants of capital structure are not only derived 
from economic reasons, it is crucial to test the validity of hypotheses based on the concept 
of socio-emotional wealth. Thus, the contribution of this study is to verify Berrone et al., 
(2010) and Gomez-Mejia et al., (2007) who argue that non-economic reasons are often 
likely to predominate in the financing decisions of family firms as the result of the choice 
between risk and preserve control (Motylska-Kuzma, 2017). 
 
The study proposes a specific conceptual framework to identify and explore the 
determinants of capital structure of family firms, by considering a firm’s characteristics 
as corporate finance determinants of capital structure.  Capital structure decisions are 
investigated in a situation when different generations of the controlling family are in 
charge. This is a new approach that distinguishes this study from previous studies. In 
addition, by focusing SEW dimensions, the thesis implements an original conceptual 
framework, in which the concept of socio-emotional wealth differentiates family firms 
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from non-family firms. In this manner, the framework accommodates a crucial part of 
family business which is the family itself. This framework is specifically, developed and 
adapted with reference to Indonesian listed family firms, in order to explain capital 
structure decisions that they make. However, to maintain the degree of generalisation of 
this framework, the instruments and variables are made adaptive and applicable to 
contexts outside Indonesia as well.      
 
The investigation makes a methodological contribution due to the fact that, to my 
knowledge, this is the first study to have tested SEW dimensions and capital structure 
decision using quantitative methods. SEW dimensions need to be more operational in 
measurement to provide sharper and clearer characteristics of SEW, especially in the 
context of capital structure decisions that involve human relations and interests in 
decision making.  
 
While research in family firms has covered the strategic importance of debt, most studies 
in family firms have directly tested the relationship between family involvement through 
ownership and capital structure decision-making. A quantitative approach is relevant to 
this research since the variable has proxy measurements. As such, preserving SEW as the 
aim of family firms will engage with capital structure decision making. Thus this study 
contributes to the existing capital structure literature on Indonesian listed family firms by 
providing a greater understanding of the factors that impact capital structure decisions.     
 
With regards to the relationship between SEW and capital structure, this study reveals 
unique implications for investors, family firms and the policy making. The study shows 
that as far as SEW is concerned, investments in family firms that have an independent 
board are sensible, especially as Indonesia has adopted a civil law model which is weak 
when it comes to offering investors legal protection. Families’ socio-emotional motives 
positively influence investors’ perceptions as long as they show strong corporate 
governance in a family firm. Being listed on the capital market may enhance a firm’s 
legitimacy by relying on professional non-family members on the board. This 
independence could increase the family’s reputation among investors and creditors, due 
to gaining access to capital facilitated by the family firm’s carefully protected successful 
business record.  
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Indonesia is one of the emerging capital markets that is developing into a well-regulated 
and transparent entity and is thus reducing problematic governance and various types of 
agency problems resulting from ownership pyramids or cross holdings. The capital 
market now possesses a degree of openness and capital access, which means listed family 
firms can add value to their businesses. Especially, there is a sense of urgency driving 
continued efforts to elevate competitiveness through improvements in the quality of 
corporate governance practices. These improvements are seen as a way to spur financial 
performance and enhance investor confidence, which in turn could increase access to 
capital inflow, at least up to the same levels as other companies in the ASEAN region. 
This optimistic opinion is because since 2015, Indonesia has been a part of the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEU) and has a vision to be the big ten of the most powerful 
economics in 2030. It is imposing higher costs on family firms pursuing SEW 
preservation, if any of those firms are filling their strategic decision making positions 
with non-professionals who lack the required competence, authority and reputation 
needed to manage complexity, including multiple principals’ interests and access to 
funding sources. Moreover, the financial market’s policy maker - the Financial Services 
Authority or OJK - needs to encourage family firms to be more prudent by avoiding 
expensive involvements that can lead to nepotism or oligarchic behaviour. Such cautious 
behaviour will help to avoid business failure when it comes to the next generations, which 
may well lack business-centric capabilities. The adoption of best practices will emerge to 
safeguard the firm’s long-term financial orientation and preserve the socio-emotional 
wealth of listed family firms.     
 
This thesis highlights that socio-emotional wealth exists in capital structure decisions and 
their relationships with lenders. This scenario implies that family firms keep a close 
mutually beneficial relationship with lenders. Nevertheless, the family’s reputation 
should be supported by due diligence and checks by lenders to discourage firms from 
increasing leverage on the basis of their unhealthy relationships with banks, involving 
issues such as nepotism and cronyism.        
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1.5. Limitations of the work  
 
This study is not free of certain limitations. Firstly, information regarding ultimate owners 
was not available in financial reports published for the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 
during the period of researched in this thesis. For this reason, I have not attempted to 
control my results for a) the profile of block-holding shareholders, b) the use of pyramidal 
ownership and cross shareholding used to increase voting power in excess of cash-flow 
rights and c) the role of block-holders who can collude with family shareholders.   
 
Secondly, although there are five major dimensions of SEW, only three were used in this 
study of strategic decision of family firms. Two dimensions of SEW family members’ 
identification with the firm and emotional attachment to the business have proven to be 
too difficult to operationalise within a quantitative study.  I could not find appropriate 
proxies to represent these two dimensions in quantitative measurements. Moreover, the 
dimension of family succession has important implications for the time horizons in the 
decision-making process. This study uses the firm’s founder’s descendants acting as 
CEOs as a proxy for this dimension without distinguishing across second and third 
generations. However, to measure the impact incrementally on a strict basis across 
generation is not easy especially if there is still a contribution from the previous 
generation. 
 
The third limitation relates to the number of observations and the period under 
investigation. Extending this study with a greater number of observations would have led 
to more robust results, especially after the requirement from government to publish the 
ultimate owners in financial report starting in 2018. Lastly, the focus on Indonesian family 
firms make the findings context specific.  
 
 
1.6. Overview of the Results 
 
The key findings of the thesis provide evidence on the determinants of the capital 
structure of Indonesian family firms across two debt measures. These results show that a 
family firm’s capital structure decision-making is substantially driven by non-financial 
goals designed to preserve SEW.  
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Firstly, the results indicate that SEW dimensions can explain capital structure decisions 
of family firms in Indonesia. A family’s influence on a firm’s decisions represents a long-
term commitment of the members of the family to maintain the sustainability of the 
company across generations through control and influence. The desire to pass the 
business to the next generation encourages families to apply risk reduction strategies to 
financing decisions in order to preserve SEW. Secondly, once the control over the firm 
passes from the founder to the next generation of family members, the desire to maintain 
the firm within the family has no significant effect on capital structure decisions. As the 
family’s engagement with their business declines as a result of the dispersion of 
ownership among generations, the demand to keep control and preserve SEW also 
declines. Thirdly, independent directors play a significant role in protecting outside 
family shareholders from self-dealing families; in particular, incompetent family 
members in positions of authority.  
 
Such firm’s characteristics, as profitability, the non-debt tax shield, firm age, liquidity 
and firm growth are significantly associated with the capital structure decision-making of 
family firms in Indonesia. However, the asset structure and firm size are insignificantly 
associated with capital structure decisions in family firms. A high concentration of family 
ownership is attributed to preserving SEW and is characterised by a reputation for keeping 
a good relationship with creditors. Therefore, intangible assets, e.g. the reputation of the 
family’s good name, might be more relevant as a collateral than a tangible asset. In 
addition, when size proxies for relative dilution of control, as agency theory posits, the 
Indonesian family firms would appear likely to have similarities in protecting their SEW, 
both for small and large businesses.   
 
The study’s general results indicate that SEW dimensions informing capital structure can 
serve to explain capital structure decisions made by family firms in Indonesia. The access 
to influence a firm’s decisions represents the holding of a long-term commitment to 
maintain the sustainability of the company across generations. Spanning the business to 
the next generation motivates the families to protect the business from risk exposure, by 
the desire to preserve SEW.  
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1.7. Organisation of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is organised into six chapters. Chapters two and three, set up a theoretical 
frameworks; chapter two establishes a theoretical foundation for family firms’ analysis 
and chapter three does the same for the capital structure in family firms. Both chapters 
are provide a background for the analyses of the main empirical findings delivered by  
studies on determinants of capital structure of family firms, as well as of some relevant 
studies investigating Indonesia specifically. Given that the theoretical framework is 
developed from agency and stewardship theories as used in the theoretical base of the 
majority of studies of family firm, the thesis is designed to relax and extend the general 
conceptual theoretical framework. This conceptual development is achieved by taking 
into account to expound the dynamic and principles associated with agency and 
stewardship theories. In addition, the conceptual theoretical framework was developed 
further, in order to characterise family firms and to address the distinctive factors of 
determinants of capital structure in specific detail.  
 
Chapter four discusses methodology and provides rational for adopting a quantitative 
approach. Chapter five outlines the quantitative results and findings, followed by 
discusses and analyses the results and findings. Lastly, chapter six concludes the thesis 
by highlighting the key contributions and implications of this work for family firms, 
policy makers and investors. Limitations of the study and recommendations for future 
research are identified. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FAMILY FIRMS  
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Family firms are the main force behind economic growth in the developing countries of 
South-East Asia. In Indonesia, for example, more than 95 percent of all firms are owned 
by families and they contribute 25 percent of the national GDP. Many of them are listed 
companies; in fact, family firms represent 60 percent of all companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The family firms’ contribution makes it important to 
explore how family firms structure their capital. Unlike non-family public companies, 
family dynamics may influence the firm-level outcomes of strategic decisions as a 
mechanism of keeping family businesses close to the family. The dominant shareholders, 
who are from the founding families, are believed to pursue family-centred noneconomic 
goals that benefit the family (Chua et al., 2015; Chrisman et al., 2012; Chua et al., 1999). 
Pursuing noneconomic goals is the distinguishing characteristic or feature of family firms 
that makes them different to other forms of businesses (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; 
Berrone et al., 2012). However, research on family firms mostly employs elements of 
traditional, non-family firm models as a framework for analysis. For example, primarily 
they use trade-off theory or pecking order theory as a framework for their analyses (King 
and Santor, 2008). This approach, in my opinion, fails to consider the importance of 
preferences and corporate governance found in family firms. In addition, little is known 
about family firms’ involvement in certain forms of financing.    
 
Research into family firms often applies two mainstream theories to explain their unique 
aspects. These theories are: a) agency theory and b) stewardship theory (Verbeke and 
Kano, 2012; Madison et al., 2016). Some studies suggest that agency theory offers a rich 
frame of reference for the unique problems of family firms (Chrisman et al., 2004), but 
others believe that stewardship theory is an ideal theory for explaining governance in a 
family business context (Davie et al., 2010). Among these debates, researchers have made 
significant strides in applying and testing those theories and extending the field of family 
firm research (such as Schulze et al., 2001; Corbeta and Salvato, 2004; Villalonga and 
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Amit, 2006). Mostly, these authors have provided insights into seven clusters of family 
firm-level outcomes; namely: i) performance, ii) strategy, iii) social and economic impact, 
iv) governance, v) succession, vi) family business roles and vii) family dynamics (Yu et 
al., 2012). These seven categories have expanded the examinations of family firms’ 
contexts. Yet, there is a lack of research regarding outcomes of family-centred 
noneconomic goals, both from the agency and stewardship theories’ perspectives. 
Arguments have been made for both theories, but still leave an ambiguity about the 
governance mechanism that leads to strategic decision making processes in family firms 
located in Indonesia.   
   
In adopting those theories, my thesis suggests that corporate governance may be dynamic; 
meaning, it implemented based on the actual behaviour of managers, rather than based 
only on behaviour assumptions the principal has of managers. Thus, this can advance 
theories by examining when and why the strategic decisions changed relative to each 
other, over time, across the owning family’s generations. The rationale for the dynamic 
perspective is the notion that firms make a choice depending on the reference point of 
each firm’s dominant principals (Berrone et al., 2012). Managers will make decisions in 
order to preserve the accumulated endowment in the firm. In the context of family firms, 
the emphasis on non-economic goals becomes important; a fact which is rarely 
understood by those observing from a non-family firm perspective. 
 
The theoretical framework is divided into two sections. This chapter focuses on the first 
part of the literature review, which examines the characteristics of family firms. I consider 
agency theory and stewardship theory concurrently, moving away from their current 
dichotomous treatment, in order to view the agent-principals’ preferences and the risk-
taking in the decision making of family firms. This perspective may offer a finer-grained 
application than had previously been available and could possibly alter the predictions 
made about family firms. Lastly, a perspective informed by an Indonesian context can 
give an overview of the significant contribution of family firms on Indonesia’s economy. 
The second part of this analysis, as presented in Chapter 3, specifically focuses on the 
capital structure related decisions in the context of Indonesia’s family firms. In this 
current chapter (Chapter 2), the determinants of capital structure will be derived from 
non-financial reference points that are used in decision making processes in family firms.  
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The definition of family firms is diverse, thereby giving a degree of variation across 
studies and causing the comparison of results to be contested. This definition involves 
two aspects: a) family ties (blood ties) and b) family involvement in the business 
(ownership, management and governance positions). According to Villalonga and Amit 
(2006), a family firm is a firm whose founder or a member of the family by either blood 
or marriage, is an officer, a director or the owner of at least 5 percent of the firm’s equity, 
individually or as a group. However, La Porta et al. (1999), Faccio and Lang (2002), 
Anderson and Reeb (2003a), Maury (2006) and Poutziouris et al. (2015) consider a 
founding family to be one that has a 10 percent fraction of the total ownership. Schmid 
(2013) on the other hand defines a family firm as one where the family owns at least 20 
percent of the voting rights. Thus, although ownership concentration makes some general 
references to inform the definition of a family firm, the threshold varies from one 
definition to another.   
 
Westhead et al. (1997) argued that when different definitions of family business are 
applied, the ownership threshold can differ from 15 percent to 81 percent, according to 
the definition used. The level of family holdings is considered to represent the degree an 
owning family can exercise family control, thereby ensuring the family firm’s long term 
future. Control could vary across the ownership concentration and often differs across the 
generations even within one family business. Controlling shareholders that pursue their 
interests and objectives are likely to have significant consequences for the firms they 
invest in. The channel through which control-motivated family holders can defend their 
corporate control is by leverage. Thus, capital structure becomes such an important firm-
related issue in that the family can influence corporate policy decisions to optimise their 
control over the firm. Leverage can allow the founding family to control more resources, 
either physical and/or human, without diluting the family’s voting rights. Ellul (2009) 
found that family-controlled ownership increase leverage to maintain or enhance control 
over the firm’s decision making process. However, leverage is not only the mechanism 
of control; it plays an important role when family firms consider preserving non-
economic goals in the future. Ensuring the business stays in the family could motivate 
them to avoid risk due to a consequence of using more debt to maintain the sustainability 
of the family and the business as a whole.     
 
As a whole system, a family business can be viewed as a hybrid combination between 
family and business. Astrachan and Shanker (2003) discuss the point that the integration 
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of the family and the business is the unique characteristic of family firms. This integration 
can be in the form of an interaction between family as a unit, family as a business entity, 
and involvement of family members in the business. The extent of family involvement 
and influence on the business is distinctive of a family business, where their involvement 
are connected as a family business system that include key elements as ownership, 
management, and government. All of these elements influence the firm’s goals and 
objectives, strategies, as well as the family structure and dynamic. However, some critics 
of those key elements have argued that the ownership, management and governance 
components of family involvement are weak predictors of a family firm’s concerns over 
succession (Chua et al., 1999). The collapse of ‘the Surabaya Post’ in 2014 may indicate 
the same situation, when family involvement fails to include succession as a mechanism 
for the renewal of family bonding with and to the next generation. Thus, this involvement 
overlooks the fact that maintaining a family firm’s sustainability should involve the 
element of succession as a dimension of family-centred noneconomic goals.         
 
Outcomes evaluated regarding family-centred noneconomic goals are referred to as socio-
emotional wealth (SEW). Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010b), Berrone et al. (2010) and Gomez-
Mejia et al. (2011) argue that SEW could be considered as one of the most typical features 
that define a family firm and make it different from non-family firms.  Berrone et al. 
(2012) offered a description of the dimensions of SEW in order to explain the behaviours 
in the decision-making process: (1) family control and influence; (2) family members’ 
identification with the firm; (3) binding social ties by excluding non-family members 
from key managerial and board positions; (4) family emotional attachment to firm; and 
(5) renewal of family bonds with the firm through dynastic succession. The priority of 
these dimensions is not a sequence; they can change over time depending on the stage of 
the life cycle of the family firm and the nature of family involvement (Le Breton-Miller 
and Miller, 2013). SEW can determine the strategic decisions of family firms that are 
most likely to preserve the family’s socio-emotional wealth and enhance the firm’s 
survival. The noneconomic goals use the endowment effect of a family firm (Chua et al., 
2015; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2000) which includes two aspects: a) the ownership and 
b) the sunk cost effect. Both of these issues occur when decision makers let their decisions 
be influenced by costs incurred at the very beginning of the time when the founder set up 
the business (sunk costs) and the length of time the founder has owned the company 
(ownership). Thus, my account considers that ownership (endowment) and sunk costs are 
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the basic control-related considerations of family firms, involving and influencing the 
strategic decision choices of family firms.    
 
 
2.2. Family Firm Characteristics 
 
2.2.1. Family Endowment  
 
Socio-emotional wealth represents an imperative point of reference that family firms use 
to make major strategic choices and policy decisions. These non-financial goals capture 
the endowment effect of family ownership. Thaler (1980) defines the endowment effect 
as a pattern in which people often demand much more to give up the object than they 
would be willing to pay to acquire it. In this context, the object is a family owned business. 
In particular, the endowment effect could be applied to see how the differences for each 
stage of family life shape the decision making. Since the founder owns and controls the 
family business, they would value the business more regarding their ownership in the 
business. However, the next generation’s perception of the value of the business is less 
likely to be in line with the founder’s values. Kets de Vries (1993) found that 70 percent 
of family businesses fail to survive through the second generation and 90 percent through 
the third generation. The perception between descendants and founders can be terminally 
different because of the duration of ownership: the greater the years the more set and 
inflexible the views.  
 
Issacharoff (1998) confirms that the endowment effect increases with the length of 
ownership duration. The founder who is handing over control of the family firm is likely 
to place greater value on the business compared to the next generation. Founders have 
already invested money, time and effort since the start of the business in order to obtain 
management control. A founder will not give up or lose control over the family firms that 
they treat as their ‘baby’, a new born business, and will therefore try to protect the firm 
from financial distress that potentially endangers their control over that business. 
 
Thaler (2015) uses the analogy of Homer’s Odysseus and the Sirens to express the notion 
of self-control, but I think that this tale is metaphorically about how a founder leads a 
company and prevents the firm from being wrecked. The Sirens were a female band 
feared by sailors because they could not resist the call of the Sirens’ song calling them to 
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their doom. Any sailor who submitted to their calling by trying to steer his ship close to 
the rocks would end up with himself being shipwrecked. Odysseus had a conflict of 
interest: on the one hand, he wanted to hear the music, but on the other, he wanted to tell 
the story and stay alive. He decided on two strategies. Firstly, he asked all the crew to put 
wax in their ears to avoid the temptation of the Sirens’ music, so they did not hear them. 
Secondly, he instructed his crew to bind him to the mast, which allowed him to enjoy the 
performance without risking the temptation to steer the ship towards the rocks.  
 
The story illustrates two strategic decisions that are used by founders to maintain the 
sustainability of family firms through control mechanisms. For the descendants and 
family members (the ships’ crews), the strategy is applied to remove the possibility of 
descendants performing actions that can put the company in danger, by monitoring their 
actions. As long as the founder is still involved in a business, descendants seem to shut 
down their own interests by following the founder’s rule set as a family system. This 
strategy is applied to reduce conflict among the family members. For the founder, 
represented by Odysseus, he chose to limit his interest to prevent self-destruction, which 
Thaler (2015) defines as a commitment strategy: a strategy of the founder who selects the 
option of having a sustainable business and then protects it for the long run.  
 
On the other hand, the endowment effect can generate ownership entrenchment. 
Chrisman et al. (2005) state that ownership entrenchment may have serious consequences 
for minority shareholders. More concentration of ownership would allow family members 
to serve their own interests rather than have the firm run properly. For example, rather 
than run business by professional, family firms create employment for other family 
members.  Morck and Yeung (2003, 2004) found that the entrepreneurial spirit and talent 
of the founder are not necessarily inherited by subsequent generations of a controlling 
family. It seems that it is much easier for the succeeding generations to keep control via 
a status quo perspective rather than obtaining competitive advantages through innovation 
and entrepreneurship. Thus, the ownership entrenchment can facilitate problems such as 
an inability to make sound decisions due to the lack of a qualified family successor for 
the business (Nicholson, 2008). Meanwhile, Anderson and Reeb (2003b) argue that 
entrenched family ownership could be seen in a positive way, which can reduce problems 
associated with the separation of ownership and management. The ownership 
entrenchment can be an effective organisational mechanism to reduce agency problems. 
Despite these debates, it can be argued that ownership entrenchment may be different 
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across generations, depending on the need of family firms to professionalise their firms.  
The situation at the founder stage can be different from the descendant stages. Changing 
from family management of a business to non-family managers may lead to 
professionalising, but it is not the only way to reduce ownership entrenchment. To an 
extent, this contentious issue has to do with attitudes and behaviour. The different 
outcomes of ownership entrenchment and the impact of ownership may vary across the 
generations and can change over time within one family business.  
 
 
2.2.2. Sunk Cost Effect 
 
The endowment effect in family firms is related to the sunk cost effect (Shepherd and 
Zacharakis, 2000). The endowment effect occurs when decision makers allow their 
decisions to be influenced by costs incurred at an earlier time when they established the 
family firms, such as the time spent and efforts made at the very beginning.  Zeelenberg 
and Dijk (1997) find evidence that people who have high levels of sunk costs in 
investment are more likely to choose safer options. The sunk costs that influence the 
assessment of an option can be either financial (capital), or behavioural (time and effort 
invested). Investment in those sunk costs is considered as the indicator of the pursuance 
of both financial and nonfinancial goals. This perception is informed by the availability 
of a choice between the option that can satisfy the family firm’s goal and one that provides 
probability in which the family’s goal may not be met. 
 
Including sunk costs in decision making can be irrational. However, in family firms there 
appears to be an explanation to this behaviour, which is the family firm’s aspiration level. 
Given the emphasis on loss aversion of the family business, the possibility of losing the 
business that they have owned and invested in, financially and emotionally, induces 
managers of a family firm to choose the decision based on preserving the endowments of 
the family firm.  
 
 
2.2.3. Family Altruism 
 
Another important characteristic of a family firm is altruism. Altruism can be seen as a 
moral value that motivates individuals to undertake actions that benefit others without 
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any expectation of external rewards (Batson, 1990), which is basically what parents do in 
family firms. This behaviour can be a utility function in which the welfare of an individual 
is linked positively to others’ welfare. Altruism fosters loyalty and commitment to the 
family and its prosperity (Ward, 1997). However, conversely altruism can also create 
agency problems within family firms.  
 
If the parent, as founder, is still involved in the company, altruism can create free riding 
and difficulty in enforcing a contract to alter the conduct of ineffective managers 
(Chrisman et al., 2004). Parents may be motivated to act unreasonably generously to their 
children, although that generosity may be counterproductive and cause the children to 
become spoilt free riders. This negative outcome may be avoided if parents implement a 
commitment strategy of disciplining their children and teaching them self-control such as 
in Homer’s Sirens illustration above. However, in a situation when the family firm passes 
to the next generation, shares become widely dispersed and majority shareholders who 
contribute less and know little or nothing about the business can be disadvantaged by 
family members who run that business. This situation can happen when a family group 
of shareholders, who may or may not have a controlling interest, actually runs the 
business. Inactive shareholders may suspect the family management of taking the benefits 
and accessing their wealth. Moreover, emotional attachment to the business, 
identification with the business and altruism may be reduced when family firms pass to 
the next generation because of conflicts among family members. In the next generation it 
appears that family members may not be willing to bear more risk, thus strategic decisions 
may be changed.     
 
The literature has proposed that altruism and executive entrenchment, combined with 
intentions to maintain family control, can influence agency relationships (Schulze et al., 
2003; Chrisman et al., 2005). Agency mitigation may help parents to avoid making 
decisions that may ultimately harm their own welfare due to the problem of self-control. 
Agency problems arise when loss of self-control causes parents to violate the terms of 
agreement that they had made with their children. Thus, it can be argued that altruism 
depends on parents-children relationships. Altruism can cause descendants who are 
involved in a family firm to behave as agents or stewards. This relationship structure may 
result in different opportunistic or trusting behaviours.   
 
 
23 
 
2.2.4. Life Cycle Effects in Family Firms  
 
The literature on corporate life cycles indicates that changes which occur in firms follow 
a pattern which can be characterised by stages of development involving organisational 
strategies, activities and structural parameters and includes i) the birth phase, ii) the 
growth phase, iii) the maturity phase, iv) the revival phase and v) the decline phase.  
(Adizes, 1979; Greiner, 1972; Quinn and Cameron, 1983). 
    
According to Miller and Friesen (1984), in the birth phase firms are typically dominated 
by owner-managers and the power is highly centralised. Firms in the growth phase have 
multiple shareholders, are medium sized, somewhat centralised and have rapid growth.  
At the mature phase, the firm’s size is getting larger, the ownership more dispersed, is 
getting older and experiences slower growth in profits. Firms in a renewal phase have a 
very large firm size, rapid growth, are competitive and highly dynamic. Lastly, in the 
decline stage the firm is beginning to stagnate and experience slow growth, risk aversion 
and the liquidation of subsidiaries. Thus, the different characteristics in every stage of 
development need the integration of decision making with the strategies and structure of 
the firms. Faff et al. (2016) that a firm’s characteristics, growth opportunities and 
organisational structure may change gradually and firms behave differently in various 
life-cycle stages. There are several empirical works that can offer evidence of a further 
association between strategic decision-making and life cycle.  
 
According to Gersick et al. (1997) family owned firms generally go through three broad 
phases: i) the controlling owner stage (in Indonesia examples being the Saratoga Group, 
the MNC Group and the Hamami Group), ii) the sibling partnership (such as the Gadjah 
Tunggal Group, the Ciputra Group and the Emtek Group) and iii) the cousin consortium 
(such as the Lippo Group, the Sampoerna Group, the Salim Group and the Sinar Mas 
Group). To account for these possibilities, the next section will discuss every stage across 
generations, starting with a) the family founder phase, then b) the descendant stages.  
 
2.2.4.1. Family Founder Stage 
 
At the very beginning of this phase, lack of access to the public markets usually means 
that financing sources are limited to internally generated funds. In addition, because a 
family’s wealth is mostly tied up in the business, typically financial portfolios are 
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undiversified. During this phase, the problem of asymmetrical information leads to the 
difficulty in getting capital from creditors. Although several group of family firms in 
Indonesia own banks, there is a government regulation to limit loans that allocated to 
firms in one group company. Thus, family firms are still need to have sufficient asset 
tangibility as collateral. However, undiversified investment signals to the creditors that 
family firms are mainly concerned with long term survival and that they prefer to pass 
the firm to their descendants (Ang, 1991) and a focus on creating SEW. Founders are 
likely to be especially concerned with maintaining the sustainability of the family 
business.  
 
At this stage, the founder who acts as a manager tends to avoid damaging the family’s 
reputation and will do his or her upmost to prevent losing everything in case of an inability 
of capacity to repay debts. Anderson et al. (2003) find that family reputation is more 
important than just collateral tangible assets to create long lasting economic consequences 
with external parties such as bondholders or creditors. The long investment horizon 
creates a good relationship of trust between the company and debt providers (Schmid, 
2013). As the duration of ownership increases, the founder places a higher value on the 
firm, so the level of loss aversion increases. Strategic decisions will be based on, and 
significantly influenced by, the fear of losing the business. Since family business owners 
mostly invest their own wealth in the firm, they tend to be more risk averse than non-
family firms.  Their investment in family business can be driven by the motivation to pass 
the firm to the next generation. Managers, both founders and hired CEOs avoid any risk 
to their undiversified personal and family capital. The issue of lower diversification of 
human capital and reputation of family is a function of their investment for the long run. 
As a result, a founder-manager will prefer strategic decisions that ensure the survival of 
the business, rather than any other type of decision. The business protection motives 
makes control not the only motivation to reduce leverage, as maintaining the 
sustainability of family business over the long term also plays a role. Therefore, to some 
extent, I agree with the view that family firms do indeed understand the need to maintain 
control over the business, but it is also important that they may find it necessary to avoid 
excessive risk of one single asset, which is the firm, especially in particular institutional 
environments such as bank-based financial system or market-based system. In bank-
based systems such as Indonesia, Germany, Japan and several European countries, banks 
play a leading role in providing capital. By contrast, in market-based financial systems 
such as USA and UK, capital market is a centre stage of funding sources.  For example, 
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Schmid (2013) shows the evidence that those family firms in banking-based systems use 
less debt to optimise their control over the firm and therefore avoid liquidation of the 
firm. Since Indonesia has adopted a bank-based system, this evidence may support the 
similarity condition with other countries that adopt the same system, suggesting family 
firms have incentives to reduce risk at any level. 
  
Family control over strategic decisions can be exercised directly by members of the 
family running the firm or indirectly by appointing a top management team. Based on 
Dyer (1988), 80 percent of a family firm’s first generation had a paternalistic management 
culture and style. Two thirds of these firms adopted a professional style. A paternalistic 
style is characterised by a hierarchical relationship, top management control of power and 
authority, close supervision and a distrust of outsiders, meanwhile a professional 
management style involves the inclusion, the predominance of non-family managers in 
the firm (Sonfield and Lussier, 2008). However, professional management does not 
always occur when a non-family member is chosen to lead the firm. The founder-manager 
can be a professional manager, since they have capabilities and skills to manage the firm 
once it is established; alternatively non-family managers can follow a paternalistic style 
if they are in a stewardship role for a family firm. Thus, professionalism is about attitudes 
and behaviour to enhance the performance of a family firm. Founder-managers can be 
powerful in decision making because they have better access to strategic decisions and 
should be able to exercise their influence on the firm’s decisions more effectively than 
family firms with founder who does not act as manager. Founder-managers have a greater 
opportunity to pursue the family’s interests (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003) and may attempt 
to safeguard the family’s interests (Tam and Tan, 2007). Thus, it is common to see family 
owners involved in multiple roles in order to attempt to achieve the goal of preserving 
SEW. In this regards, family firms are more likely to perpetuate control, directly or 
indirectly, to influence the firm’s decision making. 
 
Excessive family involvement may lead to over-centralised decision-making and bring 
about a decline of the family business. Therefore, to reduce an over-emphasis on 
maintaining binding social ties within the firm, appointing non-family members for board 
positions is likely to have a positive effect on family firms’ performances. According to 
Berrone et al., 2012, kin ties among members of extended families are likely to threaten 
social bonds among family members, such as an unwillingness to consider non-family 
members for board positions or as professional managers. Emotional attachments and 
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affective kinship bonds are strongest during the founder’s stage of the firm’s life. On the 
family’s side, kinship bonds are beneficial, but this intensity can affect the SEW 
component of a firm’s performance. Thus, to reduce too much family involvement across 
the business at this stage, a founder’s lack of resources can be enhanced by board 
members who supply financial, technical or legal support and expertise. Some input could 
be from family members but some may come from outside through independent board 
members. Such non-family members can help a company to improve its relationships 
with organisations outside the family firms, such as suppliers and creditors (banks). In 
addition, those members may have experience in running business and have knowledge 
to help young firms (Wilson et al., 2013).      
 
Founders may desire a robust business to pass on to later generations, whereas later 
generations often wish to benefit from the wealth and status of their family firms 
(Lubatkin et al., 2005; Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2013). The firm’s survival is a 
motivation that means family members are willing to serve the family business, in which 
conflict rarely happens (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2013; Chua et al., 1999). Further, 
Schulze et al. (2003) and Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) argue that the SEW is strong when 
the first generation (founder) not only keeps the ownership but also decision management 
and/or decision control, As a result, with the objective of securing transgenerational 
control, descendants will be provided with jobs and involved in the family business as the 
CEO or the chair or both positions, as CEO and chair, for the present and the future. 
Preserving SEW may culminate during the first generation. As a consequence, founders 
who have experienced high sunk costs may choose the safe option in order to avoid 
excessive risks and look for increased involvement in decision making in order to 
preserve SEW.          
 
2.2.4.2. Founder Descendant Stages  
 
In the post-founder stage, the principal shareholders can be siblings or cousins. A sibling 
partnership typically has relatively equal proportions of ownership held by members of a 
single generation. Siblings tend to be more prudent when making investments, in order 
to preserve their wealth. Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) indicate that the post-founder 
phase tends to be more conservative when making investments due to that generation’s 
sense of entitlement. They practice loss aversion to avoid any events that can threaten the 
value of their wealth inheritance. The business has generally grown in size and advanced 
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over the years, as its resources such as reputation, expertise and capital have increased 
from the foundation stage. SEW considers that the emotional attachment remains high in 
this phase of sibling partnership.   
 
Typically in a sibling partnership each partner has equal power, and is therefore lacking 
authority and influence over their siblings. Moreover, levels of altruism among siblings 
reduce, as compared to when the parents were still involved in the company (Stark and 
Falk, 1998). The children become more concerned about their own wealth. Thus, when 
ownership is dispersed equally, the siblings will be reluctant to bear risk that might cause 
loss to their SEW. One implication of loss aversion is that individuals have a strong 
tendency to preserve the status quo because the disadvantage of taking on a new 
investment that will bear a risk looms larger than the advantage from that potential 
investment (Kahneman et al., 1991). A status quo and stagnation situation (Miller et al., 
2008) may occur because no one would like to take more risks due to the priority of 
maintaining the business. Family remains in control as managers and board members. 
McConaughy and Phillips (1999) argue that descendant-controlled firms are more 
professionally run than founder-controlled firms. The former class of company tends to 
use more professional forms of management but the conflict inside family firms is 
potentially greater since more branch family members involved in the business.  
 
However, ownership is further fractionalised as it is passed to the third and later 
generations (e.g., cousin consortium). Businesses at this stage are older, larger and more 
complex and the strengths of family social bonds, attachments to the business and 
identification with the business may begin to decline (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2013). 
The declining of attachment is because members from different branches of the family 
may not have a strong social bond with the family involved and could create a conflict 
(Schulze et. al., 2003). Some cousins involved as owners but not managers possibly 
reduce their attachment levels and treat the firms merely as a source of financial support 
(Miller et al., 2013).  The dispersion of ownership during post-founder stage creates two 
conditions: (1) most non-family shareholders continue to favour consumption through 
high dividend payments to protect themselves from family members’ inclination to 
expropriate wealth from family shareholders; (2) some of the family members will 
continue to increase their holding shares due to their concern about preserving benefits 
from their cash flows rights. Therefore, cousin consortiums’ CEOs are willing to pursue 
the SEW and anticipate the dispersion of ownership as they are more likely to bear the 
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risk of losing control, as they could enjoy the growth in earnings but not in valuation. 
Typically, a cousin consortium lacks influence because the members are from different 
branches of cousins. Coalition among family members by family presence as CEO and 
chair or the presence of family in a board position could decrease any family tensions and 
align the interests among family members (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2013). Healthy 
family board members will reduce the potential of conflict. A family board will favour 
growth, as they are more concerned with the future value of the assets rather than 
consuming them. However, in the absence of the ability to issue equity, they are more 
likely to use debt in the capital structure, unless at this stage they want to release their 
shareholding and change to a new business.  
 
Family social bonds and attachment to the business may decline in this stage. Many 
family members from different branches sometimes see the business mainly as a means 
of financial support (Miller et al., 2013) and this perception can increase conflict. When 
a company has a problem associated with succession or inefficiencies, buyouts of family 
firms become a reasonable option. Family firms constitute potential targets for incumbent 
managers interested in acquiring a controlling share of the company through a 
management buyout (Scholes et al., 2009). As the generations go by, the number of 
shareholders increases, and the ties to each other and the company could be loosened 
(Marchisio and Ravasi, 2000). For example ‘PT. HM Sampoerna Tbk Indonesia’ sold the 
company through a management buyout to ‘Phillip Morris International’ after the third 
generation. The reason for the sale was because the business (cigarettes) was no longer in 
line with the interests of the third generation (agriculture). Thus, the outcome from a 
management buyout could be used to fund a new investment or project that is more likely 
in the favoured by the founder’s successors.   
 
Given the potential for conflict, some qualified board members with strong records of 
business success and experience in serving on other boards might be recruited (Le Berton-
Miller and Miller, 2013). Maintaining binding ties within the firm by excluding non-
family members from key positions might have a negative effect on family performance.   
Thus, it is possible to include an independent board member from outside the family 
membership cohort. The independent board member may be able to help a family firm to 
enhance the sustainability of the company and resolve conflicts, since the potential for 
conflict in a cousin consortium may be very high.     
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Overall, the family firm’s stage is becoming important in transferring the business to the 
next generation. Family firms are concerned with transferring not only the physical assets 
but also the intangible assets of their firms. Risk reduction motivation may be more 
dominant in the foundation stage, whereas the descendant stages tend to be more driven 
by the control motivations to preserve SEW and the sustainability of the business. Family 
firms’ strategic decision choices are driven by family involvement, which is correlated 
with the family firm’s stage of business. However, at some point, family firms that 
typically are concentrated shareholders face a high risks exposure to single assets which 
is the business itself. As a consequence, family business governance and behaviour may 
vary across the generations. Examining the governance and behaviour changes relative to 
each other over time, there appears to be comprehensive theories to explain the firms’ 
decision making.    
 
 
2.3. Theory of the Family Firm 
 
2.3.1. Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory: A Static Perspective 
2.3.1.1. Agent Behaviour and Agency Governance   
 
Agency problems are not expected in family firms because of their unified ownership and 
management, resulting in the alignment of interests between owners and managers; a 
situation with little need of monitoring (Madison et al., 2015; Chrisman et al., 2004; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, in large organisations which are listed publicly 
and which have a dispersed shareholders, there is a separation between managers and 
owners. As such, owners must necessarily delegate some authority such as financing 
decision to ‘the agent’. In family firms, agency problems appear related to the conflict of 
having outside fund providers; in particular banks. Family shareholders are concerned 
about the loss of control associated with external financing (Schmid, 2013). Meanwhile, 
the decision regarding the firm’s mixture of outside debt and equity financing will be 
delegated to corporate managers.  Agency theory is a prominent perspective from which 
to examine issues related to interests, motivation and compliance that altogether direct 
the actual behaviour of agents and governs managers to make a decision (Donaldson, 
1990).  
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a. Opportunism in the Family Firms 
 
As originally observed by Harris and Raviv (1991), capital structure decisions can be 
driven by the desire to reduce conflicts of interest between principals and managers. 
Principals will enact a governance mechanism to monitor their managers’ behaviour. As 
a system of great complexity, written and unwritten contracts among individuals who are 
involved in a firm are needed (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The contract is a crucial concept 
in agency theory that specifies the nature of residual claims. Owners are concerned 
primarily about diversifying away from specific risks, while managers have their own 
interests. Owners invest their wealth in companies and design a system in ways that 
maximise their utility, while managers accept their responsibilities because they expect 
the possibility of gaining more utility through this opportunity. When the utility of self-
serving functions of agents and of principals align, agency problems are less likely; but 
if they do not, then conflicts will arise. There are two main conflict-related issues. 
 
Firstly, when family firms hire non-family managers, the agency costs occur when there 
is a difference between inflows of resources and promised payments to managers. 
Managers under the agency theory will choose opportunistic self-interested behaviour in 
decision making. As a result, managers may seek to consume excessive benefits at the 
shareholders’ expense, or they may make decisions that reduce their risk rather than 
aligning their conduct with family shareholders’ preferences.  
 
Secondly, if the return on investment funded by debt gives a high yield (the cost of debt 
is less than the yield), creditors will take the view that shareholders possibly have more 
gains than creditors. However, if the investment fails, the creditors suffer the losses since 
shareholders have limited liability for debts. In other words, shareholders are only 
responsible for a firm’s debts up to the value of their shares. The shareholders appear 
likely to gain from investments in risky projects, even if the value of the investment is 
decreasing. The loss of value of an investment can be compensated for through the gain 
from the cost of the debt. For example, taking on a riskier project could provide a greater 
benefit to shareholders, while taking on more risk means higher chances that the firm will 
be in default to its creditors. Meanwhile, creditors require some monitoring mechanism 
to protect their investments. This requirement may reduce the inefficiency of using debt. 
Monitoring cost will be reflected in the cost of debt, which could be a higher cost of debt 
or a lower cost of debt; the format will depend on the covenant and the risk that they 
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should cover. Therefore, agency costs of debt work as a disincentive to the issuance of 
debt as an instrument of monitoring managerial and opportunistic behaviour. Schmid 
(2013) finds that if the level of credit monitoring is high, family firms tend to have a low 
level of leverage. Creditors possibly exert the influence on the firm that they finance due 
to the discipline of the manager of the family firm and at the same time reduce the internal 
monitoring mechanism.   
 
Fundamentally, there is nothing inherently wrong with a family member becoming a 
manager. However, hiring family members as managers can create asymmetric altruism 
which is not reciprocal, exploitable, and can cause harm to family firms. This scenario 
can increase agency problems when family firms hire family members to be managers, 
instead of professional non-family managers, regardless of whether they are qualified or 
competent for the position to be filled. Schulze et al. (2001) and Schulze et al. (2003) 
show that there is a tendency toward altruism which can manifest itself as a problem of 
self-control, thereby creating agency costs due to free rider problems. Moreover, Chua et 
al. (2009) and Lubatkin et al. (2007) demonstrate that the agency costs of asymmetric 
altruism are related to the governance mechanism used for monitoring and assessing 
family managers’ behaviour. The costs result from negatively biased parental perceptions 
of a child’s performance, competency and capability.  
 
Family manager capabilities may be debatable when connected with an endowment effect 
as a consequence of their contributions, such as being a founder or owner of the firm. 
Founder-managers may thoroughly understand the business since they set it up in the first 
place. The longer the duration of the founder-manager’s involvement in the business, the 
more skilful they are in managing the business. However, descendant-managers may have 
limited knowledge about their family’s business. Hodgson (1993) states that the limited 
capability of the human mind to deal with all accessible information creates bounded 
rationality in managers, which in turn limits the capability of those managers. In making 
a decision, essentially the act is not about the quantity of information available, but the 
limited capability of the managers involved. In this situation, placement incompetent and 
unskilled managers could happen, which is a risk associated with hiring family members 
without capabilities (Lubatkin et al., 2005). However, family firm owners may have a 
tendency to refrain from monitoring family members, especially when involving the 
parent-child relationship. This situation can be a dilemma for parents in which their 
actions can give beneficiaries incentives to make decisions that may harm their own 
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welfare. Accordingly, hiring the most competent and skilled managers to run the business 
is an important act according to agency theory because asymmetric altruism can cause 
harm to family firms (Blumentritt et al., 2007).   
 
On the other hand, when family firms hire a professional non-family manager, the specific 
performance criteria may be set-up to ensure that agents will act on behalf of their 
principals’ interests. The agency relationship accommodates the situation under 
transactional conditions, when the owners can use their knowledge of, and the 
information about, the agents during the exchange to make sure that the agents will work 
on behalf of the owners’ best interests.  It is reasonable to conclude that family firms tend 
to be embedded in the family business and the family’s self-serving interests (Le Breton-
Miller, 2009). However, given the problem of asymmetrical information, it may be 
impossible for principals to specify performance criteria in advance of a manager’s 
appointment and to contract the managers to serve as optimally performing agents.  
 
 
b. Family Entrenchment 
 
Cleassens et al. (2000) find that in Indonesian listed companies 84 percent of their 
management personnel comes from the controlling families, which is high when 
compared to other Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan or Singapore. Listed 
family firms are characterised by a high degree of family ownership in general and are 
predominantly family controlled. These finding that owner-managers are predominant in 
Indonesian family firms; a model which is common in family-run publicly traded firms 
in most countries around the world. However, unlike countries with a high level of 
creditor monitoring, Indonesia is characterised by low legal enforcement (Aburacra et al., 
2017). Thus, the pressures from internal and external governance mechanisms are 
considerably lower than those exerted in other similar countries.   
 
Family shareholders may commit to preserving their wealth by selecting themselves for 
a position of management. Owner-managers may act for the controlling family, but not 
for shareholders in general. In this situation, owner-managers can be more entrenched 
and less subject to discipline. They have discretion over their firms’ capital structure 
choices. In such instances, owner-managers play an important role in reducing a firm’s 
risk to protect their under-diversified human capital (Fama, 1980). However, 
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entrenchment can create agency costs in family firms, stemming from both management 
entrenchment and ownership entrenchment.  
 
In the context of agency theory, entrenchment in family firms is a combination of founder 
as owner and founder as manager, since the owner-manager position is common in family 
firms. Morck et al. (1988) and Morck & Young (2003, 2004) show that family 
entrenchment decreases the firm’s value and can create disincentives for the family’s 
entrepreneurial spirit. They argue this because the entrepreneurial spirit and skill of the 
founder may not be inherited by the next generation of the founder’s descendants. Thus, 
entrenchment is a way for the owner-manager to maintain family control over the 
business. However, ownership entrenchment is likely to be positively influenced by a 
concentration of ownership. Ruan et al., (2011) found that entrenchment depends on the 
level of ownership. This can be a dynamic, non-linear relationship between the agency-
related benefits from the use of control mechanisms; those of debt and the concentration 
of family ownership.  
 
In the case of family management entrenchment, Tosi et al. (1997) argue that the act of 
monitoring is forced on family managers as a disciplining mechanism. In particular, 
agents may be of the view that the use of funds are under their domain of management 
decision-making. However, managers may fail to experience discipline from the full 
range of corporate governance and control mechanisms. Thus, a way of improving agents’ 
discipline is by asking creditors to provide loans to a family firm. As a consequence, 
creditors closely control the use of funds; a form of external monitoring. If a manager 
fails to perform according to the principal’s expectations, the non-family manager can 
and perhaps should be replaced, because if a family manager fails the family firm may 
lose its reputation.  
 
Overall, the focus on individual motivation would seem to indicate that agency theory 
prescribes a governance mechanism to curb opportunistic behaviour in decision making. 
Careful monitoring subsequently reduces agency conflict by alignment or by 
compensation (Donaldson, 1990). To the degree managers feel their future fortunes are 
bound to their corporate employers through an expectation of the future, they may 
perceive their interests to be aligned with the owners.  Agency theory, therefore, is critical 
of governance structures that lack such institutional features as the situation when two 
roles have the same incumbent; a situation that frequently appears in family firms. In a 
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family firm’s situation, the destructive agent behaviours of opportunism and asymmetric 
altruism are found with family managers (Madison, et al., 2016). Thus, the governance 
of family firms to curb detrimental agent behaviour may change, depending on the 
relationship between principals and managers informed by goal alignment. 
 
 
2.3.1.2. Steward Behaviour and Stewardship Governance 
 
Unlike agency theory, stewardship theory maintains that there is no inherent or general 
problem regarding a manager’s motivation (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). The synergy of 
managers and owners will enhance performance effectiveness and produce a superior 
return to shareholders, rather than create a separation between them. Accordingly, the 
motivation of the steward is other-serving, because the steward seeks to attain the 
objectives of the organisation: to protect and maximise shareholders’ wealth through the 
firm’s performance (Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007). Thus, it is generally assumed 
under this theory that managers: i) have a commitment (Davis et al., 2010); ii) are pro-
organisation (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009, 2011; Eddleston and Kellermans, 2007), 
iii) are reciprocal (Pearson and Marler, 2010; David et al., 1997; Donaldson and David, 
1991) and iv) have strategic flexibility (Zahra, 2008). It is also assumed that corporate 
governance will facilitate family firms’ goal and provide managers to authorise and 
empower their roles (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). In addition, the conflict of interest 
between agent and owners is potentially low. In other words, using debt as an external 
control mechanism to alleviate agency conflicts is not necessarily significant relative to 
firms with agency corporate governance. Family firms tend to have a longer-term 
commitment to their business, place greater value on non-economic goals (Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2007), and are more embedded in the business system (Le Bretton-Miller and 
Miller, 2009). It seems reasonable to suppose there is a continuous alignment between 
managers and principals based on these assumptions; opportunism and management 
entrenchment might be less prevalent in stewardship governance and steward-managers.   
 
Stewardship theory clearly postulates that managers do not always pursue their own 
benefits but rather act as stewards of the business, suggesting less self-opportunistic 
orientation. Previous studies considered that stewardship theory is applicable to analysing 
family businesses, due to a) its identification with the firm, b) its personal connection to 
the family members and c) facilitation of social satisfaction through involvement of 
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family members (Davis et al., 2010; Pearson and Marler, 2010; Corbetta and Salvato, 
2004). Intrinsic motivation and identification with the family business are thought to 
facilitate stewardship behaviour. Several previous studies support the idea that a 
manager’s identification with the family business is positively associated with 
profitability and business survival (Valejo, 2009). In family firms such a scenario 
contributes to a fostering of trust and commitment among managers (Davis et al., 2010). 
Both managers and owners may place the same weight on their own and other parties’ 
interests in their efforts to ensure the survivability of the family business.     
 
The survivability of the family business could be of key importance to transferring the 
practical knowledge of the founder to the next generation or organisation collectively. 
Thus, the leadership of the founder appears to have a significant role to play in 
stewardship behaviour. Pearson and Marler (2010) state that the leader can motivate and 
facilitate reciprocal stewardship behaviour from the employees. The motivation of 
parents to care for their children and encouragement to consider one another suggests 
altruistic tendencies can be viewed as other-serving and symmetrical. This can be 
reciprocal for both owner and manager; family and non-family manager.   
 
Family firms have competitive advantages for those business opportunities in the sense 
of minimal bureaucratic processes. Related to this advantage, altruism leads to family 
members sacrificing short term benefits for long term goals, in particular the family firm’s 
survival. Thus, in such a family firm decision making appears to be more flexible as 
compare to family firms with agency corporate governance (Carney, 2005; Zahra et al., 
2008) due to the preservation of socio-emotional wealth of family firms; as such there 
should be little need to monitor family managers’ performances. With this concept, 
steward behaviour is a reflection of organisational commitment which aligns with the 
business (Davis et al., 2010). Managers with a high level of commitment may view the 
organisation as an extension of themselves, which means they will manifest a less self-
opportunistic orientation.  
 
As mentioned previously, stewardship theory suggests that there are situational factors 
that adopt stewardship mechanisms, such as the presence of an involvement-oriented and 
collectivist work environment (Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007; Le Breton-Miller and 
Miller, 2009; Zahra et al., 2008). The involvement-oriented environment may foster the 
power and status of the family because it provides an opportunity for managers to 
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participate in decision making that in turn could strengthen their commitment to their 
employers (Dyer, 1988). Zahra et al., (2008); Madison et al. (2017) and Miller and Le 
Breton-Miller (2006) argue that family involvement has the potential to create a 
stewardship governance environment. In this environment information will be exchanged 
symmetrically and the interactions between owners and managers empower an effective 
stewardship behaviour. This situation can be a motivation for managers to perform well, 
since they view the firm’s board is there to support rather than monitor (Blumentritt et 
al., 2007).  However, a collectivist work environment can increase free-rider problems 
resulting from insufficient monitoring, when family members individually assume that 
individual contributions are less recognised than outcomes from working collectively. 
The presence of an involvement-oriented and collectivist environment may not eliminate 
the implementation of monitoring mechanisms because a collectivist structure can compel 
norms that mitigate any undesirable behaviour of managers. But this mechanism can also 
reduce entrenchment in family firms and foster trust and engagement between managers 
and owners. Family managers and non-family managers act voluntarily, based on an 
intrinsic desire to serve the firm and will therefore naturally align with the owner’s 
interests (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Zahra et al., 2008). Thus, governance mechanisms 
are in place to ensure the steward’s behaviour facilitates the continued alignment of 
interest between manager and owner.  
   
There are two situation in which managers may choose to protect their own self-interests. 
One is when the continuation of the organisation and employment of managers in the 
company is threatened by the possibility of a takeover (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). The 
other is when a family firm undergoes restructuring it moves into a new stage in the life 
cycle. In this situation, the governance mechanisms that empower an effective 
stewardship behaviour are prescribed to facilitate the continued alignment of interests, 
thereby resulting in pro-organisational behaviour, and would possibly change the 
strategic decisions of family firms.  
 
In elaborating those theories, I suggest that implication of stewardship theory is similar 
to agency theory; it is merely a rational behaviour of managers. It might be that strategic 
decision-making is a device to maximise organisational performance and shareholder 
returns as long as the fundamental coalition between managers and owners is intact. Thus, 
it seems reasonable to suppose that there is an alternative applicable approach, rather than 
adopting agency theory and stewardship theory in a static perspective for the long-term 
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relationship, especially in the application of both theories to family firms. This alternative 
is there not because the choice to be an agent or a steward is based on rational knowledge, 
but it is about the best attitude for making strategic decisions.  
 
Both agency and stewardship theories suggest that goal alignment is a strategy to reduce 
conflict by control mechanisms and the involvement of agents in family firms. If goal 
alignment is high between owner and manager, a stewardship environment will prevail 
and monitoring is less important. But, when the goals diverge, the role of the board of 
directors and independent board directors become most important to reduce agency 
conflicts (Pieper et al., 2008).  
 
Thus, in my opinion resulting outcomes may be considered to address the rationale for 
applying agency and stewardship theories in a way not originally theorised but 
considering the reality that both types of governance: agency and stewardship corporate 
governance may coexist. The desire to preserve these goals is a key feature of family 
firms (Berrone et al., 2012; Chrisman and Kellermanns, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). 
Family-centred noneconomic goals suggest that non-financial reference points are used 
in decision making. For example, the utility of individual preference points that are 
derived from the endowment effect may differ between individual family members, such 
as the founder and descendants. Thus, the pursuit of non-economic goals can generate 
agency conflicts among family members because of misaligned interests between them. 
On the other hand, family involvement in running the business is to act in accordance 
with stewardship assumptions; individual level preferences might be different with firm-
level preferences and behaviour.   
 
Rational behaviour is people trying to do what they perceive as best for them (Hey, 1993). 
The complete list of possible outcomes that might be experienced as a result of decision 
making can be drawn up by the individual. The individual can rank the outcomes in order 
of desirability, or a less demanding option is that the individual can identify the best and 
the worst outcomes. Managers may not be able to gather and process all the information 
for reaching global maximisation decisions, but they can make a ‘rational’ decision within 
a small set of possibilities. Consequently, it is suggested by Simon (1972) that the value 
of the firm is not based on maximising but ‘satisficing’. The term ‘satisficing’ means that 
the preferences and trust conform in a relationship between owner and managers. Thus, 
the implication for family firms’ strategic decision making is not about pursuing 
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maximisation of shareholder’s wealth financially; the most important consideration is the 
sustainability of the firm in the long-term: a non-economic goals. Non-economic goals 
are the key to explaining how behaviourally manager make strategic decisions in family 
firms. Table 2.1 summarises these basic tenets of agency and stewardship theories as 
applied in family firms.             
 
Table 2.1. Summary of Agency and Stewardship Theories  
 
 
 
Agency Theory Stewardship Theory 
Foundational study Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) 
Davis et al. (1997) 
   
Assumption Economic model of man Humanistic model of man 
   
Governance Based on the principal-
agent relationship. The 
agency governance 
mechanisms are there to 
reduce control and 
monitoring.   
Based on the principal-
steward relationship. The 
governance mechanism is 
by participation and 
involvement.   
   
Behaviour Opportunistic:  
Individual 
Pro-organization: 
Collective 
   
Firm-level outcomes Minimising agency costs Minimising self-
opportunistic behaviour 
   
Strategic decision making Entrenched family 
ownership  
Involvement-oriented, 
Strategic flexibility 
 
2.3.2. Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory: an Actual Approach 
 
Agency theory and stewardship theory have been used to describe the manager’s actual 
behaviour as a result of the governance structure of the firm in which they are working. 
Both theories may provide insights into the decision process. However, the literature fails 
to address the decision-making process (Madison et al., 2016; Michiels and Molly, 2017; 
Motylska-Kuzma, 2017), especially as related to non-financial reference points that are 
used in family firms’ decision-making processes (Schulze et al., 2015). In addition, the 
literature’s focus fails to move beyond the dichotomous treatment of agency and 
stewardship theories; for example, the differences between individual reference points 
that can potentially generate agency conflicts among family members or the individuals’ 
preference levels that might be different from firm-level preferences. Thus, governance 
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mechanisms may be implemented based on the actual behaviour of manager rather than 
based only on the behavioural assumptions the principal has of the manager.  
 
In reality managers’ behaviour will be based on protecting the family interests, actions 
which are not always economic; also it is necessary to note that managers’ behaviour can 
change over time. Moreover, unlike stewardship theory that follows the naive assumption 
that managers or principals do not pursue selfish objectives. In the case of family firms 
their family members would seem to indicate that they are not self-sacrificial, nor do they 
ignore financial issues (Berrone et al., 2010). To some extent this view supports the claim 
made implicitly by Miller and Le Breton Miller (2014) and Schulze and Kellermanns 
(2015) that ‘the pursuit of non-economic goals translates into suboptimal economic 
achievement’. Economic and non-economic goals do not negate each other, but rather 
than inversely related. For example the access to capital provided by family reputation 
(Beatty and Ritter, 1986), but when access to capital is more of a problem (e.g. increasing 
volatility of earnings), capital may become an issue for family firms. Thus, financial goals 
are not a trade-off but a priority when they are consistent with the enhancement of non-
economic goals.  
 
In addition, it can be possible that the degree to which managers are tied to either the 
family or the business will shape their priorities in decision making (Le Breton-Miller 
and Miller, 2009). For example, if managers are more embedded in the family system, an 
agency environment is more likely to exist because of the hierarchical nature of the family 
and the family’s self-serving interests. It is reasonable to suggest that those managers tend 
to prefer a control mechanism as a monitoring device. But, if the managers are more 
embedded in a business system, a stewardship environment is more likely because the 
family is willing to put the interest of the business first; involvement and avoiding 
excessive business risks become priorities. In other words the dynamic of when and why 
governance and behaviours change, relative to each other over time, is a matter of the 
examination of times within family firms that only become visible over generations.  
 
In some cases, the next generation of family firms may interpret SEW differently. In the 
case of Indonesia family firms such as PT. HM Sampoerna Tbk, established in 1913, in 
March 2005, 40 percent of the family ownership was sold to Phillip Morris International 
after its third generation managed this company. The selling price was the highest price 
in the history of the Indonesia Stock Exchange, which is IDR 10,600 a share, realising as 
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much as IDR 18.6 trillion or equivalent to US$ 2 billion at that time. This example 
demonstrates that family intentions for transgenerational control increase; as a result 
family owners will demand a higher price for the firm to non-family investors. It seems 
the owners had already calculated the future benefits of control of only a part of their 
socio-emotional endowment. Therefore, capital structure decisions with increasing equity 
for non-family shareholders can form one option, but only if family owners are 
compensated for the loss of SEW, so enabling them to invest in another business based 
on the preferences of the successors. To this extent, in my opinion, it appears likely that 
SEW is the goal for family firms, as the origin of the SEW approach is preserving and 
maintaining sustainability of both the business and the family.     
 
Beyond explicit strategic goals in terms of family control and SEW preservation, how 
individual-level preference is consistent with firm-level preference depends on: a) the 
utility derived from an SEW endowment or b) the family which is embedded between the 
family system and the business system (Goel et al., 2012). Leadership embeddedness is 
examined from both agency and stewardship perspectives. Le Berton-Miller and Miller 
(2009) define embeddedness as the relationship between the actor’s economic behaviour 
and the social context in which that behaviour occurs. If the family is more embedded in 
a family system, the agency environment exists to a greater degree in that family firm. 
However, if the family is more embedded in the business system as stewardship theory 
believes (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009), the family will put the interests of 
preserving SEW as ‘the first orders of business. Thus, behaviour can be shaped by how 
the firm is be governed by family firms.  
 
In summary, I propose that capital structure decisions could be a mechanism for family 
firms to achieve the following strategic family objectives such as preserving SEW and 
related strategic behaviour of capital structure, thus preserving SEW (Berrone et al., 2010; 
Berrone et al., 2012; Naldi et al., 2016). From this point of view, I will break down these 
dimensions into more operational measurements to provide what Miller and Le-Berton 
Miller (2014) and Chua et al., (2015) recommend; SEW needs to be sharper in its 
characterisations, especially in the context of capital structure decisions. In different 
stages of the family business, behaviour may change regarding the various reference 
points. For example, if individual reference points that are derived from endowment 
effects (ownership) differ between individual family members (e.g. founder and 
descendants), the pursuit of non-economic goals can generate agency conflicts among 
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owners, family and non-family managers. This dissonance can result in a misalignment 
of interests among those involved in the firm. On the other hand, if all family members 
are involved in the business and act in accordance with stewardship assumptions, the 
individual-level preferences of the manager might be different from the firm-level 
business preferences. Figure 2.1 presents the framework illustrating the core constructs 
and relationships offered by the agency and stewardship theories when applied within 
family firm.          
 
Figure 2.1.  
Framework of a Dynamic Perspective of Agency and Stewardship Theories within 
Family Firms 
 
 
 
 Agency Theory Stewardship Theory 
Governance Monitoring and control Involvement 
Behaviour Opportunistic: individual Pro-organization: collective  
Embeddedness Family system Business system 
Firm-level outcome 
- Economic goals 
  (static way)  
 
Minimizing agency costs 
 
Minimizing self-opportunistic 
behaviour 
- Non-economic goals 
(dynamic way) 
Socio-emotional Wealth (SEW) 
 
Tendencies of agent behaviour 
and agency governance 
Tendencies of steward behaviour 
and stewardship governance 
1. Family firms tend to monitor and 
control managers. Success stems 
from hiring the most competent 
and skilful managers (Blumentritt 
et al., 2007).  
1. Family firms tend to motivate and 
facilitate reciprocity to managers 
(Pearson and Marler, 2010); 
managers have power in influencing 
the objectives of family firms. Thus, 
interpersonal relationships are 
associated with stewardship, 
including stability, interaction and 
shared social networks (Le Breton-
Miller et al., 2011) 
2. Family firms tend to focus on 
financial objectives (Westhead 
and Howorth, 2006), thus control 
is implemented.   
2. Family firms tend to place greater 
value on noneconomic goals (socio-
emotional wealth) due to 
sustainability (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007; Le Breton-Miller, 2009). 
3. Family firms tend to be embedded 
in the family system in order to 
reduce family conflicts (Le 
Breton-Miller, 2009).   
3. Family firms tend to have a long-
term commitment to their firms and 
are embedded in the business system 
(Le Breton-Miller, 2009) 
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2.4. The Indonesian Context 
 
2.4.1. Background Facts 
 
Indonesia’s economy is one of the world’s fastest growing 2017, it grew by 5.2 percent. 
By comparison, the economic growth of South Korea was about 3.3 percent and Brazil 
about 2.2 percent. However, this growth is less than China at 9 percent and India with a 
rate of 7.4 percent. Indonesia’s GDP in 2017 was $1.016 trillion, for a population of 262 
million. In the ASEAN group, Indonesia is the largest economy by far. It is also one of 
the most rapidly growing ASEAN countries (World Bank, 2017). The manufacture of 
food and beverages, business services and infrastructure and the communication sectors 
play a key role in strengthening Indonesia’s economic position (Bank of Indonesia, 2017). 
Table 2.2 provides a summary of the report of Indonesia’s economy sourced from the 
Indonesian Central Bank (Bank of Indonesia) in 2017.   
 
Table 2.2.  Overview of Indonesia 
 
Population (million)  262 
Nominal GDP (trillion USD) 1.016 
GDP/capita (USD) 3,876 
Economic growth (%) 5.07 
Investment growth (%) 6.2 
Consumption growth (%) 4.9 
Manufacturing growth (%) 4.27 
Financial Market  
     Jakarta Composite Index (IHSG) 6,356 
     Market capitalization (trillion IDR)  5.808,51 
Banking  
      Total credit growth  (%/year) 8.2 
      Lending rate (%, average/year) 6.5 
Private external debt growth (%)   6.1 
      Long-term debt (% of total loan) 72.9 
      Short-term debt (% of total loan) 27.1 
Credit growth  
      Working capital (%) 10.7 
      Investment (%)  10.5 
Credit interest rate  
      Working capital (%) 7 
      Investment (%)  6.9 
 Source: Bank Indonesia, Annual Economic Report on Indonesia, 2017 
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As can be seen from Table 2.2, private external debt grew 6.1 percent in 2017 and was 
dominated by long-term debt, suggesting increasing investment growth and open jobs for 
of new employees. More than 95 percent of corporations in the private sector are owned 
by families, highlighting that corporations are a motor of the economy and therefore they 
need to strengthen their confidence and ability in finding financial sources to support their 
endeavours.  
 
According to the Central Bank of Indonesia’s 2017 annual report, the sources of funding 
of Indonesia companies were as follows: i) 46 percent were domestic loans, ii) 21 percent 
were foreign loans, iii) 19 percent were securities issues and iv) 14 percent from capital 
and subsidiaries. These data demonstrate that companies in Indonesia mostly rely on 
banking as a source of funding, although the role of the banking industry in meeting the 
long-term funds is limited because most of the funds provided by banks are short-term. 
They still fail to meet the demand for long-term debt. In Indonesia, the volume of bond 
trading remains low compared with other countries in Asia, such as Malaysia, Thailand, 
South Korea and China (ADB Quarterly III Report, 2017). Efforts are being made by the 
Financial Service Authority (OJK) to identify additional sustainable sources of financing 
by searching for new sources of financing and improving the stimuli that can support 
firms in Indonesia through capital markets.  
 
Family businesses in Indonesia grew 83 percent, against 65 percent globally, in 2014. In 
2015, this increased to 96 percent against 85 percent globally (Price Water Cooper, 2015). 
The key challenge to growth remains access to and the availability of funding sources.   
Currently 67 percent of family businesses in Indonesia are in the descendant stages, but 
such enterprises are still less than 50 years old. The overview of family businesses in 
Indonesia may be found in Table 2. 3.  
 
Table 2.3. The Profile of Family Business in Indonesia 
 
Company aged between 20 and 50 years - 53 % 
Specialised in manufacturing - 50% 
Dominated by descendant generations - 68% 
Family members as a CEO -  47%       
Family members involved in a business (through management and governance) - 52% 
Managed by owner-CEO - 87% 
Non-family members on the board - 80% 
Source: Price Water Cooper Survey, 2014 
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2.4.2. Family Firms and the Indonesian Stock Exchange 
 
The capital market plays a significant role in Indonesia, it is an important provider of 
capital resources for family firm. Family firms in Indonesia represent 60 percent of all 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The IDX was established in 
December 1912 under the name of the Batavia Stock Exchange (Batavia now being 
known as Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia). After the Batavia Stock Exchange merged 
with the Surabaya Stock Exchange in 2007, it became the Indonesian Stock Exchange 
(IDX) located in Jakarta.  
 
The IDX has 11 constituent stock price indices and 9 sectors. This study will exclude one 
of 9 sectors, the banking industry, since this industry is highly regulated and has different 
characteristics from the other sectors. The 11 indices are: i) Jakarta Composite Index 
(IHSG), ii) Sectoral Index, iii) Liquid 45 (LQ45), iv) Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), v) 
Kompas100 Index, vi) Bisnis-27 Index, vii) Pefindo25 Index, viii) Sri-Kehati Index, ix) 
Main Board Index (MBX), x) Development Board Index (DBX), and xi) Individual 
Index. The eight sectors are agriculture (sector 1), mining (sector 2), basic and chemical 
(sector 3), miscellaneous (sector 4), consumer goods (sector 5), property and real estate 
(sector 6), infrastructure, utilities and transportation (sector 7), banking (sector 8) and 
trade and services (sector 9).  
 
In 2015, there were 520 companies listed in the IDX and all of them are included in the 
Jakarta Composite Index (IHSG); 322 of them are family firms and 198 are non-family 
firms. Not all listed firms are included in the LQ45 Index. This index was created to 
provide the market with an index of 45 most liquid stocks. In addition, this index covers 
at least 70 percent of the market capitalisation and transactions in the regular market. 
Interestingly, family firms make up to – 60 percent of most liquid stocks the LQ45 Index 
(Table 2.4).  
 
Table 2.4. 45 Securities that are listed in LQ45 Index in 2015 
 
No. Firm 
Ticker 
Name of Firm 
 
Owner 
1. AALI PT Astra Agro Lestari Tbk The Astra Group 
2. ASII PT Astra International Tbk. The Astra Group 
3. UNTR PT United Tractors Tbk. The Astra Group 
4. ICBP PT Indofood CBP Sukses Makmur Tbk. The Salim Group 
5. INDF PT Indofood Sukses Makmur Tbk. The Salim Group 
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6. INTP PT Indocement Tunggal Prakasa Tbk. The Salim Group 
7. LSIP PT London Sumatra Indonesia Tbk. The Salim Group 
8. LPKR PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk. The Lippo Group 
9. LPPF PT Matahari Departement Store Tbk. The Lippo Group 
10. MPPA PT Matahari Putra Prima Tbk. The Lippo Group 
11. SILO PT Siloam International Hospital Tbk. The Lippo Group 
12. BMTR PT Global Mediacom Tbk. The MNC Group 
13. MNCN PT Media Nusantara Citra Tbk. The MNC Group 
14. SCMA PT Surya Citra Media Tbk. The Saratoga Group 
15. TBIG PT Tower Bersama Infrastructure Tbk. The Saratoga Group 
16. ADRO PT Adaro Energy Tbk. The Triputra Group 
17. AKRA PT AKR Corporindo Tbk. Adikoesomo Family 
18. ASRI PT Alam Sutera Realty Tbk The Agro Manunggal 
Group 
19. BBCA PT Bank Central Asia Tbk. The Djarum Group 
20. BSDE PT Bumi Serpong Damai Tbk. The Sinar Mas Group 
21. CTRA PT Ciputra Development Tbk. The Ciputra Group 
22. GGRM PT Gudang Garam Tbk. The Gudang Garam 
Group 
23. KLBF PT Kalbe Farma Tbk. Boenjamin Setiawan 
Family 
24. PWON PT Pakuwon Jati Tbk. The Pakuwon Group 
25. SMRA PT Summarecon Agung Tbk. The Sumarecon Group 
26. SSMS PT Sawit Sumbermas Sarana Tbk. The Citra Borneo Indah 
(CBI) Group 
27. ADHI PT Adhi Karya (Persero) Tbk. State Owned 
28. ANTM PT Aneka Tambang (Persero) Tbk. State Owned 
29. BBNI PT Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. State Owned 
30. BBRI PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. State Owned 
31. BBTN PT Bank Tabungan Negara (Persero) Tbk. State Owned 
32. BMRI PT Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk. State Owned 
33. JSMR PT Jasa Marga (Persero) Tbk. State Owned 
34. PGAS PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) Tbk. State Owned 
35. PTBA PT Bukit Asam (Persero) Tbk. State Owned 
35. PTPP PT PP (Persero) Tbk. State Owned 
36. SMGR PT Semen Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. State Owned 
37. TLKM PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia (Persero) 
Tbk. 
State Owned 
38. WIKA PT Wijaya Karya (Persero) Tbk. State Owned 
40. WSKT PT Waskita Karya (Persero) Tbk. State Owned 
41. CPIN PT Charoen Pokphand Indonesia Tbk. Foreign Investment 
42. INCO PT Vale Indonesia Tbk. Foreign Investment 
43. UNVR PT Unilever Indonesia Tbk. Foreign Investment 
44. EXCL PT XL Axiata Tbk. Non-Family Firm 
45. ITMG PT Indo Tambangraya Megah Tbk. Non-Family Firm 
    
 Source: Indonesia Stock Exchange, 2015  
 
There are several prominent families who own firms presented in IDX, such as the Sinar 
Mas Group (6 listed firms), the Salim Group, the Lippo Group and the Gadjah Tunggal 
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Group (three groups with 5 listed firms) and the Bakrie Group (4 listed firms). These data 
show that the concentration of a firm’s control is in the hands of a few families may create 
powerful incentives and abilities to influence the governance policies regarding access to 
financing. Claessens et al. (2000) found that Indonesia stands out as the country with the 
largest number of firms controlled by a single family more than four on average. This 
number may have increased in the almost two decades since their study was published; 
in 2018 new listed firms in Indonesia reached 50, the highest annual number so far 
recorded (IDX, 2018).  
 
Through the Indonesia Service Authority (OJK) the Indonesian government has stipulated 
a regulation concerning maximum legal lending limits for commercial banks, which are 
as follows:  
 
Table 2.5. Stipulation Concerning Maximum Legal Lending Limits in Indonesia   
 
Criterion  Maximum Legal 
Lending Limits 
(% of bank capital) 
For parties that are related to the bank. 
All fund provision portfolios to related parties of the bank 
10 
For parties that are not related to the bank. 
All fund provision to one borrower that is not a related party.  
20 
For parties that are not related to the bank. 
All fund provision to one group of borrowers that is not a 
related party. 
25 
Source: The Indonesia Financial Service Authority, 2017 
 
The capital provided by banks can account for a maximum loan of as much as 10 percent 
for firms that have a relationship with the bank, or a maximum loan of as much as 20 
percent if firms do not have a relationship with the bank. In fact in Indonesia almost 70 
percent of banks are owned by family firms (Hadad, 2011). As can be seen from Table 
2.6, 20 of the 47 banks registered on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, are owned by several 
groups of family firms via a holding company. The regulations implemented by the 
Indonesia government may have a significant effect on capital structure of firms. Thus, 
funds provided by banks are not heavily allocated to one group family firms.  
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Table 2.6. List of 20 Listed Banks that Owned by Families  
 
No. Firm 
Ticker 
Name of Bank Family/Group of 
Business 
1. BAEK PT. Bank Ekonomi, Tbk Tanojo Susanto Family 
2. BBCA PT. Bank Central Asia, Tbk The Djarum Group 
3. BBHI PT. Bank Harda Internasional, Tbk Rachmad Hakim Family 
4. BBMD PT. Bank Mestika, Tbk Halim Family 
5. BCIC PT. Bank JTrust Indonesia, Tbk Tantular Family 
6. BDMN PT. Bank Danamon, Tbk Usman Asmadjaja Family 
7. BEKS PT. Bank Eksekutif Internasional, Tbk Widjaja Family 
8. BINA PT. Bank Ina Perdana, Tbk Surya Family 
9. BMAS PT. Bank Maspion, Tbk The Maspion Group 
10. BNBA PT. Bank Bumi Artha, Tbk Surya Husada Family 
11. BNII PT. Bank Maybank Indonesia, Tbk The Sinar Mas Group 
12. BNLI PT. Bank Permata, Tbk Djaja Ramli Family 
13. BSIM PT. Bank Sinarmas, Tbk The Sinar Mas Group 
14. BVIC PT. Bank Victoria International, Tbk Susana Tanojo Family 
15. DNAR PT. Bank Dinar Indonesia, Tbk Limar Family 
16. MAYA PT. Bank Mayapada Internasional, Tbk The Mayapada Group 
17. MEGA PT. Bank Mega, Tbk The CT Group 
18. NAGA PT. Bank Mitraniaga, Tbk  Yeo Willy Family 
19. NOBU PT. Nobu National Bank, Tbk The Lippo Group 
20. SDRA PT. Bank Woori Saudara Indonesia 1906, Tbk The Medco Group 
 Source: Indonesia Stock Exchange, 2015  
   
2.5. Summary of this Chapter  
A family business has a unique character resulting from the interactions between the 
family as a unit, the family as a business entity and the involvement of family members 
in the business. The extent of family involvement in, and influence on, the business is the 
distinctive feature of the family business, where the members are connected as a family 
business system. In the family system, the interest to control the family business and 
business activities directly is central to sustain and involve future generations of the 
family. As a system, enterprising family firms are a synergy of all components sustained 
across generations to pursue socio-emotional wealth for trans-generational benefit. 
Family owned firms generally go through three broad phases of dispersion: i) the 
controlling owner stage, ii) the sibling partnership and iii) the cousin consortium. This 
thesis suggest a dynamic perspective to advance the agency and stewardship theories 
regarding strategic decisions such as capital structure can be used to pursue family firm’s 
sustainability. Rather than separate and opposing lenses in a static way for viewing family 
firms, the behaviour of family firms in strategic decision-making might apply in the full 
spectrum of those theories in a dynamic. The rationale for the dynamic perspective is the 
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notion that firms make a choice depending on the reference point of the firm’s dominant 
principals; managers will make decisions in order to preserve the accumulated 
endowment in the firm. In the context of family firms in Indonesia, the emphasis of non-
economic goals becomes important, since family firms make significant contributions to 
Indonesia’s economic growth. As family firms in Indonesia grow in the next few years, 
the key challenge to growth will be the ease of access and availability of funding sources.  
 
The next chapter (Chapter 3) will explain the capital structure decision-making in family 
firms and how SEW dimensions can generate the determinants of capital structure. An 
overview will be presented of how non-economic goals and nonfinancial preference 
points could impact capital structure decisions in family firms. Two primary determinants 
of corporate policies will be considered in some detail: a) the influence of SEW 
dimensions and b) a firm’s characteristics, as an interconnection of family firms and 
capital structure decision-making.     
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CHAPTER 3 
DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN FAMILY 
FIRMS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPHOTHESES BUILDING 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
With the aim of establishing the theoretical basis of this thesis, this chapter synthesises 
the literature on family firms grounded in agency and stewardship theories. The dynamic 
perspectives of both theories that are informed by family-centred noneconomic goals, as 
a basis for decision-making in family firms, are presented. Since the founder established 
the family business, he or she would value the business more prior to his/her ownership. 
However, the situation can be very different once the business passes to the next 
generation. In the corridor to preserve SEW, capital structure-related decision can be a 
channel through which control-motivated family firms can defend their businesses via 
control and involvement. In this chapter, the approaches of determinants of capital 
structure generally, as well as the role of capital structure in family firms and their 
consequences, are emphasised. My focus then narrows to the more specific determinants 
of capital structure in family firms. In doing so, this study establishes a theoretical 
framework for testing the influence of SEW dimensions on capital structure and  
controlled by firm characteristics variables in order to yield interconnection between  
family firms and capital structure decisions. 
 
 
3.2. The Theory of Capital Structure   
 
3.2.1. Determinants of Capital Structure  
 
Capital structure decisions in the context of family firms will be informed by the two 
grounded theories of family firms: agency and stewardship. Those two theories offer a 
prominent perspective to examine issues related to agency problems. The theories 
highlight the issues of interest, motivation and compliance (Donaldson, 1990) that 
50 
 
together direct the actual behaviour of agents, as well as governing managers to take 
decisions. Thus, I will start with the forces that determine capital structure: agency, 
control and asymmetrical information. In a family firm the decisions regarding debt level 
may a function of those forces to drive such as the need for control, risk preference, and 
family’s goals. The integration of primary determinants of corporate policies: behavioural 
preferences of managers and a firm’s characteristics may yield interconnections for 
understanding the determinants of family firms’ capital structures.       
 
Haris and Raviv (1991) have identified four categories of determinants of capital structure 
that are based on the forces that determine capital structure. From the four categories I 
will prioritise three aspects that are relevant to explaining the capital structure decisions 
in family firms: i) the agency approach, ii) the control approach and iii) the asymmetric 
information approach. These three factors have identified the potential determinants of 
capital structure. Following these forces, I will start with the general idea of determinants 
of capital structure, and will then develop a model whose main focus is on family 
business.  
 
3.2.1.1. The Agency Approach   
 
This approach focuses on the conflict of interests among various parties with claims to 
the firm’s resources. Agency cost models predict that a firm’s equity ownership structure 
affects the manager-principal agency conflict. This conflict is because the manager may 
own less than 100 percent of the firm’s shares or managers may make decisions that 
conflict with the best interests of the shareholders (Harris and Raviv, 1988; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). However, the classic agency researchers have only concentrated on the 
agent side in this agency problem. It should be noted that the problem may also happen 
from the side of principal who can exploit the agents (Perrow, 1986). From the 
perspective of a principal, reducing the inefficiency of managers can be done by 
increasing the fraction of managerial ownership or increasing the fraction of the firm’s 
finance by debt. Since debt commits the firm to pay out cash, it can be supposed that debt 
will reduce the amount of free cash available to managers to engage in their personal 
pursuits by honouring interest payment obligation (Jensen, 1986). However, Moh’d et al. 
(1998) found that the dominant principal is associated with lower debt ratios, suggesting 
that the presence of a dominant principal might substitute for the disciplinary role of debt 
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in capital structure. Such principals are supposed to monitor managers intensively without 
enhancing mechanism to reduce agency problems.    
 
Under the agency approach, managers are assumed to always want to invest all available 
funds, even if paying out cash is better for investors. This investment related issue can be 
the source of conflict when principals and creditors do not have information regarding 
the investment; whether it is a good opportunity or a poor option. Stulz (1991) and Jensen 
(1986) posit that the abundance of good investment opportunities will create an over-
investment problem between managers and principals. Hence, managers may substitute 
higher quality projects with lower quality project to get favourable terms from creditors. 
Thus, after loan funding, managers can use the proceeds from risky projects, then passing 
the unforeseen risk to creditors. In other words, managers make risky decisions to 
maximise shareholders’ value at the expense creditors’ interests. This problem highlights 
the conflict between shareholders and creditors because creditors have a claim on a firm’s 
assets in the situation of bankruptcy. On the other hand, shareholders have control over a 
manager’s decisions affecting a firm’s riskiness. Therefore, debt can mitigate the problem 
by giving creditors the option to force liquidation if cash flows are poor, meanwhile at 
the same time use debt as a mechanism of shareholders to monitor manager’s risky 
behaviour. Firms with higher liquidation values, such those with high tangibility assets 
and a non-debt tax shield, will have more debt and will be more likely to default but will 
have higher market value than firms with lower liquidation values (Harris and Raviv, 
1990). Thus, a higher leverage can be expected to be associated with a large firm size, a 
large debt level relative to expected firm income, and a lower probability of restructuring 
following default.  
 
However, from the side of managers, the agents as a main component of principal-agents 
relationship, their performances mostly depend on their abilities, motives and 
opportunities. Several researchers suggest that classic agency theory only emphasises 
agency costs and alignment issues as a prescription to minimise agency problems without 
concern for managers’ risk preferences, time dimension and their motives (Wiseman and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Sanders and Carpenter, 2003; Pepper and Gore, 2012). The ways 
that managers may work for the best interests of firms, and may act as a steward for the 
firms, is not included in the factors that can shape the principal-managers relationship. 
Managers may view that debt is a stable monitoring mechanism by the same shareholders 
since using debt is preferred by incumbent shareholders. Thus, managers may think that 
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they have to maintain the continuous alignment with incumbent shareholders and act in 
the shareholders’ best interests.     
 
Combining these results, agency models propose that an optimal capital structure can be 
obtained by trading off the agency cost of debt, such as asset substitution, bankruptcy cost 
and underinvestment, against the benefits of debt, such as increased managerial 
ownership and reduced free cash flows. In particular these models predict that leverage 
is positively associated with a default probability (Harris and Raviv, 1990), liquidation 
value (Williamson, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1990), free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). 
Leverage also relates to the extent to which the firm is seen as a takeover target by 
creditors and its managerial reputation (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1989). However, leverage 
is expected to be negatively associated with growth opportunities (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Stulz, 1990), interest coverage and the probability of restructuring following 
default (Harris and Raviv, 1990). Since default is a threat to the firm’s sustainability, 
managers may limit the benefit from using more debt, with risk avoidance becoming a 
dominant drive to reduce debt levels.  
 
Admittedly agency model has offered a prediction about the determinants of capital 
structure, but in my account this approach has limitations due to the time dimension. This 
issue relates to the limited or unlimited alignment between principal-manager where the 
future is uncertain. The role of principal is only limited to monitoring managers; 
meanwhile managers are not always opportunistic and incompetent, and therefore 
needing to be controlled. Managers may consider risk preferences and an organisation’s 
goal or goals when making capital structure decisions. Therefore, my reason for 
employing agency model in family firms covers two things. First, although there is a 
separation between ownership and management in family firms, such firms are assumed 
to be better at monitoring managers than other types of large shareholders, suggesting that 
lack of alignment between managers and principals might be less prevalent in family 
firms. However, this conclusion depends on the relationship between managers-principal, 
manager’s behaviour and corporate governance in family firms. Second, the assumption 
of conflict being mitigated between principals and managers lead family firms to act 
towards capital structure decision due to the risk of bankruptcy and financial distress as a 
result of having under-diversified investment and may face a high exposure of a single 
asset, which is the family firm itself. However, this approach alone does not cover how 
the contestability and distribution of power among the several shareholders of a firm are 
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relevant to this analysis. Hence, the next section will discuss the control approach and its 
significance to this study. The control approach will connect to the issue of risk reduction 
motivation that will explain, in the next section, the role of capital structure in family 
firms.      
 
3.2.1.2. The Control Approach 
 
This approach focuses on the corporate contestability and the distribution of power among 
the several shareholders of a firm. The control approach links corporate control and 
capital structure, reflecting the fact that common equity carries voting rights, while debt 
does not. Bolton and von Thadden (1998) state that from a large shareholder’s point of 
view, new equity financing is not an optimal way to trade-off because their level of 
control may be diluted. This statement in the context of firms with owner-managers 
suggests that debt is an instrument to protect a founder-manager’s control as long as the 
firm faces no financial distress and is performing adequately. However, in a case when 
there are dispersed shareholders, with separation between shareholders and managers, 
capital structure is relevant to the distribution of voting rights. Thus, control approach 
will interconnect capital structure and ownership concentration.   
 
From the perspective of corporate governance D’Mello and Miranda (2010) argue that 
ownership structure and leverage can be seen as the internal control mechanisms to 
alleviate agency conflicts that exist between different types of stakeholders inside firms. 
Debt can serve as a disciplining mechanism between managers and dispersed 
shareholders by imposing fixed obligations on a firm’s cash flow by the obligation to 
meet interest payments. This view supports the claim made by Friend and Lang (1988) 
that the presence of a group of investors might limit the discretion of management in 
seeking lower debt ratios. In this context, the mechanism of monitoring is used by a 
principal to reduce the potential for wealth diversion. However, in closely-held firms such 
as family firms, debt can facilitate minority shareholders’ expropriation (Faccio et al., 
2001). However, at the same time debt may serve to mitigate agency problems between 
controlling and non-family shareholders.   
 
From the perspective of principals, leverage can be an expensive way to maintain 
autonomy and to determine strategic decisions of their company, since higher 
indebtedness increases the risks of bankruptcy and financial distress (Mishra and 
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McConoughy, 1990). As a consequence, if the dominant shareholder has already acquired 
enough voting power it should not be expected that leverage would be used to achieve 
control in strategic decision.  This conclusion supports the study of Moh’d et al. (1998), 
cited in the previous section, about the agency approach where the dominant principal is 
associated with a lower debt ratio. Although control motivation exists, shareholders 
remain to consider reducing agency problems, as well. In this situation I note the 
interconnection between two approaches on leverage. However, the control may overlap 
at certain concentration levels of ownership and may result in increasing leverage. In this 
situation, increasing debt may be used for the maintenance of coalitions among dispersed 
shareholders to enforce their interests. Thus, contestability affects the dominant 
shareholder’s power over leverage. If transactions take place in the firm between the 
principal and managers, suggesting the firm allows managers to make capital structure 
decisions, control over critical financing sources is a significant managerial power. Even 
without having ownerships fraction in the firm, managers have discretion to make a debt-
equity choice as long as the decision will ensure sufficient efficiency to prevent control 
challenges.   
 
If a fraction of a company’s equity is owned by its managers, who therefore obtain private 
benefits of control, Stulz (1988) assumes that such managers will not tender their shares. 
This can indicate there is an entrenched management, suggesting as long as managers 
remain in control, debt levels will remains low. In such instances, where internal control 
mechanisms fail to address entrenchment related issues, shareholders may rely on 
external control mechanisms to redirect management towards optimal behaviour. 
Therefore, any changes in leverage can be viewed as a response to opportunistic 
management in the short-run, whereas control considerations may be less significant in 
the long-run capital structures. This situation makes capital structure decisions dynamic 
over time. Empirical findings show divergence on control considerations influence 
financial leverage. This model predicts that leverage is positively correlated with the 
extent of managerial ownership and a firm’s value (Harris and Raviv, 1988; Stulz, 1988); 
and more concentrated ownership (King and Santor, 2008; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; 
Margaritis and Psikalis, 2010; Ellul, 2010). However, other studies reveal a negative 
relationship with concentrated ownership (Short et al., 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2003c; 
Maury, 2006; Croci et al., 2011; Ampenberger et al., 2013; Schmid, 2013; Santos et al., 
2014). In addition, Huang and Song (2006) found that managerial ownership has a 
negative relationship with leverage in China. Finally, Agrawal and Naser (2011) found 
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the existence of a dominant shareholder is not related to the level of leverage. The 
inconsistency of these results seems to demonstrate that control motivation can come 
under pressure and possible struggle because of the risks of bankruptcy and financial 
distress. In addition, the agency approach and control approach seem like two sides that 
trade off each other. The control approach becomes relevant to this study, given that 
family firm owners view their companies as an asset to transfer to the next generation, 
thereby establishing a multi generation presence. In addition, they are shareholders with 
control motives that maintain a long-term presence in the firm’s ownership structure, 
suggesting that control motivation might be more prevalent in family firms than non-
family firms (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Ellul, 2010; Croci et al., 2011). This approach 
will connect to control considerations explained in the next section, regarding the role of 
capital structure in family firms.      
 
   
3.2.1.3. The Asymmetric Information Approach 
 
This approach underlies the assumption that managers are assumed to possess private 
information about the firm’s investment opportunities. The choice of the debt – equity 
structure signals information to outside investors about a firm’s status and stability. 
Managers are assumed to have a better understanding of, and more information about, a 
firm’s potential investments and growth opportunities than outside investors; thus capital 
structure decisions are proposed to benefits shareholders. Therefore, in my view 
asymmetric information causes an imbalance of power between managers, shareholders 
and outside investors. A lack of equal information may lead to economic imbalance that 
results in strategic decisions. For instance, if investors are less informed than a firm’s 
insiders, then equity may be mispriced by the market. Outsider investors may not be able 
to discriminate between good and bad projects. As a result of this ignorance, interpreting 
the firm’s decision to issue new equity as a possible sign of bad news will result in new 
equity being priced accordingly. Investors will demand a high rate of return to invest or 
the firm will be forced to issue equity at a discount. Underinvestment can be avoided by 
financing the new project using security that less experienced undervalued by market such 
as internal funds or riskless debt and then equity, as suggested by Myers (1984) as a 
pecking order for financing.   
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However, Narayan (1988) and Heinkel and Zechner (1990) show that overinvestment 
problems occur as a result of information asymmetry in a new project; potentially 
attaching a negative value to the project. Thus, the solution to reduce the overinvestment 
problem is by debt, because debt makes an investment less attractive to investors. Since 
a new project is associated with issuing debt, then debt issues are good news; investors 
take higher debt levels as a signal of higher quality projects. Ross (1977) shows 
profitability, a measure of the firm’s quality, and debt-equity ratios have a positive 
relationship. In contrast, lower quality firms have a greater probability of high bankruptcy 
costs than do better quality firms. Managers of low quality firms will not decide to use 
more debt to imitate those higher quality firms. Thus, in this approach profitability, debt 
level and bankruptcy probability are all positively related. Several studies found that 
leverage is positively associated: i) with profitability if used as a signal to the market 
(Ross, 1977; Leland and Pyle, 1977), ii) the firm’s value (Ross, 1977), iii) managerial 
ownership (Leland and Pyle, 1977), and iv) the firm’s size (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
However, other researchers found that leverage has a negative relationship with 
profitability if it refers to a pecking order for financing (Wald, 1999; Syam-Sunder and 
Myers, 1999; Chen, 2004; Huang and Song, 2006) and free cash flows (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). The reason why leverage has a negative relationship with profitability explicitly 
has been investigated by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) who claim that 
information costs cause firms to follow the lowest cost of capital, such as retained 
earnings and debt. However, these claims have been contradicted by Baskin (1989), Allen 
(1993) and Adedji (1998) who argue that information costs are not the only factors that 
might drive the use of internal financing first, such as retained earnings. It was found that 
control considerations may contribute to a reluctance to issue new equities that can 
negatively impact the balance of power and control.  
 
Thus, I indicate that there is an interconnection between asymmetric information that 
causes an imbalance power between managers and investors (shareholders and creditors), 
control considerations and agency issues relating to leverage. Debt has the ability to allow 
shareholders to gather information useful for monitoring managers (agency argument) 
and allows larger shareholders to discipline managers and dispersed shareholders (control 
argument), since managers wants to continue the operations of a firm, even if liquidation 
is in the interest of creditors. Managers may be reluctant to provide detailed information 
that could result in the liquidation of their company (asymmetric information argument). 
As creditors have legal rights, they can force managers to provide detailed information to 
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support their monitoring activities of the firm’s managers. By contrast, higher 
indebtedness increases the probability of default, suggesting shareholders with enough 
control rights will prefer lower levels of debt. Therefore, debt is not only about 
contestability power, a mechanism of controlling and monitoring, but also about the 
sustainability of a firm or firms in the long run, due to the risk of bankruptcy and financial 
distress. In adopting these approaches in family firms, however, the owning families are 
assumed to be better monitors of managers than other types of large shareholders, 
suggesting that managers and principals are expected to be more closely aligned, as 
compared to relationships in non-family businesses (Anderson and Reeb, 2003b). On the 
other hand, family firms may have an incentive and ability to benefit at the expense of 
dispersed shareholders through entrenchment management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This possibility provides family firms with greater incentives 
for both monitoring and entrenchment; thus the control approach may overshadow the 
agency approach.    
 
Table 3.1 shows each theoretical result; the type of approach from which the results 
derived and the references that contained the results. 
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Table 3.1. Summary of the implications of capital structure theories and the empirical evidence of firms’ characteristics with 
leverage. 
 
Determinants 
 
Model Expected Theoretical 
Relation 
References 
    
Extent to which the firm is a takeover 
target 
Control Positive Harris and Raviv (1988) 
Increasing dispersion outside 
ownership 
Control 
 
Positive De Angelo and De Angelo (1985) 
Control protection/ Control motivation Control Positive DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985); 
Amihud, et al. (1990); Mishra and 
McConaughy (1999);  Ellul (2010); 
Croci, et al. (2011); Santos, et al. (2014)  
The probability of reorganisation 
following default/ Risk reduction 
motivation 
Agency Negative Harris and Raviv (1990); Mishra and 
McConaughy (1999); Schmid (2015) 
 Agency Negative Friend and Lang (1988); 
 Asymmetric Information  Ross (1977) 
Managerial equity ownership Agency 
Asymmetric Information 
Positive Harris and Raviv (1988); Stulz (1988) 
Free cash flow Agency Positive Jensen (1986); Stulz (1990) 
 Asymmetric Information Negative Myers and Majluf (1984) 
Liquidation value 
(Tangibility/Asset structure)  
Agency Positive Titman and Wessels (1988); Chen (2004) 
(Non-debt tax shield)  Agency Positive Titman and Wessels (1988) 
Profitability  Asymmetric Information 
 
Positive (signalling) 
Negative (pecking order) 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Ampenberger 
et al.(2013); Chen (2004); Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999); Myers and 
Majluf,(1984) 
 Agency Negative Chang (1987); Chen (2004) 
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Size  Agency 
Asymmetric Information 
Positive Titman and Wessels (1988); Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Myers and 
Majluf,(1984); Fama and French (2002) 
Growth Opportunities  Agency Negative Jensen and Meckling (1976); stulz 
(1990); Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
Firms’ age  
Managerial reputation 
Agency Positive Deesomsak et al. (2004); Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) 
Cost of financial distress/Earning 
volatility  
Agency 
Asymmetric Information 
Positive Fama and French (2002) 
Liquidity  
 
Agency 
Asymmetric Information 
Positive Deesomsak et al. (2004) 
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3.2.2. Firms’ Characteristics 
 
The empirical literature notes several characteristics that influence financing decisions in 
a firm, including: a) asset tangibility (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Ozkan, 2001; Chen, 
2004; Laery, 2009), b) profitability (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Chen, 2004; Leary, 2009; 
Ampenberger et al., 2013), c) firm size (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Fama and French, 2002), d) growth opportunities 
(Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Laery, 2009), e) non-debt tax shield (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988), f) a firm’s age (Deesomsak et al., 2004; Anderson and Reeb, 2003), and 
g) liquidity (Deesomsak et al., 2004). Although the theories are not developed with a 
specific focus on family firms, it would seem logical to follow the factors claimed to have 
some influence on corporate finance, since this study concerns about publically listed 
family firms. Following the literature regarding firms’ characteristics is therefore 
necessary in order to make judgements about connections between the observable studies 
in family firms and relevant theories. While several of these judgements may seem 
uncontroversial, there is room for significant disagreement in the case of family firms. 
   
1. Asset Tangibility  
 
Asset tangibility can be seen as a collateral available to creditors. Agency theory suggests 
that firms with high leverage tend to under invest, thus transferring wealth away from 
creditors to shareholders. This arrangement will be subject to less information 
asymmetries between firms and creditors, indicating firms have a greater liquidation 
value in cases of bankruptcy. Thus, in turn the agency cost of debt between shareholders 
and creditors will be reduced (Titman and Wessel, 1988; Voutsinas and Werner, 2011). 
The greater proportion of asset tangibility, the increase liquidation value, and the more 
creditors willing to provide loans will all act to decrease the probability of mispricing in 
the event of bankruptcy. The positive relationship between tangibility and leverage has 
been reported by previous studies (Gaud et al., 2001; Ozkan, 2001; Chen, 2004; Laery, 
2009 Ellul, 2010). Asset tangibility is easy to monitor, thus tending to mitigate agency 
conflict between lenders and borrowers. The expenditure to monitor a firm with large 
asset tangibility is likely to be reduced when compared to a firm with less asset tangibility.  
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2. Profitability 
 
Profitability is an indicator that firms are well managed and thus can be expected to be 
more efficient than less profitable firms. Profitable firms face lower expected costs of 
financial distress. In addition, the agency costs’ perspective predicts that the discipline 
provided by debt is more valuable for profitable firms, due to free cash flow problems 
(Jensen, 1986). In addition, creditors will anticipate that a profitable firm has a capability 
to repay debt. In line with this view, creditors will provide greater levels of debt for a 
profitable company (Heshmati, 2012). However, almost all empirical studies that have 
examined firms and businesses found the relationship between profitability and leverage 
to be negative (Chen, 2004; Aggarwal and Kyaw, 2010; Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010). 
The reason for this finding is because more profitable firms have a strong enough position 
to finance their business operations from internally generated funds, passively 
accumulated profits (Kayhan and Titman, 2007), a company’s exhausted debt capacity 
and the inability to raise more debt (Lemmon and Zender, 2010). In addition, profitable 
firms prefer not to take on more debt in order to avoid the risk of bankruptcy in the long-
term, as well as being reluctant to issue new equity in order to maintain control. Thus, for 
these reasons, I expect an inverse relationship between profitability and leverage in the 
long-term.  
 
3. Firm Size 
 
Large firms have been shown to have lower levels of bankruptcy risk and relatively lower 
bankruptcy costs; thus lower agency costs of debt and monitoring costs. Therefore, large 
firms have benefits to access to funding sources, thus have more availability amount of 
debt to a firm (Hooks, 2003). The firm size may indicate the information provided by 
firms toward disclosure issues. Huang and Song (2006) support the idea that size can be 
used as a proxy for information asymmetries. The larger the firm, the more information 
can be accessed by creditors and so the probability that the firm will hide information 
regarding the possibility of default will be less likely. A high degree of information 
openness enables large firms to obtain greater leverage than smaller firms (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003). To a great extent, larger 
firms face fewer information problems; a situation which might increase the bargaining 
power to creditors (Degryse et al., 2012). Another possibility is that large firms may have 
a more diluted ownership, and thus have less control over individual managers (Chen, 
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2004). Such a relationship suggests that managers may issue debt to reduce the risk of 
personal loss resulting from bankruptcy (Friend and Lang, 1988). However, if a 
company’s size is used as a proxy for the inverse probability of default, it should be a 
negative relationship with leverage. Larger firms have a lower probability level of default, 
suggesting that increasing leverage may actually increase their probability default level.   
 
4. Non-debt tax shield  
 
Non-debt tax shields (NDTS) may be regarded as substitutes for tax benefits of debt 
financing. As a consequence, debt levels should be inversely related to the level of NDTS 
(Santos et al., 2014), measured as depreciation to total assets. However, Ozkan (2001) 
argues that NDTS may be a proxy for things other than the non-debt tax shield. Higher 
levels of depreciation ratios may indicate that firms have fewer growth options or 
investment opportunities and thus have relatively more tangible assets (Barclay and 
Smith, 1995). Firms with more tangible assets indicate greater liquidation values and 
NDTS. Those firms may have more debt, although they are more likely to default; at the 
same time they will have higher market values than firms with lower liquidation values 
(Harris and Raviv, 1990). In Indonesia, tax facilities have been regulated as a stimulus 
for investment, based on Government Regulation No. 94, 2010, renewed in 2015 with 
Government Regulation No. 18. According to these regulations, a corporate taxpayer may 
be entitled to income tax benefits, such as an additional reduction in net income, up to 30 
percent  of the amount invested in tangible assets, charged at 5 percent  per annum over 
six years. This option can also involve accelerated depreciation and amortization. 
However, the tax facilities in Indonesia must be met several criteria, such as firms must 
have high investment value, high labor absorption, and high local content. In addition, 
the industry sectors that are eligible include food, textiles, chemical and chemical 
products, forestry and logging, coal and lignite mining, oil, natural gas and geothermal 
mining. Thus, it may imply a positive relation between the non-debt tax shield and the 
long-term leverage in the case of family firms that eligible to benefit this tax facilities. 
Thus, these arrangements could imply a positive relationship between the non-debt tax 
shield and the long-term leverage in the case of Indonesia firms.    
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5. Firm’s age 
 
Firm’s age should play a role in determining its capital structure because older firms may 
have longer track records and therefore a higher reputational value than newer companies. 
A firm’s reputation can be a good signal that the firm will take action consistent with 
investors’ interests, thus getting more access to the capital market at relatively low cost. 
Chua et al. (2011) argue that a firm’s age can be interpreted as a measurement of default 
risk. Established firms have a reputation regarding creditworthiness with creditors and 
should have a higher borrowing capacity because of reducing asymmetric information 
and lower levels of financial distress. Empirical studies find that capital sources depend 
on whether a business is developing or maturing (Dollinger, 1995), different financing 
arrangements having been linked with business life cycles (Berger and Udell, 1998). The 
interaction between lenders and borrowers over time may enable creditors to alleviate the 
information asymmetry that can cause financial distress in a firm. However, Filatotchev 
et al. (2006) and Johnson et al. (2016) suggest that as a firm ages after going public, 
corporate restrictions and board members influence capital structure choices. As the firm 
ages, the restrictions and boards are negatively correlated with leverage. This relationship 
may be related to the risk reduction strategy that can impose costs on diversified 
shareholders.     
 
6. Liquidity 
 
Illiquid firms face limits in attracting debt because financial distress will be indicated as 
relatively high. Even though creditors could act as liquidity providers to their important 
customers in distress (Oliveira et al., 2017), it is only a temporary solution because 
providing additional debt to lenders can increase the creditors’ current liabilities. In 
addition managers can manipulate liquid assets in favour of shareholders against the 
interest of creditors, thus increasing the agency cost of debt. Illiquid firms induce financial 
constraints, and thus increase the monitoring costs for creditors. This scenario suggests a 
negative relationship between liquidity and leverage.      
 
7. Firm’s growth 
 
Firm’s growth can be seen as a good prospect from the viewpoint of its creditors. The 
growing company has, at least potentially, a greater range and number of investment 
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opportunities. Therefore, such a situation is an opportunity for creditors to offer funds for 
a firm’s investment, because firms with higher growth opportunities are more likely to 
exhaust internal funds and require more debt than the firms that are not growing (Degryse 
et al., 2012; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). Moreover, growth opportunities are likely 
to have an inverse relationship with the probability of default and lender risk. Thus, firms 
with higher growth opportunities may be less likely to default than the firms growing 
more slowly, or not at all. This situation makes creditors more assured that they take on 
less risk of the firm going bankrupt.     
 
These results are summarised in Table 3.2 that show  empirical evidence from G-7 
countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1995), Thailand (Wiwanttankantang, 1999), 10 
developing countries (Booth et al., 2001), United Kingdom (Ozkan, 2001), Spain (De 
Miquel and Pindado (2001), USA (Korajezyk and Levy, 2003; Frank and Goyal, 2009), 
China (Chen, 2004), Asia Pacific Region (Deesomsak et al., 2004), China (Huang and 
Song, 2006), market based systems (UK and US) and banking based systems (France, 
Germany and Japan) (Antoniou et al., 2008), Indonesia and Thailand (Bunkanwanicha et 
al., 2008),  42 countries including Indonesia (De Jong et al., 2008), 40 countries involving 
both developed and emerging markets, include Indonesia (Kayo and Kimura, 2011), 
Indonesia (Moosa and Lie, 2012), and European countries (Jooever, 2013).  
 
The next section will explain the role capital structure plays in family firm’s strategies, 
starting from the characteristics of family firms that are most associated with the family 
controlled shareholder, whose control motivation is prominent. However, risk avoidance 
may need to be considered, where preserving the SEW and sustainability are both 
important goals in a family firm. Elaborating the relationship between the components of 
the organisation’s decision-making process will help in understanding the role of capital 
structure decisions in a firm’s strategy. 
 
 
65 
 
Table 3.2. Determinants of Leverage. 
 
Characteristics 
 
RJ WW BO O DMP W C D HS A B DJ FG KK ML J 
Asset Tangibility +  +  +  +  + + + + + + + - 
Profitability - - + + - +/- - +/-  - - - - - - - 
Firm’s Size + +   + - - - + + + + + +  - 
NDTS  - - - -   - -   +/-     
Firm’s Age                 
Liquidity    + -   -    -   -  
Growth Opportunities - - - -  - + - - - + - - -   
The sign of ‘+’ and ‘–‘indicate the direction of significant relationship with leverage. ‘+’ means that characteristic increases leverage, and 
vice versa for the ‘-‘sign. The studies are Rajan and Zingales (1995) (denoted RJ), Wiwanttankantang (1999) (WW), Booth et al. (2001) 
(BO), Ozkan, (2001) (O), De Miquel and Pindado (2001) (DMP), Wald (1999) (W), Chen (2004) (C), Deesomsak et al. (2004) (D), Huang 
and Song (2006) (HS), Antoniou et al. (2008) (A), Bunkanwanicha et al. (2008) (B), De Jong et al. (2008) (DJ), Frank and Goyal (2009) 
(FG), Kayo and Kimura (2011) (KK),  Moosa and Lie (2012) (ML), and Jooever (2013) (J). Comparisons suffer from the fact that these 
studies used different methodologies, different periods of time, different measures of a firm’s characteristics, and different leverage measures. 
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3.3. The Role of Capital Structure in a Family Firm’s Strategy 
 
The interconnections of family business and capital structures can be explained by 
viewing the situation as motivational based for influencing capital structure decisions. 
Most pronounced in family firms are the issues of: i) control considerations and ii) risk 
avoidance.    
 
3.3.1. Debt as a Mechanism to Avoid Control Dilution  
 
Control consideration may be related to a typical combination of concentrated ownership 
and control that is common in family firms. These combinations allow concentrated 
shareholders, in this context members of family firms, to benefit from investment projects 
for private rents. This approach may take away resources from profitable projects in order 
to satisfy the owner family’s interests. This action can occur when managers have 
excessive power enabling them to take decisions to satisfy their own interests. Several 
studies suggest that control motives can shape a firm’s capital structure decisions (Israel, 
1991; Harris and Raviv, 1988; Stulze, 1988). These views are supported by empirical 
findings such as those from Croci et al. (2011), Elul (2010) and Mishra & McConaughy 
(1999) who found that control considerations exert a far greater influence on debt over 
equity financing. It is possible that family firms will not put their control at risk and dilute 
their powers due to their desire to preserve the family’s goals.  
 
The fear of loss of control is likely to have a direct influence on levels of risk taking and 
the choice of projects in which to invest. Anderson et al. (2003) found that on average 
families have invested more than 69 percent of their wealth in the firm. This figure 
indicates that family firms will be concerned to use debt to reduce the risk from under- 
diversified investments and to maintain control over high risk exposure to one single 
asset.  Moreover, when owners are managers, they may use debt, instead of new equity, 
to concentrate their voting power, since they are apprehensive that any change in capital 
structure may dilute their power. They may consider out-of-pocket costs weigh more 
heavily compared to the opportunity costs of a new capital structure. Once shareholders 
own and control a firm, they would value the business more than they did prior to that 
ownership. Mishra and McConaughy (1999) support this notion: ‘family firms are more 
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averse to control risk and therefore avoid debt because increasing debt levels may increase 
the risk of losing control of their firm’.    
 
Control consideration becomes important in family firms due to their long commitment 
to the business (Lumpkin and Brigham, 2011), their interest in passing the business on to 
the next generations (Arregle, 2007), and their wish to maintain the reputation of the 
family business (Schmid, 2013). However, it can be argued that the intention to be passed 
to the next generation not only involves the family’s reputation, but also ownership and 
managerial skills as a legacy of the founding / owning family. The long commitment is 
related to the time and effort that the founder has invested since the firm’s beginning. 
This personal investment issue may well lead to an escalation of commitment to a failing 
project (Staw, 1976), but failure is disregarded as a sunk cost (Arkes and Blumer, 1985). 
Thus decisions relating to capital structure are not only about the financial performance 
that may follow from the new structure, but also about the outcome that an owner-
manager anticipates as a consequence of his or her ownership. Owner-managers are very 
likely to have the feeling of possession, implying that one must take care of and maintain 
the family firm. However, it is possible that over time the shareholders’ feelings of 
ownership will have increased (Strahilevitz and Loewenstein, 1998), thus leading to a 
status quo bias in capital structure decisions. The disadvantages of leaving the previous 
capital structure and restructuring with a new capital structure loom large; on the other 
hand the advantages family firms expect to get are uncertain. Managers could be reluctant 
to acquire new equity in the capital structure due to an increase in the possession of the 
firm, preferring to become familiar with the level of debt and investing themselves into 
family firms through identification of control. Naturally, this situation is in a person’s 
mind, based on the owner-manager principle that a thing which the individual has 
enjoyed, and used as their own for a long time, will take root and cannot be torn away 
without shifting behaviour to maintain sustainability. 
 
On the other hand, it is possible that the family agents have their own interests; therefore, 
to limit the destructive altruism within family firms, managers will be asked to employ 
mode debt as a control mechanism in order to avoid the free riding problem among family 
members. However, Kaye and Hamilton (2004) found that descendants are less likely to 
use more leverage because they are more concerned with wealth preservation than wealth 
creation. At this point, it can be argued that the level of debt can be in a stagnation 
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position; descendants seem to be willing to maintain their wealth with certain holding 
shareholders as long as this portion is enough to confirm their voting rights.         
 
Several studies provide evidence that listed family firms are motivated to use debt as a 
control consideration (McConaughy and Phillips, 1999; McConoughy et al., 2001). The 
researchers suggest that large family firms in the US use debt as a control mechanism. 
Moreover, Ampenberger (2013) and Schmid (2013) found this motive in Germany, while 
others focused on Western Europe (Maury, 2006), France (Latrous and Trabelsi, 2012), 
Australia (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009), and Canada (King and Santor, 2008). Other research 
initiative took place in 12 European countries (Croci et al., 2011) and 36 countries in the 
rest of the world (Ellul, 2010). Therefore, it is of interest to note that empirical evidence 
on this issue of capital structure supports the notion that debt has a role as a control 
mechanism in family firms, due the maintenance of power over such firms and the 
importance attached to the long term viability of those firms.  
 
3.3.2. Debt as a Risk Reduction Strategy    
 
Family firms are assumed to have, and belong to, large and undiversified shareholders. 
This structure of shareholders leads family firm to be a risk avoider. The shareholders 
may face a high exposure to a single asset, which is the family firm itself.  Thus, they 
have an incentive to reduce risk at the firm level. The risk can be financial and/or non-
financial, such as family reputation damage and financial distress (Schmid, 2013). Family 
firms will avoid the risk that potentially can damage their goals to preserve the socio-
emotional wealth of such businesses. To some extent, this attitude makes them prefer less 
risky financial options that potentially decrease the risk of loss family business to 
creditors; default on payment can result in fatal consequences for the firm. Moreover, the 
firm can be seen as a family asset which the members expect to be bequeathed to the next 
generation. Such an expectation means the members may be averse to any decisions that 
can harm their stakes in the business.  
 
Consistent with this view, Gugler (2001) proposes that differing capital structure-related 
decisions are due to the different incentives and motivations which are directly related to 
the risk. Family firms use debt as a means of reducing undiversified risk, especially in a 
situation where high levels of credit monitoring exist; as in Indonesia where a banking-
based system has been adopted. In these banking-based countries such as Indonesia, 
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Germany and Japan Schmid (2013) found that if the level of creditor monitoring in an 
institutional environment is high, family firms tend to avoid debt as a source of external 
funding. This conclusion suggests that managers will consider reducing the agency costs 
of debt and potential constraints imposed by creditors. Thus, a risk reduction strategy may 
be related to the family firm’s strong interest in long term survival. This situation causes 
managers to minimise risk coming from the financial distress of restructuring, a situation 
which can damage a family’s reputation. Mishra and McConaughy (1999) suggest that 
higher levels of debt increase the likelihood of a firm’s bankruptcy, as well as upping the 
levels of risk control. This conclusion shows that the choice to use debt is more sensitive 
to conditions associated with risk control.  However, risk reduction may have the side 
effect of reducing potential growth rates by giving up profitable growth opportunities 
(Schmid, 2013). In this situation, these excessive fears could reduce the attractiveness of 
family firms for investors, because family firms may be more sensitive to losing the 
family’s wealth than to increasing that wealth through nurturing the growth of their firm.    
 
Despite the two roles of debt as a mechanism to avoid control dilution, and as a device of 
risk reduction against default, a normative approach of rational choice of managers is 
based on the utility concept. Managers are presumed to be rational regarding the 
expectations of all investors, both shareholders and creditors. The expectations of 
shareholders and creditors are related to the overall outcomes of financing decisions. 
Under uncertain situations in the future, owner-managers make decisions by maximising 
the expected utility of wealth. However, the rationality assumptions do not take into 
consideration that essentially, managers have their own interests. Managers will be more 
concerned with the outcome of overall capital utility as it is reflected in the weighted 
average cost of capital. Thus, as long as managers can minimise the agency cost of debt, 
the prevalence of risk aversion is perhaps the best-known generalisation regarding risky 
choices (Kahneman and Trevsky, 1979).  
 
Overall, capital structure decisions have an important role as one major channel through 
which a control-motivated family can defend their firm and risk reduction-motivation in 
order to preserve the family firm’s goals. However, I will argue that the long-term family 
goals are concerned not only with maximising the wealth of the founding family and 
minimising the agency cost of debt as economic goals, but also with preserving non-
economic goals; the latter being the family firm’s long-term survival and sustainability. 
Achieving these goals will ensure the existence of managers’ and owners’ interests; both 
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economical and non-economical. Table 3.3 shows a summary of the literature on the role 
of capital structure in family firms.  
 
Table 3.3. Literatures about the empirical evidence on the role of capital structure 
in family firm.  
 
Author (s) & year Roles/Findings Countries 
   
Mishra and 
McConoughy (1999) 
Risk reduction strategy of loss of family business.  
Debt is associated with controlling bankruptcy risk of family 
firm, thus use lower debt level. 
 
USA 
Maury (2006) Mechanism to avoid control dilution. 
Debt is used in family firms due to control motivation and 
reducing conflicts between the family and minority 
shareholders when shareholder protection is low. 
 
Western Europe 
Ampenberger et al. 
(2013) 
Mechanism to avoid control dilution. 
Debt level is mostly impacted by management involvement.   
Germany 
   
Schmid (2013) Mechanism to avoid control dilution. 
Debt is used in order to control the firms. 
Germany 
   
Santos et al. (2014) Risk reduction strategy of loss of family business.  
Debt for family firms is used due to risk of bankruptcy and 
financial distress as a result of having an under-diversified 
portfolio. 
 
12 Western 
Countries 
Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) 
Risk reduction strategy of loss of family business  
Family firms in the Unites States employ less leverage to 
minimise firm risk.  
S&P 500 
   
Margaritis and Psillakis 
(2010) 
Mechanism to avoid control dilution. 
Debt is used as a control mechanism of family firms. 
French 
   
King and Santor (2008)  Mechanism to avoid control dilution 
Debt is a control-enhancing mechanism in family firms.  
Canada 
   
Setia-Atmaja et al. 
(2009) 
Mechanism to avoid control dilution. Debt is used as a control 
mechanism and as a substitute for independent directors.  
Australia 
   
Ellul (2010) Mechanism to avoid control dilution  
Debt for family firms is used strategically as a control-
enhancing mechanism.   
36 countries 
   
Croci et al. (2011) Mechanism to avoid control dilution  
The financing policies are influenced by control motives.  
12 European 
countries. 
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3.4. Capital Structure and Factors Affecting the Choice of 
Decisions 
 
3.4.1. Capital Structure Decisions under Certain Conditions in the Future 
 
The idea of ‘certain conditions in the future’ does not mean that conditions in the future 
will be static and without movement; what I am suggesting is that any movement will be 
continuous, certain, regular and constant. Thus, under these ‘certain conditions’ the 
capital structure is not expected to be changed and no fluctuations in firm’s activities are 
anticipated. All the steps to define and study the capital structure-related decisions are 
based on traditional assumptions that regard rationality as the most realistic procedure in 
practical decision making. The most important factor in financial decision making is 
presumed to be maximising the value of the firms’, and therefore the shareholders’ 
wealth. This supposition is based on the assumption that markets are efficient, and that 
investors and managers are efficient and rational, too (Vasiliou and Daskalakis, 2009). 
Within this framework, decision making is based on the probability distribution of 
expected returns, from knowledge of the probability of future income distribution and 
unlimited alignment in the future. Thus, it is apparent that the rationality assumption 
presumes that a capital structure decision relates to a condition of certainty and there is 
no opportunistic behaviour by managers, as the latter are perceived as efficient and 
rational. As long as the errors of managers are random, then all is well; errors produced 
by bounded rationality can safely be ignored (Thaler, 2015). For instance, the level 
outcome of agency and stewardship theories are focused on economic goals; either 
minimizing the agency costs or minimizing self-opportunistic behaviour of managers. 
However, the interest/motive potentially inserts a wedge between the failed expectations 
of shareholders and managers regarding future outcomes. This makes the process of 
maximising the value of a firm different as compared to the process under certain 
situation. The treatment of risk and uncertainty potentially shows that managers, as 
decision makers, have a preference point, limited alignments and specific motives when 
making decisions.   
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3.4.2. Capital Structure Decisions under Uncertain Conditions in the Future 
 
Alternatively, relationships between shareholders and managers are absolutely critical in 
financial decision making. The assumption is that a manager as an agent primarily follows 
self-interest when managing a firm (Findlay and Williams, 1985). Meanwhile, the main 
goal of a firm is to maximise the probability of that company’s survival. Maintaining long 
term production, growth and security is the main priority and concern of managers. This 
argument is supported by the study of Vasiliou and Daskalakis (2009) which found that 
for managers the first priority in their funding decisions is maximisation of the probability 
of the long-term survival of the firm. Pursuing this objective will secure their own 
interests, such as status and security. To achieve their desires through decision making, 
managers face the challenge of making most, if not all, of their decisions independently 
of shareholders and creditors. However, it can be difficult to accept that managers are 
autonomous agents in decision making, who are only driven by their desire to maximise 
the benefits for shareholders, without any consideration of their own preferences. For 
example, interest payments are the cost of maintaining managerial financial decisions. By 
their constant ability to make payments, managers will not be dictated to by creditors 
regarding the prospect of project investment. In fact, a manager is a semiautonomous 
agent with a set of preferences based on the expectation of pursuing a firm’s growth (size 
and profit) to avoid financial insecurity as well as optimising that firm’s financial security 
(Gordon, 1992). Maintaining long term viability, a desirable credit level, financial 
flexibility or a desirable access level to a source of funds may sometimes be a manager’s 
priorities, rather than just the maximisation of shareholders’ wealth.  
 
Furthermore, due to uncertain conditions in the future, Kregel (1998) suggests that 
individuals making decisions in real situations will not be able to specify all possible 
future outcomes. Managers make decisions using an expectation formation process based 
on custom, habit, tradition or other constituted practices; rather than those managers 
merely relying on their acquired knowledge. This perspective appears to be significant in 
that making decisions, the combination of collective experiences and imagination to 
arrive at possibility outcomes, is inherently coherent with unpredictable and uncertain 
conditions. Making decisions in a real world cannot fully specify the relevant possible 
outcomes and long-term expectations cannot be inferred from given factors. Thus, this 
view shifts the focus of determinants of capital structure financial decision-making to 
agent relations. Managers will first consider their past experiences and may presume that 
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the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, unless there are specific reasons to 
expect a change. In addition, under uncertain conditions, the capital structure could be 
inconsistent if the manager views the cost of capital as the cost of maintaining managerial 
decision-making, rather than as an objective to be maximised.   
 
Consequently, a different procedure of decision making and actual behaviour in finance 
will shape not the definition of a capital structure decision, but rather the determinants of 
capital structure and the costs associated with making such a decision. The impediments 
to the process of  maximising the firm’s value will then not only be associated with the 
cost of capital but also with what Shefrin (2001) denoted as ‘behaviour costs’. These costs 
are associated with the interests of managers, involving imperfections and emotional 
influences. Thus, the impediment may well stem from behavioural error in decision 
making. Most studies in corporate finance presume that managers are optimistic about 
the value of their firm and so investment opportunities become the reason why they follow 
the financing structure in a sequential order. However, a manager’s duty is also to 
consider how to balance the cost and benefit of using financial sources. An optimistic 
manager would never issue new equity when the capital market is efficient and the firm 
is valued fairly (Baker et al., 2004). However, different with the conventional view, 
decision making is affected by the confidence of managers, by their optimism or 
pessimism about the future, and so it explains why managers decide to use low or high 
levels of debt in capital structuring.  
 
Supposing that the balance of cost conditions under certainty and rationality, including 
the cost of capital, technology and the control of agency problem, implies that specific 
information relevant to capital structure decision-making is concentrated in one or just a 
few agents. Such a situation indicates that shareholders and creditors are not willing to 
supply funds when managers or ‘old’ owners have more information about the firm than 
outside investors (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). There are two conditions that 
make such a situation possible. Firstly, if the managers and investors share the same 
information about everything, except risk (Giammarino and Neave, 1982), the 
expectation of managers and investors will be homogenous and rational. Thus, risk is 
allowed to vary only in terms of alternatives of capital structure because risk brings the 
consequence of variation in the cost of capital. Moreover, a firm’s financial characteristics 
become a stronger determinant of financial-centric decisions than asymmetric 
information about risk preference. The risk refers to failed expectations and if this 
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happens there is a discontinuity of policy; capital structure decisions will be based on the 
parameter of the firm’s characteristics or performance. In this situation, raising capital 
through issuing equity is preferable to issuing debt, because managers will decide to use 
more debt if the company is riskier than investors think. When investors know this 
situation, they will not invest. However, by considering the taxes and costs associated 
with bankruptcy, there is an optimum balance when the cost of capital is minimised. As 
a result, the integration of financing decisions and investment decisions will culminate in 
the central objectives of the company, which are to maximise the wealth of shareholders, 
while at the same time involving only minimal risks.    
 
Secondly, the managers have more information about the value of their particular 
company’s assets and its opportunities than do outside investors, but do not share this 
information with investors because the information is so favourable to management. 
Companies will follow a certain hierarchy in financing options in order to pursue the 
ultimate aim of maximising the wealth of the shareholders. Again, managers are assumed 
to be optimistic about the value of a firm’s assets and investment opportunities. Optimistic 
managers would never choose equity as a funding source (Baker et al., 2004) if the capital 
market is efficient and the value of the firm is at its correct fundamental value. Managers 
will rely on internal sources and debt for funding and turn to equity as their last option.   
 
Thus, the assumption under the certain conditions in the future, and rationality of 
managers, means that the situation must meet the conditions of a perfect and efficient 
capital market. This situation does not necessarily mean that capital structure decisions 
are a product of the manager’s knowledge and formed by calculation about the probability 
distribution of future outcomes.  However, managers may behave in decision making by 
following their own goals; these can be not just maximising the wealth of shareholders 
but also maximising the probability of the long-term sustainability of the firm (Vasiliou 
and Daskalakis, 2009). Thus, when managers make capital structure decisions relating to 
family firms, they will not only consider economic goals but also non-economic goals.  
 
3.5. Determinants of Capital Structure in Family Firms 
 
Previous studies about capital structure in family firms focus on how that structure is 
affected by ownership concentrated in the hands of the controlling family shareholders 
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and their choice of funding sources (Santos et al., 2014; Schmid, 2005; Anderson et al., 
2003). However, the impact of the founding family’s influence on capital structure 
decision-making has still not been clarified. In family firms, the combination of family 
holdings, the desire to pass the business to the next generations, and their reputation are 
the issues taken into account when formulating capital structure decisions designed to 
preserve the socioemotional wealth of family firms. The role of capital structure is most 
likely a mechanism to reduce the potential risk of financial distress that could potentially 
harm the family firm’s sustainability. In family firms, the components of behaviour and 
corporate governance of capital structure are interrelated with family goals; the main ones 
being: a) preserving socio-emotional wealth through agency, b) control motivation, and 
c) risk avoidance of business loss.   
 
Mishra and McConaughy (1999) have explored the behaviour of a firm’s owner and the 
consequences of capital structure in family firms. They provide evidence of a key aspect 
of capital structure related decisions in family firms: losing control over their firms and 
risk avoidance caused by the increasing costs of financial distress. They find that the 
founding family controls matters in determining the level of debt financing, not 
managerial ownership. In the context of the control of family firms, it is common that an 
owner may act as a manager and the risk attitudes of an owner-manager and descendant-
manager could be changed regarding unstable risk preferences in order to take a risk in 
decision making (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). The preferences of managers may 
impact capital structure decisions with the rationale that the degree of confidence - seen 
as degrees of optimism and pessimism about the future - of the founder-manager and 
descendant-manager might be different. In decision making rational managers are 
assumed to be optimistic about the value of the firm, as in the value of assets and 
investment, which are expected to increase in the future. Managers expect that the firms 
will be more profitable and will increase growth opportunities. Since the market is 
efficient, where the investors have the same access and information is spread 
symmetrically, managers would never issue new equity (Baker et al., 2004). Issuing new 
securities is expensive due to the floatation costs and so increases the agency cost of debt.  
 
In addition, managers are assumed to have a better understanding of, and more 
information about, the firm’s potential investment and growth opportunities than outside 
investors. As a result capital structure decisions are designed to maximise the value of 
‘existing’ shareholders, who are the founding family. Outside investors, who are assumed 
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to be rational, will take action based on information from management because they 
believe in the financial principle that every action conveys information (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). The prediction about capital structures is driven not by the trade-off 
between cost and benefit of debt or equity, but more simply by pursuing the family firm’s 
goals. Motivated by the need to maintain control over the business, the decision 
emphasises that aggregating new capital is essential in order to keep control of the family 
firm and reduce the agency cost of debt.  
 
Therefore, I will develop several concepts. Firstly, I consider the three aspects that 
determine capital structure which are agency problem, control and asymmetric 
information. Deriving the determinants capital structure from those three aspects is 
relevant with the case of family firms, especially the force to avoid diluting control 
(control approach) and a risk reduction strategy (agency approach). Secondly, I consider 
the endowment effect as a consequence of the second assumption presented above and 
followed by the concept of noneconomic goals. Thirdly, non-economic goals can 
distinguish the outcome of capital structure decision under uncertainty conditions in the 
future which may suit with family firm’s goal to preserve SEW. Here, as suggested by 
Madison et al. (2015), it would be interesting to see if the tenets of socio-emotional 
wealth, agency and stewardship theory could be viewed as a dynamic approach to 
establish a new perspective of the family firm. Thus, by not putting in a dichotomous 
treatment of those theories, this study would fill the gap of how SEW is related to 
decisions made in family firms.  
     
In applying SEW in family firms, Chua et al (2015) argue that the limitation of SEW is 
that the concept is mostly focused on the function of accumulating financial wealth, while 
neglecting changes in socio-emotional endowment through aspirations for profit. 
However, Martin and Gomez-Mejia (2016) believe that the family firm may consider 
financial goals a priority, when and where they are consistent with socio-emotional 
enhancement. When making capital structure decisions, family firms will follow the 
dimensions of SEW and are controlled by financial characteristics. This paradigm 
distinguishes family firms from non-family firms. Therefore, capital structure decisions 
may be a mechanism for family firms to achieve their strategic objectives to preserve 
SEW (Berrone et al., 2010; Berrone et al., 2012; Naldi et al., 2016).  
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As a strategic aspect of a company, capital structure may impact the balance of power in 
family firms. The ability to influence company decisions represents the holding of a long-
term commitment to maintain the sustainability of the company across generations, as 
well as giving different meanings to power and control motivation. Consequently, family 
firms may wish to maintain control of their wealth; a goal often achieved by the use of 
debt as a device that allows family firms to retain control of their firms through decision 
making. The importance of control to families is because families often have long 
commitments to sustain the business over more than one generation (Schmid, 2013); an 
obligation which also creates the role of the firm as a provider of ‘patient capital’ 
(Lumpkin and Brigham, 2011). 
 
Some researchers, such as Ellul (2010), argue that control is a function of ownership 
structure. But some say that access to control over critical resources is more important 
than ownership (Rajan and Zingales, 1997). Founding families may dictate corporate 
policy either by managing the firm directly or by monitoring the company closely. The 
rest of the shareholders possibly lack the power to control a company’s decision-making. 
Inviting new investors to be a part of the shareholder cohort may harm the founder’s 
power and authority as a previous shareholder. As a result, the capital structure decision 
will consider and reflect the outcome that the founder or family member shareholders 
anticipate as a consequence of their ownership.  
 
Owner-manager behaviour varies depending on the ownership concentration (Santos et 
al., 2014) and the legal framework and institutional environment of the countries in which 
the firm operates (Antoniou et al. 2008; Ampenbergers et al., 2011; Schmid, 2013; Santos 
et al., 2014; Kuznetsov et al., 2014). From the perspective of risk avoidance, the choice 
is more sensitive to conditions associated with control risk. To raise capital, De Angelo 
and De Angelo (1985) suggested the insiders’ value control and issue non-voting stock 
without reducing control or increasing control risk. According to Anderson and Reeb 
(2003), the risk averse behaviour of family firms is evident in financial decisions when 
firms are involved in less diversified investments. The risk reduction strategies of the 
firms are pursued through investment diversification into low risk investment (Croci et 
al., 2011) and lower debt levels. Low levels of debt could decrease the risk of losing SEW, 
or family capital in the case of bankruptcy (Fama, 1980). 
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However, from the perspective of control consideration, Villalonga and Amit (2006) and 
Croci et al. (2011) found that the preference to use more debt is influenced by control 
motives. This choice is supported by empirical research that indicates higher debt ratios 
of listed family firms in Australia (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009), Canada (King and Santor, 
2008) and 12 European countries (Croci et al., 2011). Harris and Raviv (1988) as well as 
Stultz (1988) and d’Mello and Miranda (2010) provide evidence that to retain control of 
family firms, debt can be used as a device by current owners to maintain control. This 
same approach can be employed as an internal control mechanism for alleviating agency 
conflict inside the company. When internal funds are not sufficient, leverage could: a) 
mitigate the risk of diluting family control (Wu et al., 2007), b) maintain family power 
through voting mechanisms (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), c) 
avoid monitoring by lenders (Mishra and McConoughy, 1999; King and Santor, 2008) 
and d) mitigate agency problems with minority shareholders and outside family members 
(Santos et al., 2014; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009).    
 
The power to control is not always related to those family members holding shares, but 
is also informed by family members as stakeholders and by the founder of the company. 
Thus, the strategic financial decision will be influenced by family members. Power to 
gain access may be more contingent on specific financing than the power provided from 
ownership. Important access is an alternative way of conferring power. In addition, access 
is a way to foster strategic decisions such as such as those relating to financial issues. 
Giving access to one manager will keep and maintain control inside the company. As a 
result, the owners and managers have a coalition or alignment of interests due to reduced 
levels of conflict in decision making. In the context of family firms, the intention to 
maintain family control results in the owner taking a strategic position as a manager, so 
as to channel resources and capabilities through family involvement. This choice is made 
in order to ensure the firm’s survival and to protect and enhance transgenerational wealth 
(Chrisman et al., 2003b; Villalongga and Amit, 2006).  
 
When the shareholders are dispersed, families have the power to control managers’ 
decisions. Family members have both incentives and access to influence management 
appropriately. Management will bear the fiduciary relationship with shareholders but also 
have a relationship with the family members who, as stakeholders, can affect or be 
affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives (Freeman, 1984). The claims 
of family members may be taken into consideration and subordinated to the claims of 
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other shareholders. As a result, the power to control is not always related to those family 
members holding shares, but is also informed by family members as stakeholders and by 
the founder of the company.  Since a family firm’s goal is to preserve their SEW, 
managers will put this goal as a priority. The main reason for doing so is because family 
firms may bear risks due to the whole investment in the firm potentially being placed as 
a hazard (Freeman and Evan, 1990). By establishing a system and setting a collective 
strategy, the family firm will ensure the organisation’s survival. Based on the views of 
Astrachan et al. (2002) and Frank et al. (2002), power reflects the influence of the family 
on ownership concentration, management and governance. This influence can be a key 
characteristic that distinguishes family firms: a family member exerts control over 
strategic decisions (Chua et al., 1999; Schulze et al., 2003). Such control can be direct, 
such as being a CEO or chairman of the board or indirect by appointing a top management 
team. Control can be exerted by the founder or by family members or by a dominant 
family coalition. 
    
However, having a family CEO may not be well received by the market. Ampenberger et 
al. (2013) found that a founder CEO/chair in a country with a banking-based system will 
prefer to use less leverage. SEW preservation, manifested by a family CEO/chair 
placement could send information to the market. Crano (1985) argues that it is more 
difficult to deal objectively with a family member’s performance and qualifications, if 
acknowledging the institutional requirements of objectivity and transparency. Pursuing 
SEW will seduce the firm from optimal economic targets to accommodating family 
interests. As a result, creditor will concern about monitoring family firms for their 
investments. Thus, a lower level of leverage could protect family firms from the threat of 
credit monitoring from creditors.   
 
Previous empirical studies on how family involvement can impact financing decisions, 
mostly just focus on ownership with minimum attention being given to the issue of 
strategic positions such as CEOs or chair/board membership. Some argue that ownership 
has a negative relationship with leverage (Santos et al., 2014; Schmid, 2013; Mishra and 
McConoughy, 1999). In contrast, some found that ownership concentration has a positive 
impact on a firm’s debt level (Croci et al., 2011; Ellul, 2010; Margaritis and Psillakis, 
2010; King and Santor, 2008). However, other researchers found that ownership 
concentration is not significant to leverage (Ampenberger et al., 2013; Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003) and there is a non-linear relationship between ownership and debt level 
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(Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009; Schulz et al., 2003). Thus, these studies have mostly focused 
on the impact on ownership concentration levels, without distinguishing between the 
different generations such as founders and descendants in family businesses. Table 3.4 
summarises empirical findings on family involvement and capital structure decisions. 
 
Table 3.4. The empirical researches on family involvement and capital structure 
decision 
 
Sample   literatures Variable of family 
involvement 
Findings 
(The relationship 
between family 
involvement and 
leverage) 
Country 
Santos et.al.(2014) Family ownership  Negative 12 Western 
Countries 
Ampenberger et al. (2013) Family ownership 
Founder CEO  
Not significant 
Negative 
Germany 
Schmid (2013) Family ownership 
Active management role 
(CEO, Board)  
Negative 
Negative 
Germany 
Croci et al.(2011) Founder CEO/Chair Positive 12 European 
countries 
Ellul (2011) Family ownership Positive 38 countries 
(13 European; 9 
Asian;  USA and 
15 Latin  
America) 
Margaritis and Psillakis 
(2010) 
Family ownership Positive French 
Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) Family ownership Non-linear relationship Australia 
King and Santor (2008) Family ownership Positive Canada 
 
Villalonga and Amit 
(2004)  
Family ownership Negative Fortune 500 
companies 
Schulze et al. (2003) Family ownership Non-linear relationship USA 
(private family 
firms) 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) Family ownership 
Founder CEO, descendant 
CEO, hired CEO. 
Not significant 
Not significant  
S&P 500 (USA) 
Mishra and McConoughy 
(1999) 
Family ownership Negative USA 
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The researchers argue that a family firm’s willingness to give up control and loosen SEW 
should weigh less heavily as it moves from the founder stage to third generation stage. 
These issues frequently result in a decline in the motivation to keep control and preserve 
SEW. Thus, agency governance and agent managers are more effective during these 
descendant stages. However, some argue that attachment and identification with the 
business (Zellweger et al., 2012) and dynastic motivation (Casson, 1999; Parker, 2014) 
suggest that the duration of family control will induce the next generation to keep control, 
aiming to preserve SEW. As a result, the objective of securing transgenerational control 
will make the descendants provide jobs and involve members in the family business as 
CEO and/or chair or duality (CEO and chair) to safeguard both the present and the future. 
In addition, the new younger family members will prefer to have associate CEOs rather 
than external directors (Jones et al., 2008) to preserve SEW. In case they need to raise 
capital from new equity, the family business members motivated by the intention of 
transgenerational control would consider selling the company at a higher price to 
compensate for the loss of SEW (Zellweger et al., 2012). It appears likely that at this stage 
of a firm’s life, there is a reduction of commitment and identification with the business, 
or a reduction of stewardship behaviour among family members.   
 
Following stewardship theory, family involvement across the business, including the 
management, the board and other levels of activity, is likely either to: a) result in a 
tendency to hire unskilled family members, rather than professional managers or b) the 
appointment of family members that leads to overly centralised decision making. Thus, 
excessive family involvement potentially harms SEW and threatens relational trust. The 
researchers also propose the loss of SEW as the explanation for this option choice. It is 
difficult to accept that the independence of family firms is the way to preserve SEW 
because the reciprocal bond seen within a family business is not exclusively between 
family members but is likely to be extended to a wider set of constituencies (Miller et al., 
2009). Promoting a sense of stability and commitment to the firm (Miller and Le Breton-
Miller, 2005) is a part of developing family relationships, including trustworthy partners.  
 
In Indonesia, an independent board for listed companies is mandatory rather than 
voluntary. It is ruled in the Indonesia Financial Services Authority (OJK) No. 
33/POJK.04/2014 article 20, verses 2 and 3, that if the board membership consists of two 
members, one of them must be an independent. If the board consists of more than two 
members, 30 percent of those members must be independent. Thus, even though the form 
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is mandatory, the percentage of the independent board members can indicate and be 
interpreted as a limitation of the independence of too many kin ties among family 
members. Such a limitation is likely to endanger strong social bonds and trust with the 
stakeholders (Miller and Le Breton Miller, 2005). As a consequence, reducing too much 
emphasis on maintaining binding social ties within the firm to the family firms can avoid 
family business declined.  
 
Table 3.5 shows the dimensions of SEW and the expected strategic behaviour regarding 
capital structure decisions. Table 3.6 summarises the empirical findings relating to 
determinants of leverage in family firms.   
 
Table 3.5. The dimensions of SEW and Expected Strategic Behaviour 
 
 Dimensions of SEW Expected Strategic Behaviour  
1. Family control and 
influence.  
Actively/Directly: 
Strong ownership position (Harijono et al., 2004; Berrone 
et al., 2012; Santos et al., 2014). 
 
Founder actively involved in strategic position 
(Anderson et al., 2003; Maury, 2006). 
 
Being a CEO or chairman of the board or duality 
(Schulze et al., 2003; Anderson and Reeb, 2004; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Cruz et al., 2010; Miller et 
al., 2010; Berrone et al., 2010; Chua et al., 2011; 
Schmid, 2013). 
 
Appointing family members to strategic decision maker 
positions (Chua et al., 1999; Schulze et al., 2003; Chung 
and Chan, 2012). 
 
Passively/Indirectly: 
Appointing of top management team members (Berrone 
et al., 2012). 
 
Assembling a board that supports family decisions 
(Mustakallio et al., 2002).   
   
2. Renewal of family bonds 
through dynastic succession. 
Appointing relatives to succeed (Schultz et al., 2001; 
Cruz et al., 2012). 
 
Preservation of the family dynasty (Casson, 1999). 
 
3. Binding social ties.  Appointing independent board members (Miller and Le 
Breton Miller, 2005). 
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Table 3.6. Determinants of Leverage Family Firms 
 
Variables 
 
C H SA S M SA A AA 
Family Ownership + + + -  + -  
Founder CEO/Chair +*      -  
Family Board Rep         
Board Size      -   
Family Management    +     
Descendant CEO     +    
Asset Tangibility +*/-**  + + + + +  
Profitability - - - - - - -  
Firm Size  + + +  + +  
NDTS -*/+** - +      
Firm Age -  + - +  +  
Liquidity        + 
Growth Opportunities +  - -     
R&D/Sales         
Total Risk      -  + 
The sign of ‘+’ and ‘–‘indicate the direction of significant relationship with leverage. ‘+’ means 
that variables increases leverage, and vice versa for the ‘-‘sign. ‘*’ refers to long-term debt and 
‘**” refers to short-term debt. The studies are Croci et al. (2011) (denoted C), Harijono et al. 
(2004 (H), Santos et al. (2014) (SA), Schmid (2013) (S), Molly et al. (2011) (M), Setia-Atmaja 
et al. (2009) (SA), Ampenberger et al. (2013) (A), Anderson and Reeb (2003) AR), Comparisons 
suffer from the fact that these studies used different methodologies, different period of times and 
different measures of variables, different leverage measure. 
 
3.6. Consequences of Capital Structure Decisions   
 
Financing involves making strategic decisions for a company, since those decisions 
determine the company’s investment policy. An optimal capital structure decision may 
serve to maintain the firm’s growth (Chua et al., 2011), and the availability of investment 
opportunities in the future. Decisions regarding a firm’s financing will impact the 
investment project due to the cost of raising capital and making returns to the investors; 
both debt holders and shareholders. To finance the investment, the company will consider 
a financial structure which could minimise the cost of capital. The reasons for this 
consideration include: a) the possibility of financial distress, b) taxes and financial friction 
and c) information friction that led to the financial cost. As a general rule, more capital is 
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available for debt investment than equity investment. The cost of raising capital can be 
broken down into: i) the transaction costs, which are the actual costs of completing the 
funds, and ii) the required return which is provided to the investors.  
 
Substantially, financing decisions in various companies follow the financial logic driven 
by economic motives. Within the capital structure, choices are offered between internal 
and external sources, but capital structure requiring strategic decisions in family firms 
makes the issue of capital a control mechanism to maintain the interest of owners. This 
view is closely related to the particular idea of Dreux (1990) that financial objectives 
could not be achieved without a major recognition of the fundamental issues relating to: 
i) ownership, ii) appropriate capital levels and iii) the control of the business. So, the use 
of debt is a device of owners to defend their corporate control. Family firms face a trade-
off between raising external finance and losing their control over the firm.   
 
Both the survival and sustainable profitability of companies depend on the capacity to 
balance economic and social purposes by distributing wealth and value to each group of 
stakeholders as a part of a company’s system (Clarkson, 1995). In other words, a firm’s 
interests are not purely economic, as follows from utilitarian principles, thereby justifying 
value creation through the decision making process. In family firms autonomy among 
family members, as well as solidarity between them to pursue a) trans-generations, b) 
socio-emotional wealth and c) fairness in power allocation become the rules of the game 
by which to run the company. However, from another perspective, families’ experiences 
of conflicts become a reason for investors’ opportunistic behaviour by offering quick and 
cheap financial fixes in exchange for their shares or other assets. 
 
Family firms tend to avoid damaging the family’s reputation in order to prevent the loss 
of their assets in case of the loss of their capacity to repay. In addition, the non-financial 
reason for raising new equity through initial public offerings (IPOs) for the family 
business has been found to be that their reputation and status motives for going public 
may be a means to increase the prestige of the family (de Lema et al., 2011). Capital 
structures can improve the external relationships of firms with different capital suppliers 
and bring about internal changes in investment planning.  
 
If the shareholders are undiversified, the company could impose a financial decision with 
less risk, a position argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1986). Family firms prefer to avoid 
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risks by seeking financial sources that can bear the probability of default. In addition, 
self-interested managers have an incentive to reduce the level of corporate debt to optimal 
levels, in order to comply with the shareholders’ points of view.  The managers tend to 
be more concerned about total risk in financing by picking the financial logic that 
minimises the cost of capital or transaction costs. That is, conservative financial policies 
prefer less debt, as using more debt will increase the probability of a business 
experiencing financial distress.  
 
However, in a situation involving widespread shareholders, managers are relatively free 
to pursue their own preferences due to the free rider problem. Family firms reduce the 
effectiveness of external control mechanisms and expose the firms to the ‘self-control’ 
problem (Jensen, 1994) by placing family members as managers. This process is one way 
to reduce the agency problem or diminish conflict from different interests and motives 
because conflict can be viewed as a risk that may threaten the sustainability of the 
company.  Anderson and Reeb (2003) propose that family firms could reduce the firm’s 
risk in two ways. First, family firms influence investment decisions by pursuing new 
projects that are imperfectly correlated with existing projects. Diversification becomes 
the best way to reduce financial risk, since most family firms put their wealth in the 
company. Second, family firms may seek capital that can bear the probability of default. 
The low level of debt could decrease the risk of losing undiversified family members and 
family capital in case of bankruptcy (Fama, 1980).  
 
To summarise, Figure 3.1 shows the theoretical framework of capital structure decision-
making in family firms. 
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Figure 3.1 
Developed Theoretical Framework of Capital Structure Decision in Family Firms  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7. Research Gaps and Hypotheses Development 
 
Agency theory and stewardship theory maintain that the principal and managers become 
more aligned over time, but ownership concentration is more dispersed. As a result 
friction among family members is more likely when family firms pass from one 
 
FIRM’S 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 
DIMENSIONS of SEW 
 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
DECISION 1. Family control and 
influence. 
Determinants: 
1. Ownership 
2. Founder being a CEO 
3. Family Board Representation 
4. Being CEO & Chair (Duality)  
2. Renewal of family 
bonds through 
dynastic succession.  
 
Determinant: 
Descendants being a CEO 
3.Binding social ties.  
 
 
 
Determinant: 
Independent board members 
1. Asset Tangibility 
2. Profitability 
3. Firm Size 
4. NDTS 
5. Firm Age 
6. Liquidity 
7. Growth Opportunities 
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generation to the next. The philosophical characteristics of agency theory and stewardship 
theory are derived from different concepts of the model of a person. The weakness of 
agency theory is the assumption made about individualistic motivation resulting in agent-
principal divergence. However, it is believed that in modern corporations, managers and 
principals seek an individual utility. Each owner has an intention to maximise their 
investment in the company. Managers are morally, if not legally, contracted to maximise 
the shareholders’ wealth. So, problems are incurred with the owners when their interests 
are divergent. If managers do not share the same individual motivation and interest as the 
owners, that dissonance can become a serious problem. To ensure that the interests of the 
manager or agent and principal are aligned, agency theory prescribes mechanisms, 
incentives and governance structure (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Control and monitoring become the key elements to govern the company and to 
ensure that managers act on behalf of the shareholders’ interests. It would seem logical 
that control and monitoring become important managers in these two roles (controllers 
and monitors) act on behalf of owners and perform their mandatory duties.    
 
Again, what if the interest does not align or a discontinued alignment of interest occurs? 
Stewardship theory assumes that agents act in the best interest of their principals 
(Donalson and Davis, 1989; 1991) and empower their stewards’ behaviour to facilitate 
continued alignment of interest. Thus, the interests of managers are directed by 
organisational utility, rather than by personal objectives. It appears that managers perform 
their duties voluntarily by acting as a steward of the firm. Acting as a steward means the 
manager’s attitude is based on self-determination and more intrinsic motivations, such as 
opportunity and achievement. In this context, collectivism is more dominant than 
individualism. By working for an organisation, personal satisfaction and needs are met. 
Pro-organisational motivation of managers could raise personal levels of utility and self-
serving behaviour. Although stewardship theory states that the managers are pro-
organisation in behaviour, there is a stratum or a sequence in applying stewardship theory: 
the sequence of interest. Thus, there is no trade-off between individual interest and 
organisational interest. The structure of the organisation basically facilitates and 
empowers the manager’s ability to act as a steward. Control and monitoring can be 
counterproductive if managers are to be trusted; therefore, involvement is significant in 
this context.  
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The interesting point regarding motivation is how the managers define themselves in term 
of their membership of their particular organisation. Identification refers to being 
embedded in the organisation. The fact is that in family firms, not all family members 
become managers or are actively involved in the firm. Some family firms hire managers 
from outside the family. Hence, some managers work on behalf of the family and work 
towards organisational goals. It is fair to conclude they have organisational commitment. 
Thus, pushing the boundaries of agency theory into family firms that use institutional 
approaches, rather than personal approaches, as a basis from which both managers and 
owners can be influence.  
 
An agents’ behaviour tends to predict performance outcomes based on the agent’s risk 
preferences (Mc Guire, 1988, Rees, 1985) or their frames about expectation regarding the 
future (Baker et al., 2004). Therefore, it is reasonable that they decide to use a low level 
or high level of leverage, depending on how they compare the anticipated outcomes of 
capital structure decisions from the available options in terms of loss aversion. In the case 
of family firms, the motivation of a family manager will be to preserve the noneconomic 
goals which are maintaining long-term reproduction, growth and the safety of the firm 
itself (Vasiliou and Daskalakis, 2009).   
 
The aspect that makes family firms unique is the connection of such key elements as 
ownership, management, government and succession. All of these issues influence goals 
and objectives, strategy, family structure and dynamics (Chua et al., 1999). However, the 
literature fails to address how decisions relating to the non-economic goals of family firms 
are made.  The different assumption about family firms’ goals is essentially the research 
gap of agency theory/stewardship theory and moving away from those theories static 
dichotomous treatment to a dynamic approach. Dynamic perspectives can benefit theory 
by explaining why behaviour changes relative to capital structure decisions over time. 
This perspective helps investigate behaviour patterns based on the noneconomic goals 
(SEW) and would possibly alter predictions made about capital structure decisions in 
family firms. Following this view, there are three dimensions of SEW that I have 
explained on Chapter 2 based on the descriptions from Berrone et al. (2012) that are 
related to capital structure. 
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1. Family control and influence  
 
Agency theory highlights that increasing the common stocks of managers in the firm is a 
way to get a better alignment of the owner’s interests and manager’s interests. Using debt 
financing will reduce total equity financing that, in turn, could reduce the scope of 
managers’ and shareholders’ conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Studies have 
assumed that owner-managed firms will have either zero or insignificant agency costs 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000). So, under 
this theory, capital structure decision-making is a device to maximise organisational 
performance and shareholder returns (Schulze et al., 2001; Eaton et al., 2002; Dyer, 2006; 
Miller et al., 2007; Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008; Block et al., 2011). Family firms reduce 
the possibility of losing or diluting control by using a strategy that helps to maintain the 
family’s voting power (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Stulz, 1988). 
Debt will solve the problem of control as long as the firm faces no financial distress. In 
addition, debt is a strategy of control consideration to maintain power in the firm, 
especially when ownership is dispersed under descendant stages.  
 
Stewardship theory (Corbeta and Salvato, 2004; Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006; 
Uhlaner, Floren, & Geerlings, 2007) highlights that as long as the fundamental coalition 
between managers and owners is intact, the value of the firm seems to increase 
financially. This increase occurs because fundamentally there is no inherent or general 
problem with the manager’s motivation (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). The stewardship 
theory supports that under one person who has authority over the decision making, such 
as founder as the CEO/chair, it will not be in their interest to take benefits from their 
position (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). The dual CEO-chair role in the firm is a strategy 
to reduce agency problems (Poutziouris et al., 2015). In addition, such a role seeks to 
protect the interests of the CEO and shareholders and avoid managerial entrenchment. 
Family firms may avoid debt due to control considerations, since decision making is 
under a single person, the founder-manager.   
 
In contrast, to preserve and pursue noneconomic goals might require that choice will be 
based on, and informed by, loss aversion of SEW, such as control over business. 
Behaviourally, capital structure might be different across generations since the dynamic 
of family life can influence SEW priorities across generations, due to the pursuit of 
ensuring the family firm’s sustainability. Family firms will be more willing to use debt 
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when ownership is concentrated in the hands of a controlling owner (Chua et al., 1999; 
Misra and McConaughy, 1999), such as during the first generation founder phase. Those 
same families are less willing to use debt when ownership is dispersed, such as in the 
sibling partnership stage involving the next generation. It appears likely that the 
relationship between ownership concentration across generations and debt level is non-
linear (N shape). Empirically, Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) found that family ownership and 
debt take a non-linear shape (inverse U); however, Schulze et al. (2003) found a U-shaped 
relation in private family firms. Thus, I posit that: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Concentration of ownership in the hands of family members has a non-
linear relationship with leverage over the life period of the family.   
 
 
There are two situations regarding family involvement in a family firm. Firstly, founders 
who are also the CEOs of their family firms tend to be more risk averse as a consequences 
of these family business owners investing most of their wealth in the firm they have 
created. Subsequent empirical tests show that if a founder acts as the CEO, family firms 
have low levels of leverage. This low level is because the founder has a motivation to 
pass a successful, unthreatened firm to the next generation (Ampenberger et al., 2013; 
Schmid, 2013). The intention to transfer the business to the next generation makes 
founder-managers more risk averse, so enabling them to pass their single asset, the family 
firm, to the next generation. A founder acting as the CEO tends to be more concerned 
about how the family business, his / her one single asset, can deal with high exposure to 
the market place and survive. Therefore, founder-managers have an incentive to reduce 
risk at the firm’s level. Additionally, there are non-financial issues such as the family’s 
reputation that can be damaged if financial distress occurs.   
 
Secondly, Ellul (2010) and Croci et al. (2011) found when family members are also board 
members, they prefer to avoid equity financing because control considerations exert a far 
greater influence on debt than does equity financing. Family member representation on a 
board may be more concerned about wealth preservation and the stability of the family’s 
wealth than family firms without family board representation. Those board members 
could reduce family tensions and align the interests among family members (Le Breton-
Miller and Miller, 2013). Moreover, not only do they tend to align the interests, they will 
vote to use increased amounts of debt instead of losing control of the family firm. If 
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ownership is dispersed among other shareholders, as long as the family has an influence 
via board membership, ‘whispering’ strategic decisions might be still be sufficiently 
powerful to influence capital structure decisions. This situation seems to demonstrate that 
the relationship between family board representation and debt level is positive, since it 
maintains family control to preserve SEW strongly among board members. I thus 
hypothesise:  
 
Hypothesis 2. If the firm founder acts as the CEO, the family firm will have low 
leverage.  
Hypothesis 3. If family members are represented on the Board of Directors, this 
increases leverage of the family owned firm.   
 
 
A member of the family is both the CEO and a member of the Board of Directors (a 
duality position) provides a greater influence to pursue the family’s interests than if the 
position was not of a dual nature (Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2003). The holder of a dual 
position will almost certainly attempt to safeguard the family’s interests (Tam and Tan, 
2007). The coalition among family members by the founder’s presence as CEO and chair 
could decrease family tension and align interests among family members (Le Breton-
Miller and Miller, 2013). However, when they occupy both positions, their power to 
influence capital structure decisions increases. This power increment allows the dual role 
holder to choose the options that will not put the firm in a long-term period of risk, 
involving possibilities of financial distress or being taken over by creditors. The founder 
CEO/chair will almost certainly view the firm as an asset that will be transferred to future 
family generations (Arregle et al., 2007). The above points indicate that there is a negative 
relationship between duality and leverage. I thus posit that: 
  
Hypothesis 4.  In a family owned firm, when a member of the family is both the CEO and 
a member of the Board of Directors, this results in less leverage. 
 
2. Renewal of family bonds through dynastic succession 
 
A family firm’s stages reflect the time when the family control of the business is 
transferred from one generation to the next generation. The ownership could be dispersed 
among successive generations of family members and/or the placement of managerial and 
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controller positions by the next generation. Both agency theory and stewardship theory 
highlight that: a) if the continuation of the organisation and employment of managers in 
the company is threatened by the possibility of takeover (Donaldson and Davis, 1991) or 
b) a family firm is restructuring to accommodate a life cycle change in the company, 
managers will react to protect their own self-interest. The motivating prospect behind the 
managerial reactions is that the organisation may have no benefits for them personally. 
Thus this is the critical situation, according to both agency and stewardship theories, when 
any coalitions or alignments are jeopardised for the long run.    
 
Moreover, the strength of efforts dedicated to preserving SEW might become weaker 
between family and the business as time passes. Chua et al. (1999); Schulze et al. (2003) 
and Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) argue that the SEW is strong when the first generation 
(founder) keeps the ownership and both decision management and/or decision control, 
but the SEW could fail to survive through to the next generation. The researchers all 
suggest that the family firm’s willingness to give up control and lose SEW should weigh 
less heavily as it moves from the founder stage to stage three.  
 
As a family’s engagement with the business declines with the dispersion of ownership 
among generations (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). As a result of these issues the demand 
and motivation to keep control and preserve SEW declines. The next generation’s 
perception of the value of the business is unlikely to be in line with that of the founder or 
the previous generation. The above would seem to indicate that a descendant CEO is 
willing to use more debt to pursue their objectives, because dispersion of ownership is 
more likely to bear risk (Schulze et al., 2003). However, if the descendant CEO is more 
concerned about wealth preservation than wealth creation (Kaye and Hamilton, 2004) the 
descendant is more likely to use a lower level of leverage to protect the family firm from 
the threat of a takeover by a supplier of capital. Thus, I posit that: 
 
Hypothesis 5. If a descendant of the family firm’s founders acts as the CEO, this will 
lead to a lower level of leverage.    
   
3. Binding social ties  
 
Agency theory highlights that an independent board chair is there to control managerial 
opportunism. In contrast, stewardship theory stresses that while acting as stewards, the 
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family may place outside directors on the board to provide expertise, objective advice or 
commonly act as advocates or independent auditors for the company (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991). This scenario is the opposite of implicitly monitoring and controlling 
activities on behalf of minority shareholder protection. The studies of Setia-Atmaja et al. 
(2009) and Anderson and Reeb (2004) found that family-controlled firms use either debt 
or dividends as a substitute for independent directors, due to mitigating families’ 
expropriation of minority shareholders. So, if debt as a mechanism of control is 
substituted by an independent board, the debt level tends to be low.       
By contrast, SEW provides kinship ties with some of the same collective benefits that 
arise in closed networks, including relational trust (Berrone et al., 2012).  Independent 
board member can help a company to improve its relations with organisations outside the 
family firms, such as creditor banks. The independent board may be able to help family 
firms to enhance the sustainability of the company and resolve conflicts, since the 
potential for conflict in cousin consortiums may be very high (Le Berton-Miller and 
Miller, 2013). The presence of independent board members could mitigate family 
altruism in hiring unprofessional expertise that lacks fresh ideas, has limited skills or 
results in overly centralised decisions. Thus, an independent board might play a role in 
moderating the family’s power and alleviating conflicts among shareholders. 
Correspondingly, Harford et al. (2008) found that a stronger board that can be indicated 
by a more independent board, thereby forcing the firm to hold more debt and more short-
term debt. There seems to be a positive relation between board independence and 
leverage, thus I posit that:  
 
Hypothesis 6. Board independence increases the level of leverage in a family owned firm.      
 
Table 3.7 provides a list of hypotheses about determinants. It is divided into three parts 
based on the dimension of SEW that consist of the six hypotheses cited above.  
 
Table 3.7 
List of Hypotheses of Determinants Capital Structure of Family Firm 
 
 Justification 
Dimension SEW 1: 
Family control and influence   
Hypothesis 1.  
Concentration of 
ownership in the hands 
Agency theory highlights that leverage and ownership 
concentration are interrelated through the agency problem, 
control and risk. Ownership structure and debt can be seen as 
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of family members has a 
non-linear relationship 
with leverage over the 
life period of the family.  
internal control mechanisms aimed at alleviating the agency 
conflicts that exist between different types of stakeholders 
inside corporations (D’Mello and Miranda, 2010). Capital 
structure choice will be based on loss aversion of SEW, such 
as control over business. Family firms will be more willing 
to use debt when ownership is concentrated in the hands of a 
controlling owner (Chua et al., 1999; Misra and 
McConaughy, 1999) but the dispersion of ownership may 
result in their use of debt having a non-linear relationship. 
Family firms are most vulnerable to conflict and least willing 
to bear added risk (Schulz et al., 2003), when the ownership 
is split in relatively equal proportion among founder 
descendants.  
Hypothesis 2. 
If the firm founder act 
as the CEO, the family 
firm will have low 
leverage.  
 
A stewardship perspective suggests that the family’s 
attachment to the organisation is highest when the firm is 
owned and managed by its founding family (Chua et al., 
1999; Misra and McConaughy, 1999). Equity holders with a 
controlling interest should be able to exercise their influence 
in the firm’s decisions more effectively if the founder is a 
CEO, particularly if the CEO is also the board chair or a 
board member (Boyd, 1995; Conyon and Peck, 1998). 
Schultze, et al. (2003). CEOs of family firms tend to be more 
risk averse as a consequence of family business owners 
investing most their wealth in their firm. Subsequent 
empirical tests shows that a negative relationship between a 
CEO and leverage levels can be explained by i) the 
motivation to pass the firm to the next generation and ii) 
higher risk aversion (Ampenberger et al., 2013 and Schmid, 
2013).   
Hypothesis 3. 
If family members are 
represented on the 
Board of Directors, this 
increases leverage of 
family owned firm.   
 
Equity holders with a controlling interest should be able to 
exercise their influence on the firm’s decisions more 
effectively if the founder is a board chair or board member 
(Boyd, 1995; Conyon and Peck, 1998). Schultze, et al. 
(2003). Ellul (2010) and Croci et al. (2011) noted that 
founder chairs prefer to avoid equity financing because 
control considerations exert a far greater influence on debt 
over equity financing. Stewardship theory posits that family 
member representation on a board is more concerned about 
wealth preservation rather than wealth creation (Kaye and 
Hamilton, 2004). Family presence as board members could 
reduce family tensions and align the interests among family 
members (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2013).  
Hypothesis 4. 
In a family owned firm, 
when a member of the 
family is both the CEO 
and a member of the 
Board of Directors, this 
results in less leverage. 
A founder CEO-chair gives greater influence to pursue 
family’s interest (Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2003). Moreover, the 
duality may attempt to safeguard the family’s interests (Tam 
and Tan, 2007). However, when a CEO is also chair of the 
board of directors, their power to influence capital structure 
decision increases, allowing them to choose decisions that 
protect the firm from a long term period risk, such as 
financial distress or take over by creditors. 
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Dimension SEW 2: 
Renewal of family bonds through dynastic succession. 
 
Hypothesis 5. 
If a descendant of the 
family firm founders 
acts as the CEO, this 
lead to a lower level of 
leverage.    
The coalition among family members by family presence as 
CEO could decrease the family tensions and align the 
interests among family members (Le Breton-Miller and 
Miller, 2013). They tend to align the interest and be willing 
to use more debt instead of losing control of the family. 
Monitoring becomes an effective mechanism of control due 
to the lack of qualified family successors to run the business 
(Nicholson, 2008) as agency theory posits.   
 
Dimension SEW 3: 
Binding social ties. 
  
Hypothesis 6. 
Board independence 
increases the level of 
leverage in a family 
owned firm. 
(Berrone et al., 2012): SEW provides kinship ties with some 
of the same collective benefits that arise in closed networks, 
including relational trust. Independent board member can 
help the company to improve the relations with organisations 
outside family firms such as suppliers and creditors. Harford 
et al. (2008) found that a stronger board that can be indicated 
by a more independent board which will force the firm to 
hold more debt and more short-term debt. Both agency and 
stewardship theories are equally applicable for board support 
on the success of family and non-family CEOs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.8. Summary of this Chapter 
 
The SEW could be considered as one of the most unique features of family firms and that 
make them different from non-family firms. The aspect that makes the family firms 
unique is the connection of such key elements as ownership, management, government 
and succession.  Preserving SEW is relevant to the long term goals of family firms and 
their sustainability as a business. As a strategic decision of a company, capital structure 
decisions may impact the balance of power in family firms. The access to influence 
company decisions represents the holding of a long-term commitment to maintain the 
sustainability of the company across generation. Control is not always a function of share 
ownership for family firms; instead that authority is manifested in access to control over 
critical resources such as capital needed and family members. Consequently, family firms 
may wish to gain control of their wealth and choose a capital structure that could be a 
device and / or a control mechanism. Agency theory and stewardship theory expect that 
the firm’s owners and managers, or majority and minority shareholders, become more 
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aligned but ownership concentration is more dispersed. As a result, friction among family 
members is more likely when family firms pass from one generation to the next. 
Therefore, capital structure decisions based on the objective of the preservation of the 
SEW have two implications. Firstly, capital structure decisions might lead to preserving 
the SEW for long-term survival, instead of just maximising the company’s economic 
wealth. Value is related to keeping ownership and business control. Secondly, if 
protecting the socioemotional wealth of the family becomes a priority for family owners, 
that orientation could disadvantage other shareholders such as those who are not family 
members (Berrone at al., 2012). The situations cited above seem to demonstrate that the 
chosen capital structure model represents a strategic decision to preserve SEW in a 
dynamic way, rather than being informed by the static perspectives of both agency and 
stewardship theories. The next chapter will explain how the method to test the 
determinants of capital structure in family firms is based on the development of the 
hypotheses presented above.    
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the methods used to answer the research question and test the 
hypotheses set in Chapter 3. It contains: a) a discussion of the research philosophy in 
relation to other philosophy, b) details of the research strategy, c) the source of study 
design, d) the methodological approach underlying the empirical study and e) an 
explanation of the research instruments that have been developed and used to achieve the 
research goals. This chapter is divided into three sub-sections: i) type of data, ii) data 
collection, and iii) diagnostic tests. In addition, this chapter considers data limitations and 
methodological issues encountered during the data collection process.  
 
 
4.2. Philosophical Discussion 
 
Research is a process of intellectual discovery that compares the system thinking of how 
the real world works with the real world itself. System thinking can mean different things 
in the context of different research discipline, suggesting that this is more than just a 
collection of tools and methods, it is also an underlying philosophy. Research in finance 
is generally accepted as being socially and scientifically oriented as appropriate standards 
of scientific enquiry are applied to social science rather than natural phenomena. 
Therefore, researching financial issues is categorised as a social science that studies how 
people think about, behave towards and make decisions regarding financial issues. 
Finance need to be understood from a conceptual and intuitive standpoint in order for 
individuals to analyse and make financial decisions effectively.  
 
How to acquire knowledge involves three substantive issues: the nature of belief, the basis 
of truth and the problem justification (Ryan et al., 2002). The source of belief that assumes 
knowledge can be known a priori rather than from observation or experience, is called 
rationalism. For example, in finance the idea of perfect capital markets is a rationalist 
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abstraction. The rationalist argues that the conceptualisation of perfect capital markets 
can be understood and reflected upon by the exercise of reason alone. By contrast, another 
epistemological approach called empiricism, argues that knowledge is uniquely 
determined by experience. Empiricists claim that experience can represent a justification 
of beliefs about what we know (Ryan et al., 2002). Both empiricism and rationalism focus 
on the source of knowledge and can be classified under the umbrella of positivism.   
 
Epistemologically (i.e. what is known to be true or should be), regarding acceptable 
knowledge in the field of finance, this research follows positivist methodology. Positivists 
argue that true belief is grounded in what people perceive and it is derived from a value-
free independent reality (Bryan and Bell, 2011).  In other words, the positivist approach 
suggests that social reality is independent from human perception.  Positivist research 
only records facts that can be collected and analysed independently and quantitatively 
(May, 1997). This approach has an advantage for testing hypotheses and identifying 
causal relationships between variables as predictive tools (Burrell and Morgan, 1979), as 
well as providing support for quantitative findings. Hence, the ontological consideration 
that is related to the existence of something has an independent reality apart from a 
person’s perception of it. The preposition that truth has no objective basis could be said 
to be true, if knowledge is a product of minds. Such a view means there must be 
justification and verification through observation to prove it. The principle informing the 
role of orientation for the role of theory in this research is deductive, which is to test the 
theory. Testing the theory means that predictions can be made on the basis of the 
previously observed and explained realities and their inter-relationships.         
 
 
4.2.1. Positivism and Post-Positivism 
 
Positivism is an epistemological position that advocates the application of the methods of 
natural science to the study of social reality and beyond (Bryman and Bell, 2007). In 
addition, positivists believe that reality is stable and can be observed without interfering 
with the phenomenon being studied. The paradigms of modern research in finance are 
inspired by positivist philosophy. This view is supported by Frankfurter and McGoun 
(1999) who argue that research in financial economics is dominated by positivism. In 
principle, the philosophy of positivism will be based on two distinct approaches to 
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knowledge (Ryan et al., 2002). The first approach is grounded within the context of 
rational processes, it relates to knowledge about what can be known a priori and does not 
have to be perceived. The second approach is grounded in the object of enquiry. The first 
one follows the ideas of Socrates and Plato and is known as ‘rationalism’. In finance, the 
concepts of ‘ideal’ or ‘perfect’ capital markets follow platonic abstraction. If this is 
applied, the idea is not realistic since, in the real world, there is no perfect capital market 
which assumes that managers behave rationally all the times. So there is an absence of 
flotation costs, there are no taxes, no transaction costs and the situation is under certain 
conditions, therefore capital structure is irrelevant (Modigliani and Miller, 1958).  
 
In turn, ‘empiricism’ follows Aristotle’s idea that knowledge may be gathered through 
observation and categorisation. It also challenges the existence of the ideal form. This 
position is based on the following principles: (i) accepting only phenomena and hence 
knowledge that can be warranted as  knowledge (the principle of phenomenalism); (ii) 
the hypothesis can be tested based on the theory and allows an explanation to be assessed 
(the principle of deduction); (iii) the knowledge is a result of collecting of facts based on 
laws (the principle of induction); (iv) the science must be value free or objective; (v) and 
there is a difference between scientific statements which is the domain of scientists and 
normative statements, because the truth cannot be confirmed by the senses.  
 
Accordingly, following empiricism, this research will be concerned with what is 
discerned to be real or reality subsisting within objects or realism. Realism represents the 
common-sense view that a thing has a reality which is independent of perception. 
Likewise, the approach of empirical realists to determine the truth about reality is to take 
what is claimed and compare it with empirical evidence, so it can be a corresponding 
theory of truth. However, there is another idea that rather than being correspondent, the 
reality of experience is a mental representation as well. Knowledge is therefore mentally 
constructed and the truth does not correspond with reality but is coherent with the 
individual or with beliefs of others. This position is different from the idealist who 
concludes that reality is a construction of society and it is not the construction of minds.     
      
By way of comparison post-positivism, or interpretivism, is an epistemology stance that 
is critical of positivism. If positivists believe that there is independency between the 
object and subject of research, post-positivists accept that the background, knowledge and 
values of the researcher can influence what is observed. Thus, interpretivism is predicated 
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upon the view that a strategy is required to attain the subjective meaning of social science. 
Post-positivists are profoundly influenced by Weber’s conception called Verstehen 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007). The fundamental difference between social science and natural 
science is that social reality has meaning and therefore human action is meaningful; the 
task of scientists is to interpret their actions from their point of view. Therefore, the social 
phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors and 
social objects are socially constructed.     
 
 
4.2.2. Philosophical Discussion and Rationale for the Choice of Approach   
 
This thesis follows the methodology of positivist empiricism in order to provide evidence 
from within the financial disciplines and particularly in the field of corporate finance. The 
reason for this choice is that empiricism accepts the distinction between theoretical and 
empirical domains of discovery. The central thesis of positivist empiricism is verification, 
thus only empirical observation through the process of validation is cognitively 
meaningful.  
 
Both the research traditions of positivism and post-positivism/interpretivism have their 
own approaches to detecting the truth of reality. The positivist approach suggests that 
social reality is independent from human perception. However post-positivism argues that 
the idea of social reality is a construct and a result of the human’s mind and is therefore 
subjective. Positivists believe that the role of researcher is limited to data collection and 
interpretation in objective way (May, 1997). This approach is useful for testing 
hypotheses and identifying causal relationships between variables to predict reality 
(Burrel and Morgan, 1979). By contrast, post-positivism focuses on the subjectivity of 
the individuals who are observed as well as those doing the observing (May, 1997) and 
can be more responsive to any idiosyncrasies of the observed objects. Even though both 
use data sets, the positivist uses quantitative data analysis and post-positivists focus on 
qualitative factors such as perceptions and opinions of those participants in the study.  
 
This thesis follows the paradigms of financial economics created by positivists such as 
Milton Friedman, Robert Lucas and Eugene F. Fama. However, since reality is 
independent from perception, realist methodology will be applied. Positive realists 
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maintain that reality exists within the objects of perception and that the construction of 
behavioural reality and the way to determine the truth is to compare what is claimed with 
empirical evidence to create a corresponding theory of truth (Ryan et al., 2002). This idea 
is relevant to the situation of family firms in that a capital structure decision is not value 
neutral, the family is motivated inside not only based on the peak hierarchical aim of the 
firm, which is maximising the value of shareholders, but also to preserve SEW. This 
observation means that the theories individuals construct are coloured by normative views 
of how the world should be organised (North, 1990). Accordingly, this thesis uses a 
quantitative research method to support the data analysis process. The determinants of 
capital structure are derived and quantified from the aim of family firms to preserve 
socioemotional wealth. To achieve this aim families will: i) keep control of and influence 
over the firm’s operation, ii) renewal of family bonds through dynastic succession, and, 
iii) binding social ties.   
 
 
4.3. Research Design 
The design of the research presented in this thesis is illustrated in the figure below:  
 
Figure 4.1. Research Design 
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The research design relates to the plan for conducting the study. With regards to this 
thesis, the hypotheses are derived from the theoretical framework and literature reviews 
contained in Chapters 2 and 3. The objectives of this research is to investigate the 
determinants of capital structure of family firms in Indonesia, with particular focus on 
preserving SEW could explain family firms’ behaviour with regards to their capital 
structure. The study is using a quantitative approach.   
 
The research model is constructed by comparing and evaluating prior studies in general, 
and prominent literature about capital structure decisions and family firms in particular, 
along with relevant information specific to family firms in Indonesia. The research 
follows the concept of socioemotional wealth by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010); Berrone et 
al. (2010) and Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011) – socio-emotional wealth was created as an 
extension of behavioural agency theory, as formulated by Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia in 
1998. 
 
To answer the objectives and all the hypotheses set out in this thesis, this study employs 
both pooled and panel data analysis, due to the longitudinal nature of the data contained 
in the present study. Panel data regression methods are used to account for possible 
unobservable heterogeneity. The poolability test is employed to test whether panel data 
models (fixed effects and random effects) are necessary. The appropriate model 
specification will occur after the testing procedures outlined above are carried out. 
According to Kutzetnov et al. (2008), these estimation techniques (fixed and random 
effects) allow researchers to control for unobserved individual, firm-specific effects.  
 
 
4.3.1. Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
 
In the pooled model, all observations are put together and the regression coefficients 
describe the overall influence, with no specific time or individual firm aspect. It is 
assumed that the error term captures the differences between the individuals (a cross 
sectional unit) over the time (a time series), thus the pooled model is: 
Yit = Ziα + βXit +εit ………………………….……………………………………..….(1) 
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Where: 
Yit is the dependent variable where i = firm and t = year. 
Zi is a constant term and a set of individual variables. 
α is unknown intercept for each individu. 
β is the coefficient for independent variables. 
Xit represents independent variables. 
εit  is an error term.   
 
The ordinary least square (OLS) technique is used to estimate the pooled model. If Zi is 
contains only a constant term, then OLS provides consistent and efficient estimates of 
common α and β. However, this model is usually restrictive and unrealistic since this 
model omits the individual effects. Moreover, pooling the data in this model implicitly 
assume that the average values of the variables and the relationships between them are 
constant over time and across all of the cross-sectional units in the sample (Brooks, 2014).  
Thus, variables in the OLS model is expected to be biased upward suggesting there are 
bias of unobservable individual effects in the residual term of OLS and the potential 
correlation between individual effects and the included regression.   
  
According to Green (2008), if there are individual firm-related and/or time-specific 
heterogeneities on the dependent variable, this problem can be accommodated by 
employing one of the panel techniques, fixed effect model or random effect model. 
Therefore, a panel data technique helps to minimise the problems that arise regarding 
omitted variable problems, such as time-specific and firm-specific variables. In addition, 
this approach provides robust parameter estimators, rather than just time-series or cross-
sectional data.      
 
 
4.3.2. Fixed Effect Model (FE) 
 
The fixed effect model allows for the control of unobserved heterogeneity that describes 
individual’s specific effects, which are not captured by observed variables. The fixed 
effect model assume that individual’s specific may impact or bias the predictor, thus it 
needs to be controlled the bias. This model remove the effect of time-invariant 
characteristics, thus the effect of the predictors on the variable can be assessed.  In fixed 
effect, if Zi is unobserved but correlated with Xit, then the least square estimator is biased 
and inconsistent as a consequences of omit variables. This model will be estimated by 
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using OLS and takes αi to be a group-specific constant term in the regression model and 
slope varies across i, (Green, 2008) thus the fixed effect model is:    
Yit = αi + β’Xit + εit ….………………………………………………………..………..(2) 
 
The fixed effect model explores the relationship between explanatory variables and 
dependent variable within each firm. Each firm has their individual characteristics that 
may affect the independent variables. Thus, something within individual can influence 
biased explanatory variables or dependent variable. This model removes the effect of time 
variant characteristics from independent variables and evaluate those variables. In 
addition, those time invariant characteristics are unique to individuals and do not have 
correlation with other individual characteristics.  
 
 
4.3.3. Random Effect Model (RE)  
 
In a random effect model, αi is an unknown intercept for a group specific disturbance, 
similar to εit, the unobserved effects are captured by the error term except for each group. 
The component of µi is the random disturbance characterizing the ith observation and is 
constant through time (Green, 2008). Thus, the random effect model is:  
Yit = α + β’Xit + µi + εit …………………………………………………………..…….(3) 
 
The random effect model will be estimated by the generalised least square (GLS) 
technique. The GLS technique takes into account the different correlation structure of the 
error term in the random effects model (Green, 2008). This model assumes that the 
individual specification is a random variable that uncorrelated with explanatory variables 
of the same individual. Moreover, the variance of the individual specific effect is constant. 
Thus, the parameters (α and the β vector) are estimated consistently but inefficiently by 
OLS (Brooks, 2014), and the conventional equation of OLS would have to be modified 
as a result of cross-correlations between error terms for a given a cross-sectional unit at 
different time.    
 
The purpose of employing three alternative research methods is to find out which model 
will provide the best specification to estimate the datasets. To decide the best option, 
firstly, this study uses the Wald F-test for testing fixed effect models against the pooled 
OLS model under the null hypothesis that the dataset is poolable or the coefficients are 
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zero. The null hypothesis of OLS is that the dataset is poolable, means individuals have 
the same slope coefficients. If the null hypothesis is rejected (if ρ < 0.05) because the 
Wald F-test is significant, suggesting that the fit specification to estimate the data sets 
needs to use a panel effect.    
 
Secondly, this study uses the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for testing 
random effects model against pooled OLS, under the null hypothesis that the cross-
sectional variance components are zero. It means no significant difference across units 
(i.e. no panel effect). The significant LM test means the rejection of the null hypothesis 
(if ρ < 0.05), suggesting that the individual firm effect is not consistent and there is a 
panel effect. Thus, if null rejected, a Hausman test must be performed to compare with 
random effects estimation.   
 
Lastly, to distinguish between fixed effects and the random effect models, I employ the 
Hausman test. This test under the null hypothesis investigates whether the coefficients 
estimated by the random effect estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the fixed 
effects estimator. Thus, if the null hypothesis is rejected (if ρ < 0.05), that outcome will 
suggest that fixed effects estimators are more appropriate and consistent than random 
effects model estimations.          
 
 
4.4. Methodology 
4.4.1. Population and Sampling 
 
This study utilises quantitative secondary financial data obtained from The Indonesian 
Capital Market Institute (TICMI) database for the period from 2011 to 2015 covering 520 
Indonesian companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX): 322 family firms 
and 198 non-family firms. Based on IDX classifications there are 9 sectors: (1) 
Agriculture; (2) Mining; (3) Basic and Chemical; (4) Miscellaneous; (5) Consumer 
Goods; (6) Property and Real Estate; (7) Infrastructure, Utilities and Transportation; (8) 
Banking; and (9) Trade and Services.   
 
The study targeted all Indonesian family firms that were listed companies available in the 
market for 5 consecutive years. The data for pooled and panel econometric techniques 
was collected from the firms’ annual reports and from IDX publications. The time horizon 
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was chosen due to the post-merger period of the Jakarta Stock Exchange and Surabaya 
Stock Exchange, an entity that then became known as the Indonesian Stock Exchange 
(IDX) on October 30, 2007. Furthermore, there was a trade-off between sample size and 
the length of the sample period, where firms had continuous presence in the market for 
five consecutive years. Hence, the data was chosen in a way that optimised the number 
of observations and the length of the sample period. Thus, 2011 to 2015 is the period that 
can optimise the number of observations.  The reason for the study period selection was 
to minimise the missing observations for sample companies; a model was constructed 
according to the following sample selection criteria: 
1. Firms that operate in the banking sector (sector 8) were excluded because of their 
special characteristics in comparison with the capital structure of non-banking 
industries. Banks are highly regulated by the Indonesian government. Another 
reason for exclusion is that banks have a high level of leverage that may tend to 
bias results and analysis (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  
2. Family firms engaged in merger or acquisition activity during this study period 
were excluded. 
3. Family firms with missing data were excluded. 
4. Family firms that have been delisted and then relisted during this study period 
were excluded. 
    
The application of these criteria confined the sample population to 160 family firms, 
allowing for a total of 800 observations for each variable, with data continuously available 
from 2011 to 2015. This number corresponds to almost 50 percent of all family firms 
listed in the IDX at the end of 2015. Thus, this study sample consists of almost half of the 
listed family firms in the IDX during the 2011 to 2015 research period.   
 
 
4.4.2. Data and Collection Procedures 
 
The observations consist of all IDX listed family firms in Indonesia that meet the 
inclusion criteria set out above, relating to data from the first generation to the third 
generation. As can be seen from Table 4.1, Panel A, a total of 800 observations, excluding 
the financial institutions sector and firms with no financial reports, were manually 
collected for 160 listed family firms. Following prior studies (La Porta et al., 2000; Setia-
Atmaja et al., 2009), 47 financial firms (including 20 banks) are excluded because they 
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are highly regulated and their corporate policies are influenced by government 
regulations.   
 
Table 4.1. 
Panel A. Number of observations 
 
 Number of 
Companies 
Number of Observations 
(5 years) 
Population:    
Family firms  322 1610 
Final observation:   
Family firms Founder Stage (1st Generation)    59 295 
Family firms Descendant Stage 
2nd Generation 
 
 72 
 
360 
3rd Generation  29 145 
Total sample 160 800 
 
Panel B. Indonesian family firms clustered by industry (2011-2015) 
 
Code Industry  Number 
1. Agriculture 8 
2. Mining 10 
3. Basic and Chemical 29 
4. Miscellaneous 17 
5. Consumer Goods 15 
6. Property and Real Estate 20 
7. Infrastructure, Utilities, and Transportation 11 
9. Trade and Services  50 
Total  160 
 
 
McConoughy et al. (1998), La Porta et al. (1999), Faccio and Lang (2002), and Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) define a family firm as any company run by the founder or member of 
the founding family, or a founding individual who owns a fraction of the company or 
serves on the board; it should be noted the percentages of these ownership fractions vary. 
Thus, to operationally define a family firm the 10 percent ownership threshold will be 
used, which is in line with many other family-firm investigations (La Porta et al., 1999; 
Maury, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Pindado et al., 2008) and is considered high 
enough for a family to exercise effective control over the business (Poutziouris et al., 
2015).  In addition, the regulations in Indonesia allow the major shareholder to enhance 
their control, thereby directly or indirectly controlling the management and the 
company’s policies, in spite of holding less than 25 percent voting shares (under the act 
number 12/23/PBI/2010 of Bank Central Indonesia).    
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The data about family ownership, a family CEO’s influence, family board representation, 
positional and role duality and family succession issues were collected manually. For 
some firms, the process of decision-making is clear since the information denotes the 
founder, other family members and their descendants. Admittedly, after the founder stage, 
usually family firms expand the family members with other family names (distant 
relatives and in-laws). Therefore, I was obliged to trace descendants by manually 
searching corporate histories from companies’ prospectuses and other sources, such as 
company press releases, capital market news and literature for each firm in the research 
sample.   
 
 
4.4.3. Variable Measurements 
 
Financial literature is divided on what is the most appropriate measurement of leverage 
(Frank and Goyal, 2009). Some authors argue that book value is the most appropriate 
criterion to be used (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009) because managers consider book value 
rather than market value when making their decisions (Myers, 2001). Other researchers 
argue that market value provides more reliable results (Ampenberger et al., 2013) and 
still others argue that both should be used (Kayo and Kimura, 2011). Above all, DeAngelo 
and Roll (2011) state that book value and market value leverage measures are highly 
correlated. This study follows the pointers from Anderson & Reeb (2003) and Setia-
Atmaja et al. (2009) who measured leverage in terms of book value, since mostly the fund 
sources of family firms in Indonesia are from banking loans. Book value in Indonesia is 
also used by creditors to determine how much capital to lend to a firm and the amount 
creditors can expect to receive if the firm goes into liquidation.   
 
The variable of leverage included two measures: long-term debt and short-term debt. 
Long-term debt is an alternative source of long term funds, in addition to equity, and is 
much more prominent in developing countries, such as Indonesia, when compared to the 
financial arrangements evident in developed countries/economies. However, developing 
countries such as Indonesia’s carry a substantially lower amount of long-term debt 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Booth et al., 2001). This is because companies 
in Indonesia mostly rely on banks as funding sources, at a time when the role of the 
nation’s banking industry in meeting the demand for long-term funds is limited. In 
addition, fund sourced from debt markets are still inadequate for long-term funds in 
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Indonesia, compared with other South-East Asia countries such as Malaysia and 
Thailand.  
 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggested that in developing countries firms use trade credit 
as a means of financing their activities. This finding describes the situation in Indonesia 
regarding the limitations of the banking industry in providing long-term funds, because 
most of the funds collected by banks are in the form of short-term debt. On this basis, I 
included ‘accounts payable’ as a short-term debt when measuring leverage levels for 
Indonesia firms. Therefore, in this research, the book values of long-term debt and short-
term debt are applied to estimate and identify factors that influence capital structure 
decisions. 
 
Independent variables related to the concept of SEW dimensions include family control 
and influence, renewal of family bonds through dynastic succession and bonding social 
ties. Control variables account for: i) tangibility, ii) profitability, iii) firm size, iv) non-
debt tax shield, v) a firm’s age, vi) a firm’s liquidity vii) growth opportunities, along with 
binary variables for family influences and involvement. These variables include: a) CEO 
founder, b) family board representation, c) role duality and d) CEOs’ descendants). All 
the variables used in this study are briefly described below.  
 
a. Family Control and Influence 
1. Ownership  
 
Family ownership addresses the impact of different levels of family holdings. To analyse 
the ownership structure of family firms, this study follows La Porta et al. (1999), 
Claessens et al. (2000) and Bunkanwanicha et al. (2008). Firstly, I investigate the 
founding family firm by identifying the ultimate owners who control 10 percent or more 
equity and who are involved in the top management of the firm. Supplementary data such 
as capital market news, prospectuses of companies at the time of their initial public 
offering that cover the history of companies and other resources were used to identify the 
owners of the firms. I consider a family and its members (such as same family name, 
family in-laws, etc.) as one unit of analysis. Then, I calculate the percentage of shares 
held by the family as a group, denoted as ownership, in order to address the impact of 
different levels of family holdings. I consider that the relationship between family 
holdings and debt might not be uniform over the entire range of family ownership. For 
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this reason, I assume that such relationships cannot be precisely linear. Therefore, to test 
whether the family ownership concentration has the same impact when nonlinearities are 
considered, I modify the regression by including the percentage of family ownership, the 
percentage of family ownership squared (denoted as ownership2) and the family 
ownership cubed (denoted as ownership3). This study uses a 10 percent ownership 
boundary that has been widely used in prior studies of family firms and is considered high 
enough for an owning family to exercise effective control (La Porta et al., 1999; Maury, 
2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Pindado et al., 2008; Santos et al., 2014; Poutziouris et 
al., 2015).  
 
 
2. CEO Founder 
 
The combination of undiversified family holdings and the desire to preserve SEW and to 
pass the company onto subsequent generations suggests that founder CEOs (denoted as 
CEO founder) are more likely to have stronger incentives to reduce risk, particularly if 
they are wanting to maintain control of the business (Jensen, 1986). Lower debt can 
reduce risk when aiming to reduce the probability of bankruptcy (Harijono et al., 2004). 
However, Anderson et al. (2003) found that the cost of debt when the founder is CEO is 
less than the cost of debt taken on by outside CEOs. This outcome indicates that the 
founder, as a CEO, is viewed as bringing the unique and added value of their skills to the 
company. When family firms decrease their members’ ownership, family influence via 
the CEOs can be a powerful influence upon decision making, because they have better 
access and better mechanisms to provide incentives to invest than ownership. The variable 
CEO founder indicates the operational role of the founder and is a binary variable that 
equals one if the founder acts as CEO and zero for an outside CEO.  
 
 
3. Family Board Representation  
 
Equity holders with controlling interest in a business should be able to exercise their 
influence on the firm’s decisions more effectively if the founder or family member is the 
board chair or a board member (Boyd, 1995; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006; Ampenberger et al., 2013). Ellul (2010) and Croci et al. (2011) noted that a 
founder chair prefers to avoid equity financing because control considerations exert a far 
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greater influence on debt than does equity financing. While a descendant chair is more 
likely to use a lower level of leverage that could protect the family firm from the threat 
of takeover from capital suppliers (creditors). Such a chairperson is also likely to be more 
concerned about wealth preservation rather than wealth creation (Kaye and Hamilton, 
2004). The variable of family board representation is used to oversee and limit 
managerial opportunism (Anderson and Reeb, 2003); a behaviour which can happen 
when the CEO is hired from outside the family. To estimate the role of boards in capital 
structure  family board representation is a binary variable that equals one when a family 
member is present on the board of directors and zero otherwise.  
 
 
4. Duality 
 
The dual position of the founder as the CEO and chair of the Board of Directors gives a 
greater opportunity to influence the operation of the firm and to pursue family interest 
than if there is no dual position (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). Family firms may attempt to 
safeguard the sustainability of the business and preservation of socioemotional wealth by 
placing family members as CEO and chair of the board of directors (Tam and Tan, 2007). 
However, Miller et al. (2007) argued that dual roles may be beneficial only when the 
business is at the founder stage. The variable duality is measured by a binary variable that 
equals one when CEO is a Chairman and zero otherwise.  
 
 
b. Renewal of Family Bonds through Dynastic Succession  
 
The renewal of family bonds through dynastic succession is estimated by using a binary 
variable to denote the descendants of the founder family firm’s involvement in the 
business as a CEO (denoted as CEO descendant); the variable equals one if the founder 
descendant acts as CEO and zero for an outside CEO. This research uses the succession-
based dummy-variable approach as the primary indicator of next generation participation 
in this testing. Ensuring the business is handed down to the next generation and assets are 
passed down to descendants, suggesting that succession becomes a continuous process in 
family firms (Poutziouris, 2001). The research of Kaye and Hamilton (2004) points out 
that transferring business to the next generation appears to create a negative relationship 
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with leverage. However, Molly et al. (2010) posit that if the next generations are mostly 
concerned with SEW, the result could be reversed.    
 
 
c. Binding Social Ties 
 
Family firms may select an independent board member who can provide professional 
expertise or has needed expert knowledge. It is expected that they will add to the value of 
the firm and discipline managers to take their interest benefits (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Boone et al., 2007). According to Andersen and Reeb 
(2004), independent directors play a part in protecting outside family shareholders from 
self-dealing families, such as when an unqualified or incompetent family member is 
placed as a CEO. In addition, independent boards are associated with the lower cost of 
debt as compared to other means of funding (Anderson et al., 2002; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 
2002) and a healthy board members of family firms. Thus, it would seem logical to 
conclude that there is a positive relationship between board independence and debt ratios. 
Studies by Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) measure a board’s 
independence by the number of independent directors divided by the  total board size 
thereby establishing the proportion of outside independent directors compared to directors 
who are family members (denoted as board independence).    
 
 
d. Control Variables (Firms’ Characteristics) 
 
There are numerous factors that could affect capital structure decisions. If a regression 
model fails to account for these variables, one cause could because the regression does 
not have the appropriate form for other parameters (omitted variable bias). The bias could 
produce a spurious relationship between dependent and independent variables and the 
results would therefore not be reliable (Wooldridge, 2012). To prevent this issue from 
occurring, firms’ characteristics have been chosen as control variables that are known, 
from the previous literature, to impact a firm’s capital structure. To define the control 
variables, I am informed by the studies of Croci et al. (2011), Ellul (2011), Ampenberger 
et al. (2011) and Schmid (2013).   
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1. Asset Structure  
 
The variable TANG is measured as the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. The greater 
the proportion of asset tangibility, the more creditors are willing to provide loans, 
resulting in an increase in a firm’s leverage (Gaud et al., 2001; Ozkan, 2001; Chen, 2004; 
Laery, 2009 Ellul, 2009). Creditors will see that asset tangibility is easy to monitor and 
thus tends to mitigate agency conflict between lenders and borrowers. The expenditure to 
monitor family firms with large asset tangibility seems likely to be reduced, when 
compared with family firms with less asset tangibility. Thus, such asset tangibility as a 
collateral can reduce the risk of agency costs associated with debt by the creditors (Titman 
and Wessel, 1988; Voutsinas and Werner, 2011). Thus, a positive relationship between 
tangibility of assets and leverage is expected.   
 
2. Profitability 
 
The variable PROF is measured by the ratio of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation 
and amortisation (EBITDA) to total assets. Profitability is an indicator that firms are well 
managed and thus are more efficient than those that are not. In line with this view, credit 
suppliers will provide more debt to profitable companies, informed by the perception of 
a reduced bankruptcy risk (Heshmati, 2012). However, almost all empirical studies that 
focus on the demand side have found the relationship between profitability and leverage 
is negative (Aggarwal and Kyaw, 2010; Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010). In addition, 
profitable firms prefer not to add more debt in order to avoid the bankruptcy risk in the 
long-term and in order to maintain control are reluctant to issue new power diluting 
equity. Thus, for these reasons, I expect an inverse relationship between profitability and 
leverage in the long-term.  
 
3. Firm Size 
 
The variable SIZE is measured by the logarithm of total assets. The effect of size toward 
disclosure is that the larger the firm the more information is provided to creditors. As the 
information is open to the public, ‘it is in the public domain’, the probability that firms 
will hide the information regarding the possibility of default is unlikely; thus large firms 
can obtain a greater amount of leverage than smaller ones (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003). In general, larger firms face fewer 
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information problems than other businesses; a scenario which might increase their 
bargaining power with creditors (Degryse et al., 2012). Therefore, firm size is expected 
to have a positive impact on leverage.  
  
4. Non-debt tax shield  
 
The variable NDTS is defined as the ratio of depreciation to total assets. This may be 
regarded as a substitute for the tax benefits available from debt financing. As a 
consequence, debt levels should be inversely related to the level of any non-debt tax shield 
(Santos et al., 2014). However, Ozkan (2001) argues that NDTS may be a proxy for other 
things; a higher level of depreciation tends to have fewer growth options of investment 
opportunity sets, thus have relatively more tangible assets (Barclay and Smith, 1995). 
Therefore, available evidence may imply a positive relationship between a non-debt tax 
shield and leverage levels.     
 
5. Firm’s age 
 
The variable AGE is measured by the number of years since the firm’s incorporation. 
Established family firms have a reputation regarding creditworthiness with creditors and 
should have a higher borrowing capacity because of reduced asymmetric information and 
lower financial distress. The interaction between lenders and borrower over time makes 
creditors able to alleviate the information asymmetry that causes financial distress in a 
family firm. However, Filatotchev et al., (2006) and Johnson et al., (2016) found that as 
a firm ages after going public, the corporate restrictions and board members influence the 
capital structure choices. Thus, a negative relationship between firm’s age and leverage 
is expected.  
 
6. Liquidity 
 
The variable LIQ is defined as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities.  Illiquid 
family firms face limits on attracting debt because potential or actual financial distress 
will be indicated as relatively high. Even though creditors could act as liquidity providers 
to their important customers in distress (Oliveira et al., 2017), such relief is only 
temporary because providing additional debt to lenders can increase creditors’ current 
liabilities. Consistent with this reasoning, illiquid family firms induce financial 
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constraints and increase the monitoring costs demanded by creditors. On the other hand, 
Ozkan (2001) argues that firms with greater liquid assets may use these assets to finance 
their investments. Thus, a negative relationship between liquidity and leverage is 
expected.  
 
7. Firm’s Growth  
 
The variable GROW is defined as the market value of equity to the book value of equity.  
Firms with higher growth opportunities are more likely to exhaust internal funds and 
require more debt than the firms that are not growing. Therefore, this choice can raise the 
costs of borrowing that lead firms to choose internal funding sources or equity instead of 
debt. Moreover, growth opportunities are likely have an inverse relationship with the 
probability of default and lender risk. Firms with growth prospects may be less likely to 
be default than firms with less growth opportunities. This situation assures creditors they 
cover less risk of the probability of such a firm’s bankruptcy. Therefore, a positive 
relationship between growth opportunities and leverage is indicated. Table 4.2 provides 
a summary of the variables used in regression analysis.  
 
Table 4.2. Measurement of Variables 
 
Variables Measurement 
Dependent variables  
1 Long-term debt (LTD) Ratio of book value of long term debt to total assets.  
2 Short-term debt (STD) Ratio of book value of short term debt to total assets. 
   
Independent variables  
Family Control and Influence  
1. Family ownership The percentage of shares held by the family as a group. 
2. Family ownership2 The square of the variable Family Ownership 
3. Family ownership3 The cube of the variable Family Ownership  
4. CEO founder A binary variable that equals one when the founder of 
the firm is serving as the CEO, zero otherwise. 
5. Family board 
representation  
A binary variable that equals one when a family 
members are present on the board of directors, zero 
otherwise. 
6. Duality  A binary variable which equals one if the CEO is the 
Chair of the board of directors, zero otherwise. 
   
Renewal of family bonds 
through dynastic succession 
 
7. CEO descendant  A binary variable that equals one when a family 
member succeeds as CEO, zero otherwise.  
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Binding Social Ties 
8. Board independence The proportion of independent directors on the board. 
   
Control variables 
(Firm Characteristics) 
 
9. Asset structure (TANG) Ratio of tangible assets (the sum of fixed assets and 
inventories) to total assets.   
10. Profitability (PROF) Ratio of earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation 
to total assets. 
11. Firm size (SIZE) The natural logarithm of total assets. 
12. Tax shield effect (NDTS) Non-debt tax shields-ratio of depreciation to total 
assets.   
13. Firm age (AGE) The number of years since the firm’s incorporation.  
14. Liquidity (LIQ) Ratio of current assets to current liabilities 
15. Growth opportunities 
(GROW) 
Ratio of market value to book value. 
   
 
 
4.4.4. The Model 
 
I employ the following model to investigate the determinants of capital structure of listed 
family firms on the IDX. In this model, the observed leverage is presented as a function 
of various firm-specific factors. The primary specification is: 
 
Leveragei,t = α + β1(OWNi,t) + β2(OWN2i,t) + β3(OWN3i,t) + β4(CEO founderi,t) + 
β5(Family board representationi,t) + β6(Dualityi,t) + β7(CEO decendanti,t) + 
β8(Board independencei,t) + β9(TANGi,t) + β10(PROFi,t) + β11(SIZEi,t) + 
β12(NDTSi,t) + β13(AGEi,t) + β14(LIQi,t) + β 15(GROWi,t) + €i,t 
 
Note: the leverage measure of the firm i in year t, and family involvement variables and 
firm characteristics for firm i in year t, signify the explanatory variables and control 
variables.  
 
This study uses panel data to combine cross-sectional data with time series information. 
Such an approach utilises general models for panel data that enable the production of 
empirical estimates of the relationship between leverage (dependent variables) and 
dimensions of SEW (independent variables). The firm’s characteristics are employed in 
the role of control variables. The hypotheses will be tested using a regression model that 
explains the firm’s capital structure. This method is in line with previous studies 
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(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Ampenberger et al., 2013). Thereby, the existing theories 
presented earlier can be used to draw the hypotheses.  
 
According to Harris and Raviv (1991), different measures of leverage can produce 
different results that can affect the interpretation of those results. Moreover, the 
determinants of capital structure are highly sensitive to choice of leverage (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Both et al., 2001). Therefore, for the analysis two different measures of 
leverage are employed in this study as dependent variables: i) long-term debt book value 
to total assets (LTD) and ii) short-term debt to total assets (STD). The independent 
variables use numerical parameters that proxy for: (1) Family control and influence: 
involvement in ownership, being CEO, being Chair/Board members and being both CEO 
and Chair at the same time: duality); (2) Renewal of family bonds through dynastic 
succession (descendant succeeds as a CEO); and (3) Binding societal ties (independent 
board members). These models use binary variables that proxy for founder and 
descendant as a CEO compared to an outside hire as a CEO. Two different models are 
used to test the validity of capital structure in family firms. The two models are presented 
below:  
 
Model 1. (Long-term debt): 
LTDi,t = α + β1(OWNi,t) + β2(OWN2i,t) + β3(OWN3i,t) + β4(CEO founderi,t) + β5(Family 
board representationi,t) + β6(Dualityi,t) + β7(CEO decendanti,t) + β8(Board 
independencei,t) + β9(TANGi,t) + β10(PROFi,t) + β11(SIZEi,t) + β12(NDTSi,t) 
+ β13(AGEi,t) + β 14(GROWi,t) + €i,t 
 
Model 2. (Short-term debt): 
STDi,t = α + β1(OWNi,t) + β2(OWN2i,t) + β3(OWN3i,t) + β4(CEO founderi,t) + β5(Family 
board representationi,t) + β6(Dualityi,t) + β7(CEO decendanti,t) + β8(Board 
independencei,t) + β9(TANGi,t) + β10(PROFi,t) + β11(SIZEi,t) + β12(NDTSi,t) 
+ β13(AGEi,t) + β14(LIQi,t) + β 15(GROWi,t) + €i,t 
 
 
Note: α stands for model constant, βi stands for the coefficiency of independent variables, 
i stands for the firm number (N = 160), t stands for the number of the number of the years 
(T = 5) and €i,t stands for the error term.  
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4.5. Summary of this Chapter 
 
In this chapter, the detail about the philosophy, philosophical rationale and choice of 
approaches to conduct this study are discussed. There is a clear orientation of principle to 
link the theoretical terms embedded within financial models with empirical observations. 
The basis orientation to the role of theory in this research is deductive, a focus chosen to 
test the agency and stewardship theories. By testing the prediction of these theories can 
be made on the basis of the previously observed and explained realities and their inter-
relationships. This thesis follows a positivist empiricism methodology in order to provide 
evidence within the financial disciplines and particularly in the field of corporate finance. 
This perspective is relevant with regards to family firms in that a capital structure decision 
is not value neutral. The owner family has internal motivation not only based on the peak 
hierarchical aim of the firm - to maximise value to shareholders - but also to preserve 
SEW. Thereby, the existing theories presented earlier can be used to test the hypotheses. 
Owing to the longitudinal nature of the data employed in the present study, the research 
design employs both the fixed effects model and random effects model. To minimise the 
potential lack of validity in the conclusions, this study analyses the results obtained 
quantitatively. The measurement validity, internal validity, and external validity are taken 
into account, so that the results obtained should be consistent with each other. Lastly, this 
chapter considers data analysis procedures to verify that the estimation model is correct.    
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ANALYSIS 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the findings of the research on the capital structure of family firms, 
in the context of Indonesian listed companies. An analysis and discussion of the data and 
the study’s methods will be offered in this chapter, as well. The empirical findings are in 
the form of quantitative regression results, which are presented in two parts. The first part 
highlights descriptive statistics, and the second part outlines the main quantitative 
regression results. The quantitative analysis uses long-term debt and short-term debt as 
dependent variables, together with several independent variables. With the aim of testing 
the theoretical framework detailed in Chapters 2 and 3, the main focus of the analysis is 
on the empirical evidences, which will be used to provide a holistic picture of the 
determinants of capital structure decisions in family firms in Indonesia.   
 
This chapter is subdivided into several sections. Section 5.2 explains data analysis 
procedures. Section 5.3 explains the descriptive statistics and univariate statistics on the 
determinants of capital structure. Section 5.4 presents multicollinearity tests. Section 5.5 
examines the multivariate testing results on capital structure. Section 5.6 analysis the 
determinants of capital structure in Indonesian family firms that will answer and discuss 
hypotheses 1 to 6, and Section 5.7 summarises the overall analysis and discusses the 
findings relating to how capital structure is decided in family firms, based on the 
dimensions of socio-emotional wealth: (i) family control and influence, (ii) renewal of 
family bonds through dynastic succession and (iii) binding social ties.   
 
 
5.2. Data Analysis Procedures  
 
Data analysis went through different stages before being imported and used in the data 
analysis programme. Firstly, data collected from financial statements was entered 
manually in the MS Excel sheet, itemising both dependent and independent variables as 
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proposed above. During this stage, the data was calculated based on the proxies that are 
used as parameters. Since the data was ready for the regression, the next step was to move 
to the data analysis econometric software (STATA). 
 
The next procedure was a multicollinearity test for some sets of explanatory variables. 
The variables were tested to ensure that there is no multicollinearity among the 
independent variables that would affect the significance of the regression results. This 
procedure examines an exact linear relationship in the observation between the means of 
the response variables and the value of explanatory variables (Van Horne, 2001). The aim 
of this test is to analyse whether there is a correlation between independent variables. The 
way to detect the problem of multicollinearity in this study is by using the tolerance values 
and/or the variance inflation factor (VIF) (Hair et al., 1998). A variable whose mean VIF 
values are greater than 10 could be considered as a linear combination of other 
independent variables. Those variables will not include a predictor variable in a model if 
they have a VIF value of more than 10 or a mean VIF greater than 10.  Hence, the main 
estimation method applied in this analysis uses panel regression.   
 
Moreover, to correct the possibility of heterokedasticity, the pooled model estimated 
using the procedure of robust standard error named the White-Hubber standard error 
correction process (Schmid, 2013; Patersen, 2009). These tests ensure that the coefficients 
of the independent variables are not biased as the result of incorrect standards errors. The 
reason to apply this test is because if the analysis involves time series data, there is a 
higher probability that there exists heterokedasticity in the error terms. Heterokedasticity 
specifies that the variance of the error terms is not constant as the dependent variables 
change. To correct the heterokedasticity, this study followed a correction technique 
proposed by White (1980). Furthermore, the regressions are tested for the overall 
significance of the model by the F test and its probability value (p-value), for individual 
variables partially using T test and p-values, as well.       
 
T-test was used to test the hypotheses that independent variables: family control and 
influence, renewal of family bonds through dynastic succession and binding social ties 
have relationships with leverage. In this test, the null hypothesis assumes there is no 
relationship between independent variables and leverage of listed family firms in 
Indonesia. The alternative hypothesis assumes that there is significant relationship 
between independent variables and leverage of listed family firms in Indonesia Stock 
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exchange (IDX). The level of significance will be expressed using p-value is more than 
0.05 then the null hypothesis is true since this means that there is no statistically 
significant relationship between independent variables and financial leverage of listed 
family firms in Indonesia.  
 
Similarity, if the p-value is less than 0.05 percent then the alternative hypothesis is 
considered true since this means that there is significant relationship between the 
variables. Coefficient of adjusted determinant determination (adjusted R-squared) was 
used to provide a measurement of how well the observed result was explained by the 
model, as proportion of total variation of outcomes explain by the model.    
 
Notwithstanding the identification of the parameters and their influence on literature 
related to the capital structure of family firms, there is no single model that fits perfectly 
with such research as this. Nevertheless, most studies have looked for the impact of 
ownership concentration, family control on debt level or regressed debt levels against the 
firm’s characteristics as determinants of capital structure (Santos et al., 2014; Schmid, 
2013; Ampeberger et al., 2013; Croci et al., 2011). A pooled cross section estimation is 
conducted that involves observations over a five year time period for 160 different 
Indonesian family firms. The panel estimation approaches that are employed in this study 
to examine the fixed effects model approach and random effects model. These 
instruments allow the investigation of dynamics by a time order and reveal unobserved 
heterogeneity. A fixed effect model controls for the effects of time-invariant variables 
with time in-variant effects. There are omitted variables that are correlated with the 
variables in the model under family influence and control; the fixed-effects model may 
provide a means of controlling any omitted variable bias (Schmid, 2013).  
 
On the contrary, random effects models address the possibility of a spurious relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). The 
spurious relationship may because the exclusion of unmeasured explanatory variables still 
affects a firm’s behaviour. Therefore, the Hausman test will be conducted to decide the 
preferred estimation model of this research. Rejection implies that the fixed effects model 
is more reasonable or preferred than the random effects model. The model used is a panel 
regression of a firm’s leverage against: a) the family’s influence and control, b) family 
succession, c) board independence and d) the firm’s characteristics as control variables. 
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The hypotheses are tested by pooling the data using the primary specification model 
above.  
 
Another alternative specification test is considering alternative measures of leverage. In 
the primary analysis, this research uses the ratio of long term debt to total assets as a 
leverage measure. Croci et al. (2011) and Johnson (2003) used short term debt as a proxy 
for leverage to examine the role of short term debt maturity in mitigating the debt 
overhang problem for high growth firms. The researchers found that the short-term debt 
maturity alleviates the negative impact of growth opportunities on leverage. This outcome 
follows asset substitution theory that short-term maturity debt alleviates the agency costs 
of debt (Leland and Toft, 1996; Diamond, 1991; Barnea et al., 1981).         
 
 
5.3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The objective of this study is to draw inferences concerning the determinants of the capital 
structure of listed family firms in Indonesia, while controlling for a number of firm-
specific characteristics.  Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used 
in this research over the whole observation period. Included are the mean, median, 
standard deviation, maximum and minimum values for the primary variables in the 
analysis. This study employs two measures of leverage as shown in Table 5.1 LTD is 
defined as the ratio of book value long-term debt to total assets; STD is defined as the 
ratio of book value of short term debt to total assets. 
 
 
5.3.1. Analysis and Discussion of LTD and STD 
 
For the entire observation, I found that the average book leverage of long-term debt is 
0.1553 (median 0.1169), with the standard deviation of 0.1354; the maximum being 
0.6306 and the minimum 0.0080. This figure is less than those reported in the extensive 
literature of family firms around the world. For example Ellul (2011) found the average 
book value leverage (long-term debt) for a sample of 5,975 firms from 38 countries to be 
about 0.2456. In Europe, Croci et al. (2011) calculated an average of 0.2614 for long-
term debt. Schmid (2013) found the average leverage for a sample of Germany family 
firms presents the value of 0.22; Australia family firms present an average long-term debt 
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of 18.86 percent (Harijono et al., 2004) and Andersen and Reeb (2003) found that the 
average leverage in US family firms is about 18.42 percent. However, Huang and Song 
(2006) found that in China the average book value leverage of long-term debt is about 
8.88 percent, which is almost half the level found in Indonesian family firms. These 
characteristics suggest the choice of debt level is affected by firm-specific and 
institutional factors; despite profound differences family firms have their own firm 
characteristics in financial structure decisions.  
 
The substantially low amount of long-term debt in Indonesia is accompanied by a high 
level of short-term debt which on average (median), has the value of 0.3162 (0.3026) with 
the maximum of 0.8524 and the minimum of 0.0033. Bank loans provide short-term 
financing for working capital; equity might be the main source of finance for capital 
investment of family firms in Indonesia. On average, long-term debt deviates from the 
mean by about 0.1354; meanwhile short-term debt deviate from the mean by about 
0.1645. Both debt types have low standard deviations, indicating that they tend to be very 
close to the mean. This data indicates a more homogenous or similar spread of long-term 
debt and short-term debt in Indonesian family firms. Thus, overall, Indonesia has levels 
of corporate leverage below 40 percent, indicating that family firms in Indonesia face 
lower risk of financial distress relative to its counterparts in developed countries.    
 
This research has established that Indonesian family firms are generally less debt oriented, 
when compared to Asia Pacific countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Australia. This finding confirms the study of Booth et al. (2001) who demonstrated that 
the debt ratio of firms in developing countries is significantly lower than in developed 
ones. However, the substantially lower amount of long-term debt is accompanied by a 
higher level of short-term debt. This situation is consistent with the study by de Jong et 
al. (2008), who found that the long term debt level of Indonesian firms is on average 14.8 
percent. Beck et al. (2002) suggested that the empirical observation of low leverage ratios 
in developing countries is due to the difficulties companies face in accessing external 
funds. However, this argument would seem difficult to accept in relation to the situation 
in Indonesia. There are 47 family firms in the finance sector in this study. Around 20 
banking companies are owned by groups of family firms including the Mayapada Group 
(Mayapada Bank), the CT Corp/Mega Group (Mega Bank), the Sinarmas Group (Sinar 
Mas Bank, BNII), the Maspion Group (Maspion Bank), the Djarum Group (Bank Central 
Asia), and the Medco Group (Saudara Bank). 70 percent of the banks in Indonesia are 
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family owned (Hadad, 2011). Based on the OJK regulation, capital provided by banks to 
firms, with which they are affiliated by belonging to the same group, can account for a 
maximum loan of as much as 10 percent from bank capital.  This level goes up to the 
maximum of 20 percent if firms do not have a relationship with the bank. Thus, in the 
context of accessing external funds, these data do not support the argument put forward 
by Beck et al. (2002). Even though family firms have support from financial institutions 
under a group of family business, and the implications for funding sources are profound, 
external funds offer easier access but their supply is limited by government regulation.  
 
By contrast, the average short term debt is 31.62 percent. This results confirms that firms 
in Indonesia mostly rely on banks as a source of funding (about 46 percent of loans) and 
most of the funds provided by banks are short-term debt. According to Bank of Indonesia 
(2017), bank loans deliver short-term financing; 21 percent of funds are from foreign 
loans and equity provides only 19 percent of the finance for capital investment by family 
firms in Indonesia. Thus, family firms in Indonesia are largely funded by loans, which 
form 67 percent of funding sources.  
 
In addition, these findings support the argument of Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010a, 2010b) 
that debt may be influenced by seeking greater short-term financial return. Family firms 
in Indonesia use debt mostly for short-term financial reasons. This behaviour confirms 
the result that the average of short term debt is 31.62 percent, two times higher than long 
term debt (15.53 percent). Short-term finance has less default risks than long-term finance 
and allows creditors to monitor and control borrower (family firms) effectively. Funding 
sources from the debt market are still insubstantial for long-term funds in Indonesia, 
where the volume of bond trading remains low compared with other Asian countries such 
as Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea and China in 2017.  
 
 
5.3.2. Analysis and Discussion of Explanatory Variables 
 
It has been established that the percentage of shares held by the members of the family in 
Indonesian family firms varies from 0.1017 (minimum) to 0.9607 (maximum), with the 
average value of about 0.4814 and the median value of about 0.5117 and on average 
family ownership deviates from the mean by about 0.2131. Although large family 
controlled firms do not display a significant wedge between ownership and control 
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compares with Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (Claessens et al., 2000), Indonesia has the 
largest number of firms controlled by a single family. Thus, the wealth is very 
concentrated in the hands of several families.     
 
With regards to family influence, an average of 0.3086 of CEO positions are held by 
founders, 0.3457 by descendants, and the rest (0.3457) by outside CEOs. These ratio 
suggests that family firms hire a non-family member as a CEO, which is the proportion 
almost equal with family member CEO (both founder and descendant). However, on 
average, when either a founder acts as a CEO or a descendant acts as a CEO there are 
high standard deviations - 0.4622 and 04759, respectively. These figures indicate that the 
distribution of family members act as a CEO are very polarized for the sampled firms in 
this study. These figures are normal results in which family firms in Indonesia spread out 
from the first generation to the third generation. As family firms went public through an 
initial public offering, family firms need to ensure effective direction by using 
professional managers, too. 
   
Among family firms, on average 0.6750 of board representatives are family members. 
This shows that family firms on average have high numbers of family members on the 
boards of directors, with a standard deviation of 0.4687. Thus, the variability shows a low 
standard deviation in this observation, suggesting the percentage of family representation 
on the boards are more concentrated around 67.50 percent. These figures show that in 
Indonesia the role of family member representation on the board of directors is significant 
to maintain the stability of a family’s wealth. However, the duality variable shows a high 
standard deviation (0.4773) within the mean value is 0.3500. This data indicates the 
number a duality position in family firms were very polarized in Indonesia. These figures 
confirm the fact based on the family survey in 2014 that owners are most likely to be a 
CEO is about 87 percent (Price Water Cooper Family Survey, 2014).  
 
Family firms in Indonesia have a minimum level of independent board members (0.3894) 
in accordance with government regulation of independent directors, with a minimum 
value of 0.33 of total board members. This number shows that approximately one in three 
board members is an independent director. The board independence variable shows a low 
standard deviation in this study that is about 0.1144, suggesting the most of the proportion 
of independent directors are very close to the average. This shows that most family firms 
have already responded to the new government rule regarding the minimum proportion 
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of independent directors. However, this study found that family firms without 
independent directors still exist, suggesting the government regulations must be more 
strictly enforced. Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables, both 
dependent and explanatory.   
 
Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics for Variable Measures 
 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
Dependent Variables      
Long-term Debt (LTD) 0.1553 0.1169 0.1354 0.0080 0.6306 
Short-term Debt (STD) 0.3162 0.3026      0.1645 0.0033      0.8524      
      
Independent Variables      
Family Control and Influence      
Family Ownership 0.4814 0.5117          0.2131 0.1017          0.9607          
CEO founder 0.3086 0 0.4622 0 1 
Family board representation  0.6750        0 0.4687 0 1 
Duality  0.3500 0 0.4773 0 1 
      
Renewal of family bonds through 
dynastic succession 
     
CEO descendant 0.3457 0 0.4759 0 1 
      
Binding social ties      
Board Independence 0.3894 0.3300 0.1144 0 0.7500 
      
Control Variables      
Firm Characteristics      
Asset structure (TANG) 0.5213 0.5518 0.2234 0.0117 0.9970 
Profitability (PROF) 0.0758 0.0680 0.0961   -0.5578 0.6474 
Firm Size (SIZE) 13.6535 14.3226   3.9193 4.5951 19.3185 
Tax shield effect (NDTS) 0.0336 0.0238 0.0442 0.0001          0.5686        
Firm Age (AGE) 30.2575 30 12.7005 2 104 
Liquidity (LIQ) 1.8370 1.3984   1.4024   0.0005 9.7169 
Growth opportunity (GROW) 1.8418 1.1315 2.0105 0 20.1600 
 
 
With regards to firms’ characteristics; family firms report that the asset structure or 
tangibility on average equals 0.5213 with the standard deviation of 0.2234. It means that 
more than 52 percent of total assets are tangible assets. The tangibility shows a low 
deviation with the minimum value of 0.0117 and the maximum value of 0.9970. These 
results show that tangibility tends to be very close to the mean and similar spread among 
family firms. Thus, these findings indicate that family firms in Indonesia are less diverse 
in the terms of liquidation value and since asset tangibility as a determinant of the debt 
capacity of a firm, suggesting that family firms in Indonesia have homogenous borrowing 
constraint. 
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At the same time, family firms on average are faced with low profitability where the mean 
value is about 0.0758 and the standard deviation is 0.0961. The profitability variable 
shows a high deviation in this study with the minimum value of -0.5578 and the maximum 
value of 0.6474. These figures show that different sectors of industries differ profoundly 
in term of performance. Moreover, these findings indicate that family firm performances 
are spread out and varies depending on life cycle organization or organization aging, too.    
 
Family firms report that firm size shows on average equals IDR 13.6535 billion with the 
standard deviation of IDR 3.9193 billion. The maximum size of family firms is about IDR 
19.3185 billion and the minimum size is about IDR 4.5951 billion. This indicated a low 
standard deviation that means most of family firm size are very close to the average. If 
firm size is a proxy for capital market access, then large and small family firms have 
similar response to easing credit conditions and access to creditors. Thus, large and small 
firms provide the same information toward disclosure issues.   
 
Family firms in Indonesia have low NDTS on average equals 0.0336, with standard 
deviation of 0.0442. The NDTS variable shows a high deviation with the minimum value 
of 0.0001 and the maximum value of 0.5686. These figures indicate the level of NDTS 
are spread out, suggesting that not all family firms in Indonesia enjoy the benefits from 
tax facilities. Some firms miss out because they do not satisfy the several requirements 
for corporate tax benefits such as the qualitative criteria and eligibility of the industry 
sectors based on the government regulations (such as food, textiles, chemical and 
chemical products, forestry and logging, coal and lignite mining, oil, natural gas and 
geothermal mining).    
 
The average ages of family firms in the sample is approximately 30 years. The oldest firm 
had the age of 104 years. Age shows a low deviation in this study with the standard 
deviation of 12.7 years. In addition, based on the firms’ ages, the findings confirm that 
family firms in Indonesia have already passed to the descendant generations. With regards 
to family generations, there are 59 firms under the founder, 72 firms are under the second 
generation and only 29 firms are under the third generation, suggesting that the ages of 
family firms in Indonesian are relatively concentrated around 30 years. These figures 
confirm the fact based on the family survey in 2014 that more than 50 percent company 
aged between 20 and 50 years (Price Water Cooper Family Survey, 2014).  
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Liquidity is on average about 1.8370, as expected, higher than 1 but not over liquid. 
Liquidity shows a low deviation in this study with minimum value of 0.0005 and 
maximum value of 9.7169. This reflects a significant amount of liquidity commonly held 
by the retail sector (sector 9): about 50 companies or around 0.30 of total companies in 
this study sample. These figures indicate that most of the family firm liquidity are very 
close to the average, suggesting that family firms in Indonesia maintain the most similar 
level of liquidity due to face limits in attracting such short-term debt.  
 
Lastly, growth opportunities are on average about 1.8418 with standard deviation of 
2.0105. The growth opportunities show a high deviation with the minimum value of 0 
and maximum value of 20.1600.The high standard deviation indicate that most firm 
growth are spread out across industries. The high value of growth opportunities comes 
from the agriculture industry (sector 1), which is dominated by the high growth of palm 
oil plantations in Indonesia over the last 30 years. Palm oil, with its derivative products, 
is the most important commodity; since 2014, Indonesia has produced 33.5 million tons 
of palm oil that raised $18.9 billion in export income.  
 
5.4. Multicollinearity Tests 
 
Because it is possible that the selected explanatory variables may be correlated, I 
implemented a multicollinearity test. According to Gujarati (2003) the presence of 
multicollinearity makes the estimation and hypothesis testing about individual 
coefficients of independent variables in regression impossible. The results of the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) show that the mean VIF for all variables included in the model is 
1.26 and the VIF for all variables ranged between 1.06 - 1.69 and less than 10, which 
indicates that the model does not suffer from any multicollinearity problem as suggested 
by Gujarati (2003). Therefore, all explanatory variables can be regressed in panel data set 
at the same time.  
 
Another method to detect the presence of multicollinearity is by applying a correlation 
matrix. The presence of collinearity is indicated by a high correlation between two of the 
independent variables. However, there is no certain standard about what to consider as 
high correlation. Bryman and Cramer (2001) propose that when correlation exceeds 0.80 
multi-collinearity may be suspected. The results of the correlation matrix for all variables 
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included in the model range between 0.002 - 0.509 and are less than 0.8; indicating that 
the model does not suffer from any multicollinearity problems.  
 
Table 5.2 presents the correlation matrix and the VIF for all variables. Examination of the 
correlation matrix indicates that a high level of correlation was not detected between the 
two independent variables.    
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Table 5.2. Correlation Coefficients between Variables and VIF Coefficients 
 
Variables LTD STD OWN CEO 
founder 
Family 
board 
rep 
Duality CEO 
descendant 
Board 
independence 
TANG PROF SIZE NDTS AGE LIQ GROW VIF 
LTD 
 
1.000               - 
STD 
 
-0.038    1.000              - 
OWN 
 
-0.069    0.073    1.000             1.10 
CEO founder 
 
-0.057   -0.120    0.050    1.000            1.69 
Family board 
rep 
-0.030    0.122    0.1968    0.1136    1.000           1.42 
Duality 
 
-0.032    0.002    0.162    0.337    0.509    1.000          1.66 
CEO 
descendant 
0.033    0.066    0.018   -0.488    0.174    0.121    1.000         1.56 
Board 
independence 
0.114    0.033    0.055    0.049   -0.105   -0.127   -0.097    1.000        1.14 
TANG 
 
0.111    
 
0.125    0.041    0.017    0.008   -0.010   -0.083    0.214    1.000       1.19 
PROF 
 
-0.118   -0.033    0.150    0.041   -0.030   -0.002   -0.003    0.1216   0.0652    1.000      1.11 
SIZE -0.002    
 
0.028   -0.072   -0.016   -0.102   -0.118    0.034    0.091   -0.014    0.172 1.000     1.11 
NDTS 
 
0.103    0.008   -0.053    0.037    0.017   -0.004   -0.102    0.165    0.235   -0.028 -0.161    1.000 
 
   1.13 
AGE 
 
-0.127    0.117   -0.074   -0.113   -0.051   -0.044    0.138    0.065   -0.009   -0.016 0.092   -0.017    1.000   1.08 
LIQ 
 
-0.215   -0.409    0.033   -0.006   -0.040    0.014    0.066   -0.042   -0.293    0.159 -0.014   -0.141   -0.045    1.000 
 
 1.14 
GROW 
 
0.101   -0.091   -0.061    0.111    0.032    0.021   -0.067   -0.064   -0.053    0.027 0.039   -0.033   -0.169   -0.007    1.000 
 
1.06 
Mean 
 
               1.26 
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5.5. Multivariate Testing Results 
 
To decide the best specification to estimate the datasets, in the first step, both model 1-
LTD and model 2- STD were run with the OLS model. The results show that the 
explanatory variables power for both models are significant, according to the F-test. Then, 
to decide that the data set is poolable, the Wald F-test for testing fixed against pooled 
OLS model under the null hypothesis was employed. The test found that the Wald-F test 
rejected for LTD and STD, since Prob > F (0.00) is less than 0.05, suggesting that the 
LTD and STD models need to use a panel model. 
 
Moreover, to confirm that panel effects model fits to estimate the LTD and STD model, 
I employed a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) for testing the random effects model against 
pooled OLS informed by the null hypothesis that the cross sectional variance components 
are zero. The result shows that the LM test rejected for LTD and STD, since Prob > F 
(0.00) is less than 0.05. The significant LM test means the rejection of the null hypothesis 
(if ρ < 0.05), suggesting that the LTD and STD models need to use a panel model. Thus, 
if null rejected, a Hausman test must be performed to compare with random effects 
estimation.   
 
I continued to test by the Hausman specification test, in order to determine which one of 
the alternative panel analysis methods is more appropriate; fixed effects or random effects 
models. With regard to this, the test under the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
estimates by the random effect estimators are the same as the ones estimated by the fixed 
effects estimator do not exist or the null hypothesis is rejected, suggesting that fixed 
effects estimators are more appropriate for LTD model. By way of comparison, the 
Hausman specification test for the STD model shows that the null hypothesis was not 
rejected where Prob > chi2 (0.0887) is more than 0.05,  suggesting the random effects 
models are more appropriate to estimate the STD model.  
 
Table 5.3 reports the poolability and specification tests for both LTD and STD models.       
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Table 5.3. Poolability and Specification Tests 
 
Panel A: The Determination of Estimation Model 1 (LTD)  
Wald F-test  (OLS vs FE) LM test (OLS vs RE) Hausman Test  (FE vs RE) 
Prob > F = 0.000 < 0.05 
Reject Null, use Panel Model 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 < 0.05 
Reject Null, use Panel Model 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 < 0.05 
Reject Null, use FE 
Model Selection : Fixed-Effects Model 
 
Panel B: The Determination of Estimation Model 2 (STD) 
 
 
Wald F-test  (OLS vs FE) 
 
LM test (OLS vs RE) Hausman Test  (FE vs RE) 
Prob > F = 0.000 < 0.05 
Reject Null, use Panel Model 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000 < 0.05 
Reject Null, use Panel Model 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0887 > 0.05 
Fails to reject Null, use RE 
Model Selection: Random-Effects Model  
 
 
 
5.5.1. Estimation Results 
 
This analysis is based on 800 observations of family firms under the first generation to 
the third generation in Indonesia for the period from 2011 to 2015. Table 5.4 contains the 
estimated coefficients from regressing leverage (long-term debt and short-term debt) on 
(i) family control and influence, (ii) renewal of family bonds through dynastic succession 
and (iii) binding social ties.  The models are: 
 
Model 1 (Long-term debt): 
LTDi,t = α + β1(OWNi,t) + β2(OWN2i,t) + β3(OWN3i,t) + β4(CEO founderi,t) + β5(Family 
board representationi,t) + β6(Dualityi,t) + β7(CEO decendanti,t) + β8(Board 
independencei,t) + β9(TANGi,t) + β10(PROFi,t) + β11(SIZEi,t) + β12(NDTSi,t) 
+ β13(AGEi,t) + β 14(GROWi,t) + €i,t 
 
Model 2 (Short-term debt): 
STDi,t = α + β1(OWNi,t) + β2(OWN2i,t) + β3(OWN3i,t) + β4(CEO founderi,t) + β5(Family 
board representationi,t) + β6(Dualityi,t) + β7(CEO decendanti,t) + β8(Board 
independencei,t) + β9(TANGi,t) + β10(PROFi,t) + β11(SIZEi,t) + β12(NDTSi,t) 
+ β13(AGEi,t) + β14(LIQi,t) + β 15(GROWi,t) + €i,t 
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As this study uses panel data to investigate the determinants of capital structure in family 
firms of different size, it is possible that the residuals are not independent, causing the 
heteroscedasticity problem. This problem refers to the condition where the variability of 
a variable is unequal across the range of value of the other variables that predicts it. To 
correct the heteroscedasticity problem, especially for fixed effects estimators of model 1- 
LTD, I employ a robust standard error regression option (White-Hubber corrected 
standard error) since there is no serial correlation based on the VIF results above. The 
robust regression results for model 1-LTD show that the coefficients and standard errors 
are quite similar, and the t-value and ρ-values are also quite similar to those obtained 
without using this option.     
 
By way of comparison, model 2 - STD is more appropriate to estimate via the random 
effects model. The random effects technique can address the possibility of a spurious 
relationship between dependent and explanatory variables (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). 
This relationship may arise due the exclusion of unmeasured explanatory variables that 
nevertheless still affect a firm’s behaviour in the short-term. For instance, CEO founder, 
Family board representation, Duality, and CEO descendant variables are relatively stable 
in the short-term and are consistent with the notion that families generally control and 
influence their firms for short-term periods. In addition, I employ a robust standard error 
regression option, too, using White-Hubber corrected standard error. The result shows 
that the coefficient, standard error, the t-value and ρ-values are also quite similar to those 
obtained without using this option. 
 
The adjusted R-squared indicates that approximately 0.1454 of the variation in long-term 
debt is explained by variables in the equation. In addition, the F-statistics show that the 
overall regression is significant at the 0.01 level, as the p-values are less than 0.01. In 
contrast, the adjusted R-squared indicates that approximately 0.2211 of variation in short-
term debt is explained by variables in the equation. This value is higher than the value of 
the adjusted R-squared of long-term debt. The F-statistics also show a consistent result 
with long-term debt which is significant at the 0.01 level and the p-values are less than 
0.01. Table 5.4 presents the estimation results for model 1- LTD with the fixed effects 
model and model 2- STD with the random effects model, both using White-Hubber 
standard error test.  
 
 
134 
 
Table 5.4. Panel Regression Results on Leverage for Indonesia Listed Family 
Firms   
 
Variable 
 
LTD 
(White-Hubber Standard 
Error) 
STD 
(White-Hubber Standard 
Error) 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
     
OWN 1.4066 (5.27)***    
 
-0.1422    (-0.28)    
OWN2 
 
-2.4238 (-4.07)***          0.7008     (0.66)    
OWN3 
 
1.1385 (2.93)***           -0.6052    (-0.90)    
CEO founder -0.0222  (-1.72)* 
    
-0.0468    (-1.56)    
Family board 
representation  
 
-0.0129   
 
 (-1.07)        0.0514    (1.98)**   
Duality 0.0055  
 
 (0.48)        -0.0122    (-0.40)    
CEO descendant 
 
0.0108    
 
 (0.97)        -0.0121    (-0.43)    
Board independence 
 
0.1984    
 
 (4.27)***        0.0583    (0.56)    
TANG 0.0295   
 
 (1.32)       -0.0220    (-0.59)    
PROF 
 
-0.1908  (-4.01)***         0.1012        (2.45)**    
SIZE 0.0022    
 
 (1.15)    -0.0014         (-0.55)    
NDTS 
 
0.2034 (1.70) *      -0.1695    (-1.91)*    
AGE -0.0012  (-2.60)***   
        
0.0016    (2.28)**    
LIQ   -0.0303    
 
(-7.44)***    
GROW 0.0075 (2.96)***    
 
-0.0036    (-1.26)    
Intercept -0.1340 
 
(-2.54)***       0.3054     (3.15)***    
Adjusted R Square   0.1454  0.2211  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  
Inflection points 0.2902 and 0.7096 -  
Number of 
observation 
800  800  
Legend: significant at * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. T-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. 
 
 
Next, I will analyse and discuss the findings with regards to the hypotheses of this study. 
In particular, six hypotheses that are related to dimensions of SEW, as well as presenting 
the analysis of firms’ characteristics that control the determinants of capital structure.    
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5.6. Determinants of Capital Structure in Family Firms  
 
5.6.1. Evidence on the Non-Linear Relationships of Family Ownership and 
Capital Structure Decision 
      
Hypothesis 1: Concentration of ownership in the hands of family members has a non-
linear relationship with leverage over the life period of the family firm.   
 
Table 5.4 presents the estimation of an equation using fixed effects regression for long-
term debt with family ownership, using an estimated quadratic and a cubic equation of 
family ownership to examine the non-linear relationships between leverage and family 
ownership. It appears likely that the relationships between family holdings and debt are 
not uniform over the entire range of family ownership. Firms that have a family ownership 
percentage greater than 0.10 are considered to be family-owned.  
 
Figure 5.1 shows that variables family ownership, family ownership2 and family 
ownership3 suggest that the relationship between long-term debt and the level of family 
holdings is non-linear. This means that the family ownership and debt relationship 
variables take an N shape for long-term debt with the inflection point at around 0.29 
(minimum) and 0.7096 (maximum). By contrast, there is a statistically insignificant 
relationship between family ownership and short-term debt.  Although on average family 
firms in Indonesia use short-term debt (around 31.62 percent) more than long-term debt 
(15.53 percent), with short-term financing provided by bank loans, the capital structure 
decisions are not necessary involved family ownership concentration for the short-term 
decisions.  
 
With the consideration that usually family firms started with 100 percent of shareholding 
before IPO, I will present the findings from the right side when family shareholding is in 
the maximum level. The results show that the debt level decreases slightly until point B 
when the level of family ownership declines as shareholding reaches level P2 
(approximately 0.7096). Then, as the level of family ownership disperses until a certain 
level (approximately 0.29), the level of long-term debt increases up to point A. After that, 
the debt level decreases again slightly when ownership below 29 percent. In other words, 
after reaching a maximum level when the family holds around 71 percent, any further 
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decrease cause the level of debt increase until reaching around 29 percent of the family 
holding, after which the debt level decrease again.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Relationship between Capital Structure and Family Ownership 
 
Keeping family control over the firm’s operations is one of the dimensions of SEW 
(Berrone et al., 2012) that could explain the behaviour evident in the capital structure 
decision making process. Control is a function of ownership proportions, although the 
relationship between ownership and leverage is not clear cut. Agency theory suggests that 
in closely held businesses, such as family firms, debt can allow controlling owners to 
manage capital resources without diluting their voting rights (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Harris and Raviv, 1991; Faccio et al., 2001). When internal funds are not sufficient, 
leverage could mitigate the risk of diluting family control (Wu et al., 2007); helping to 
maintain family power over the business as long as the firm faces no financial distress. 
Nonetheless, capital structure choices will be based on loss aversion of SEW, especially 
maintaining control over the business. Family firms will be more willing to use debt when 
ownership is concentrated in the hands of a controlling owner (Chua et al., 1999; Mishra 
and McConaughy, 1999), but the dispersion of ownership may result in their use of debt 
having a non-linear relationship. This suggests that family firms are most vulnerable to 
conflict, and least willing to bear added risk, when the ownership is split in relatively 
equal proportions among the founder’s descendants.  
 
     Leverage                                       
                                                                 A                                                                 Long-term Debt 
                                                                       
                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                      B                                             P1 = 0.2902 
                                                                                                                                      P2 = 0.7096                                                                                                                     
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These figures show that due to a long-term commitment to maintain the sustainability of 
the company across generations, together with the private benefits of control experienced 
in Indonesia, families will increase their firms’ debt levels to preserve their control. 
However, at the same time, family firms put substantial wealth at risk. A combination of 
low risk preferences and the possible struggle for bankruptcy risk, resulting low level of 
leverage. Thus, the relationships between family ownership and long-term debt appear to 
be non-linear. It is worth nothing that the estimated quadratic and cube structure turning 
points on these variables are well within the range of the sample data. The results suggest 
that family firms maintain a long-term presence in their firm’s ownership structure by 
balancing the motive to control family firms and avoid bankruptcy risk in the long run.         
 
Moreover, the finding is consistent with empirical observations. Ellul (2011), Setia-
Atmaja et al. (2009) and Schulze et al. (2003) all found that family ownership and debt 
form a non-linear relationship, even though these studies have resulted in a different 
shaped relationship (inverse U shape and U-shaped). Thus, family ownership addresses 
the impact of different levels of family holdings. The high (more than 71 percent) and 
low (less than 29 percent) levels of ownership are more risk averse and hence borrow less 
long-term debt. Whereas, to decide short-term debt levels does not need a function of 
ownership proportion, because the impact to preserve SEW is not significant in the short 
run.   
 
Behaviourally, borrowing could be explained by the simple prediction for ‘uncertain 
conditions in the future’, so people will be risk seeking for loss and be risk averse for 
gains (Thaler, 2015). Family firms make choices depending on the reference points of the 
firm’s dominant principals. These principals make decisions in such a way that they 
preserve the accumulated endowment of their family firms. Thus, the choice at each level 
of ownership does not give an expected outcome that is equal. In the worst situation, 
family firms will be back at the level of leverage where they started, which is when the 
debt level endangered the control, due to the priority of aiming to preserve SEW. Those 
owners who were highly leveraged lost much more than when the capital structure started. 
In other words, family firms will be risk seeking for control over business losses from 
reducing ownership, yet tend to be risk averse for gains from ownership. The relationship 
between ownership and leverage, at both the low level and high level of ownership, shows 
that family firms tend to be risk avoider by decreasing their levels of leverage. At this 
point, the preference to use less debt is influenced by risk reduction motives. The debt 
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level choice is more sensitive to conditions associated with control risk. According to 
Anderson and Reeb (2003), the risk averse behaviour of family firms appears in financial 
decisions, when firms are under less diversified investment. The risk reduction strategy 
of the firms is pursued through investment diversification with lower debt levels. 
 
Risk reduction strategy is related to family firms’ strong interest in their long term 
survival. This situation makes founder-managers minimise risk from the financial distress 
of restructuring, which can damage the family’s reputation. Family reputation is expected 
to be passed down to the next generation, too. Therefore, the consideration to use more 
debt will be counterproductive with the aims of preserving social emotional wealth. 
Rather than using the reputation of the family name to borrow more, family firms might 
use reputation as an intangible collateral to sustain accessibility to funding for the long 
run, as an assurance over critical resources (Rajan and Zingales, 1997). This risk 
reduction strategy is fungible with their sunk costs (effort and time) at the beginning of 
the business as a whole asset, both tangible and intangible (reputation and pride) in 
perpetuity. Setting up the reason to use a low level of debt would seem logical, in that 
avoiding credit monitoring could also affect capital structure decisions, especially in a 
specific institutional environment such as Indonesia.   
 
At the level of medium ownership concentration (from 0.29 to 0.7096) for long term debt, 
increasing the leverage is be explained with the changing of risk preference, which is to 
be risk taker regarding the possibility of losing control (control motivation) over family 
business and as a result borrow more long-term debt. Researchers have provided evidence 
that in order to retain control of family firms debt is used both as a device by the current 
owners to maintain control and as an internal control mechanism for alleviating agency 
conflict inside the company (Harris and Raviv, 1988; Stultz, 1988; d’Mello and Miranda, 
2010). Thus, when internal funds are not sufficient, leverage could mitigate the risk of 
diluting family control. They may use debt, instead of new equity, to concentrate their 
voting power, since they are apprehensive that any change in capital structure may dilute 
their power. This figure indicates that family firms will be concerned to use debt to reduce 
the risk from under- diversified investments and to maintain control over high risk 
exposure to one single asset.   
 
The low level of long-term debt decreases the risk of losing SEW (undiversified personal 
or family members) and family capital in the case of bankruptcy (Fama, 1980). This 
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outcome is in line with the findings and consistent with the explanation above, that family 
firms perceive risk differently for their long-term debt regarding their endeavours to 
preserve the long term sustainability of the company. However, these results are 
inconsistent with the findings of some previous studies, which report a linear relationship 
between ownership and leverage. These findings can be classified as: a) negative (Santos 
et al., 2014; Schmid, 2013; Mishra and McConoughy, 1999), b) positive (Croci et al., 
2011; Ellul, 2011; Margaritis and Psillakis, 2010; King and Santor, 2008) or c) not 
significant (Ampenberger et al., 2013; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). This apparent 
inconsistency can be attributed to three factors.  
 
Firstly, capital structure decisions vary depending on the ownership concentration and the 
outcome for SEW. Ownership concentration represents power over the business. It is 
possible that over time, the shareholders’ feelings of ownership have increased 
(Strahilevitz and Loewenstein, 1998), thus leading to status quo bias in capital structure 
decision. This situation is in a person’s mind, based on the principle that a thing which 
individuals enjoy and use as their own for a long time takes root and cannot be torn away 
without shifting the behaviour and trying to maintain sustainability. When the 
accumulated legacy of the company is threatened, the family will make decisions to 
protect and strengthen their aim to preserve SEW which may not be based on economic 
logic, even if they put the company at risk. Therefore, a family firm’s willingness to give 
up control and lose SEW should weigh less heavily depending on the concentration of 
ownership and how debt is used as a mechanism of control. In addition, these results are 
consistent with the findings by researchers who argued that the SEW is strong when the 
first generation (founder) keeps the ownership because of the sunk costs invested by the 
founder at the beginning of the company’s life (Chua et al., 1999; Schulze et al., 2003;  
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). As long as founders engage in the business, their motivation 
to obtain management control will increase. This point highlights the importance attached 
by owners to the aim maintaining the family business. Thus, the family prefers capital 
structure decisions that will preserve the value of SEW, which is the factor that is closely 
related to keeping ownership and business control. Keeping family control of the business 
by involvement in corporate governance, as suggested by stewardship theory, will assist 
managers to help ensure that the family’s principles, policies and practices are upheld 
within the subsequent generations.   
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Ownership concentration focuses on the outcome of preserving SEW as a result of the 
benefits of control. When the motive to maintain the sustainability is larger, control 
becomes more valuable and the founder might be unlikely to relinquish the business, even 
after the family’s firm has gone public. Meanwhile, the founding families often have a 
long-term commitment to span the business across more than one generation. Such a 
commitment suggests that capital structure decisions and family ownership relationships 
are informed by the possibility of losing control in the future under uncertain conditions. 
Consequently, foregone gains are less painful than perceived losses of the business they 
invested in; a performance profile marked by an N-curve shaped relationship between 
leverage and ownership.   
 
Secondly, those studies that find a linear relationship assume that the preference of risk 
is always stable as both agency theory and stewardship theory suggest. Both theories 
typically assume stable risk preferences (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  
Behaviourally, the agent in a corporate governance context can have a variety of risk 
preferences. Since the duration of ownership is increasing, founders place a higher value 
on an object that they have owned, so loss aversion also increases. As long as people hold 
the object, the consequence of forgoing gains are less painful than perceived loss. Time 
and duration become important factors to control the fear of losing. The family’s 
attachment to the organisation is different between founders and their descendants. Chua 
et al. (1999) and Misra and McConaughy (1999) demonstrate that a family’s attachment 
to the organisation is highest when the firm is owned and managed by the founding 
family. This strength is because they treat the firm as an asset that will be bequeathed to 
future family generations. This focus places more emphasis on the impact of ownership 
as a function of control, with debt level being considered as a proxy for controlling risk 
aversion in aiming to preserve SEW. Again, research confirms that the firm’s founder 
tends to follow stewardship theory and the descendants tend to follow agency theory in 
dynamic perspectives.   
 
Thirdly, previous studies have interpreted family control as being represented by the 
voting rights of family firm members, while this current study uses the levels of family 
holdings that capture cash flow rights (Santos et al., 2014; Schmid, 2013; Croci et al., 
2011; Margaritis and Psillakis, 2010; King and Santor, 2008). This strategy is consistent 
with the approach by Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) and Schulze et al. (2003) who found that 
the relationships between leverage and ownerships are non-linear. Both voting rights 
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(control) and cash flows right (ownership) could estimate the impact of family firms on 
capital structure decisions. Debt for certain levels of ownership concentration in the hands 
of the founders of family firms might be used to limit the excessive exposure to any risks 
to the sustainability of a family business. For these reasons, I find that the relationship is 
non-linear. Accordingly, this result offers support for Hypothesis 1, which points to the 
curvilinear relationship between family ownership and leverage (long-term debt).    
 
 
5.6.2. Evidence on Family Influences through Management and Governance on 
Capital Structure Decisions   
 
Hypothesis 2: If the firm founder acts as the CEO, the family firm will have low 
leverage.  
 
As can be seen, according to the results the founder as CEO seems to prefer to use less 
long-term debt compared with an ‘outside’ CEO. CEO founder prefers to use less long-
term debt as much as 2 percent lower than an outside CEO for long-term debt. This result 
is significant at 0.10 level. However, for short-term debt, if the founder acts as the CEO, 
there is no significant relationship with capital structure decision.    
 
This implication supports the idea that the CEO founder’s priority above all others is to 
transfer the business to the next generation. Such a goal causes founder-managers to be 
highly risk averse in order to ensure they can pass their single asset, the family firm, to 
the next generation. Therefore, founder-CEOs have an incentive to reduce risk at the 
company level, suggesting they will prefer to use significantly less leverage than an 
outside CEO.  
 
I investigated the situation when the founder of a family firm acts as its CEO. Family 
members should be able to exercise their influence more effectively if the founder is a 
CEO (Boyd, 1995; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Schulze et al., 2003). A CEO has a profound 
influence on corporate policies, such as capital structure decisions. Family influence 
through the CEOs can be much stronger than through ownership alone. Ellul (2010) and 
Croci et al. (2011) found that a founder CEO prefers to avoid equity financing because of 
control considerations. However, this finding supports the argument that behaviourally 
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decision makers are concerned about the avoidance of loss and prefer to avoid an 
anticipated loss altogether, rather than engage in less risky options to merely minimise 
the loss (Thaler and Johnson, 1990).  
 
The results in Table 5.4 show that family firms that have the founder as their CEO have 
significantly lower levels of long-term debt compared to those family firms with non-
family member CEOs. However, when leverage is measured as short-term debt, a founder 
CEO or a non-family CEO do not influence debt levels to any statistical significance. 
With regard to family influence, on average 30.86 percent of family firms in this study 
are managed by a founder-CEO.  This figure is consistent with the hypothesis and in line 
with the findings of Ampenberger et al. (2013), who noted that founder CEOs exhibit 
significantly lower debt ratios, compared to non-founder CEOs. Moreover, Mishra and 
McConaughy (1999) showed that the lower level of debt is driven by the founding family 
desire to continue their business. This attitude could be explained by the founder CEOs 
being concerned about two negative impacts of debt in aiming to preserve SEW: i) the 
increasing cost of financial distress and ii) the probability of losing control over the 
business. The more debt taken on by family firms to finance their operations, the more 
they are at risk of experiencing financial distress, including: a) bankruptcy costs, b) higher 
costs of capital and c) conflicts of interest. Thus, having a CEO founder would seem to 
indicate being more risk averse over the long-term as a consequence of family business 
owners investing most of their wealth in the firm.  
 
Agency theory suggests that lowering total equity financing by using more debt can 
reduce the scope of the agency conflict between managers and shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). This situation is based on the assumption that managers and equity 
holders are not members of the same family. There are two possible management-related 
scenarios in family firms: i) managers are hired from outside the firm or ii) the manager 
is a family member. ‘Manager as agent’ in family firms may act for the controlling family, 
but not for the shareholders in general (Morck and Yeung, 2003). This bias confirms the 
results for the sample firms in this study, where although around 30 percent of family 
firms are managed by professional outsider managers, their orientation is towards the 
interests of the controlling family. Family involvement has a strong impact on the 
behaviour of managers within the firms. For instance, this study shows that if an outsider 
is the CEO, the family firms have low leverage levels, as when the founder was the CEO. 
However, non-family CEOs use a higher level of long-term debt than did the founders. 
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The situation is different under descendant generations, where neither descendant CEOs 
nor non-family CEOs significantly affect capital structure decisions. Thus, there is 
mimic-type behaviour of non-family CEOs towards family member CEOs in making 
capital structure decisions. This behaviour refers to interpersonal relationships that are 
associated with stewardship, including stability, interaction with and social sharing with 
family firms. Thus, under founder stage, family firms tend to be more applying 
stewardship corporate governance where family firms motivate and reciprocity to non-
family CEO. The founder facilitates non-family CEOs to empower themselves as long as 
their decisions are in line with the interests of the family.     
 
In addition, the conflict of interest between non-manager CEOs and owners is potentially 
low. Using debt as a control mechanism to alleviate agency conflict is not necessarily 
significant; whereas that technique is of value when maintaining the sustainability of the 
firm. Thus, family firms in Indonesia work to secure the long-run wealth or socio- 
emotional wealth to hand on business to the next generation. Given the emphasis on loss 
aversion suggests that in the case of family firms, losing the business that they have 
owned and invested in, both financially and behaviourally since the beginning, will 
induce founder-managers to choose a low level of debt to preserve the endowments of 
their family firms. Therefore, in the founder stage, family firms tend to have a longer-
term commitment to their business, place greater value on noneconomic goals due to 
sustainability (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), and are more embedded in the business system 
(Le Bretton-Miller and Miller, 2009). The family is willing to put the interest of the 
business first, suggesting that steward-type behaviour and stewardship governance are 
more prominent under founder stage.   
 
An increasing cost of financial distress in some ways could impact a family’s reputation, 
which is tied to the prestige and the economic success of that family’ firm. However, 
creditors may have a different perspective regarding a family’s reputation. In some cases 
creditors could see that CEOs derived from family members lead to greater management 
entrenchment (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001). Creditors will anticipate that management 
entrenchment could impact the performance of the firm. As a consequence, creditors 
require a higher remuneration from the family firms with a CEO founder than they do for 
a business with an outside hire as its CEO; therefore, the higher the cost of debt, the less 
the preference to use debt. Also, having a family CEO may not be well received by the 
market. This situation leads capital lenders or creditors do more monitoring of family 
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firms for their investments. As a result, a lower level of leverage could protect family 
firms from the threat of takeovers from creditors.   
 
The results of this study support the argument that the preference to use less leverage is 
associated with an entrenched CEO. An entrenched CEO has discretion over their firm’s 
leverage choice. Others suggest that entrenchment motives may cause managers to 
increase leverage in order to inflate the voting power of their equity stakes and reduce the 
risk of takeover attempts (Harris and Raviv, 1988; Stulz, 1988). The implication of 
entrenchment is interpreted as increasing agency costs made by increased ownership. 
However, CEOs prefer less leverage because of the desire to reduce their firm’s risk in 
order to protect their under-diversified human capital. Thus, they can entrench themselves 
against pressures from internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, such as 
control and monitoring. Berger et al. (1997) found that leverage levels are lower when 
CEOs do not face pressure from either ownership or active monitoring. When founders 
or owners are also CEOs, it would seem logical that they are not under pressure from 
monitoring. The capital structure decisions might be considered to be more focused on 
reducing the risk of financial distress with the use of short maturity debt to preserve their 
reputations (Gosh et al., 2011). Thus, this study yielded evidence from Indonesian family 
firms suggesting the implications of entrenchment are not one sided, because CEO 
founders might have advantages in incentives and monitoring of the firm. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, I conclude that capital structure decisions in the hands of family 
managed-firms frequently consider long-term family business survival and are concerned 
about SEW.  
   
However, this study contradicts the findings from Anderson et al. (2003) and Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) that show CEO founders and CEO hires bear an insignificant 
relationship to the cost of debt. The cost of debt financing results from the creditor’s 
perception about family leadership. The requirement of yield from firms with family 
CEOs tend to be a consideration when deciding the debt level they wish to take on. Their 
studies found that CEO founders and CEO hires do not have a significant relationship to, 
or influence on, the cost of debt. In other words, CEO founders may not be detrimental 
to creditors as their self-serving behaviour (entrenchment) adopts low-risk strategies that 
are to the benefit of creditors (Bradley and Chen, 2011). Moreover, inconsistent with 
these results, Ellul (2011) and Croci et al. (2011) demonstrated that CEO founders favour 
debt financing, and control considerations exert a far greater influence on debt over equity 
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financing. They argued that debt level will be culminated during the founder stage and 
tends to decrease as family attachment to the firm weakens during the transitions to 
subsequent generations. The preference for debt financing is a non-diluting security 
factor. Conversely, this study finds that in Indonesia, during the founder stage, debt levels 
are low and creditors provide short-term debt to family firms. Such an arrangement 
indicates that capital structure decisions are designed to avoid risk and that creditors have 
a preference for more risky investments.  
     
Generally, the results showed that family firms avoid a loss of control and decrease the 
likelihood of financial distress by placing the founder in the CEOs position. In addition, 
a family CEO pursues SEW because personal attachment and self-identification with the 
firm are stronger when in the hands of its founder as the CEO (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). 
In addition, Indonesia family firms behave differently with respect to their capital 
structure decisions in different institutional settings, such as the underdeveloped stock 
markets in East Asian countries (Oxford Business Group, 2018). Instead, these firms tend 
to ally themselves with finance coming from the banking-based system, where creditor 
monitoring is tight. Thus, CEO founders might face reputational concerns that arise from 
the effect on creditors. A CEO founder’s presence allows the firm to develop relationships 
with creditors that are expected to be built up over successive generations. The firm’s 
survival, together with preserving SEW, are important concerns and therefore also 
reasons to reduce the probability of the firm experiencing financial distress. Hence, the 
result supports the hypothesis that a founder CEO has a negative relationship with long-
term debt. 
 
 
Hypothesis 3. If family members are represented on the Board of Directors, this 
increases leverage of family owned firms.   
 
The results presented in Table 5.4 show that family board representation is associated 
with significantly higher short-term debt (5.14 percent) compared to those family firms 
that do not have family representation on the board of directors. This outcome is 
significant at the 0.10 level. On average, in family firms, seven out of ten members of 
boards belong to the family. With respect to influence and control, it can be emphasised 
that the family board representation can reduce asymmetrical information regarding the 
default likelihood in loan repayments by family firms. In fact banks in Indonesia are the 
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most frequent providers of short-term debt, thus they perceive family firms’ performance 
according to their ability to repay their loans. These results support the findings by Lorca 
et al. (2011) and Fields et al. (2011). Moreover, in line with work that demonstrates that 
short-term debt has a role in mitigating the debt overhang problem, as well as lessening 
the negative impact of growth opportunities (Croci et al., 2011; Johnson, 2003), family 
board representations are more concerned about short-term debt due to the need to avoid 
liquidity risks. 
 
Stewardship theory supports the view that having family board representation is healthy, 
especially during the founder’s generation (Miller et al., 2007). This positioning helps 
family firms to obtain external funds from creditors who feel secure giving loans to family 
firms. This argument points to the minimisation of conflicts between members and the 
uninterrupted management of the firm by the controlling family (Poutziouris et al., 2015). 
Thus, family board representation is associated with lower liquidity risks, thereby a) 
giving the firm a higher chance of survival and b) helping to preserve SEW.     
 
One unanticipated finding is that having board level family representation is not 
associated with a significant lower leverage for long term-debt, when compared to family 
firms that do not have such representation. This result is consistent, to an extent, with the 
findings of Schmid (2013) who demonstrated that participation of the members of a 
founding family in the firm’s supervisory board does not significantly influence capital 
structure decisions. Apparently, family board members consider long-term decisions will 
less relevant to them than following generations, since the power relationships on family 
boards change in step with the development of family firms over time. Huse and Zattoni 
(2008) observed that the dynamics of family firms will change the relationships among 
family members. Thus, the path dependencies related to power and control of family 
businesses are not static; a state which challenges the assumption contained within both 
agency and stewardship theories that they are static, rather than dynamic. These theories 
are bias in trying to maintain the status quo of long-term relationships in family firms, 
such as the relationship between long-term debt decisions and the presence of family 
members on a board. A board in a stewardship culture may be slower to respond in such 
conditions for fear of jeopardising the SEW of a family firm (Wright and Kellermanns, 
2011). Family board representatives are reluctant to alter capital structure and will 
respond quickly when family control is challenged or at stake. As a result, long-term debt 
level decisions are not affected by having family board representation in a company.      
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Admittedly, with regards to behavioural capital structure decision-making under 
uncertain conditions in the future, having board family representation may not be 
detrimental regarding long term decisions. Indeed family members may not engage in the 
family business in the future, for instance because of age reasons, thus limiting their 
involvement in the business. Moreover, the limitation of their knowledges about the 
future and lack of power relationships between family members on board and CEOs, 
suggesting the insignificant impact to the leverage (long-term debt). Therefore, family 
control through board positions is more pronounced when family firms decide to take on 
short-term debt rather than long-term debt. Family representative on the board directors 
are concerned with short-term financing which is mostly funded through bank in 
Indonesia. The more family firms use short-term debt, the more family board monitors 
the effectiveness of capital structure decisions. This relationship is interesting to note 
since the choice of debt maturity depends on the degree of the involvement of the family. 
Accordingly, the result rejects the hypothesis that family board representation has a 
positive relationship with leverage if leverage is measured as long-term debt. However, 
the hypothesis can be accepted if leverage is measured as short-term debt.  
 
 
Hypothesis 4. In a family owned firm, when a member of the family is both the CEO 
and a member of the Board of Directors, this duality results in less leverage. 
 
Family firms are highly likely to allow one person to act as the CEO and the chair-person 
of the board directors.  This duality allows one powerful individual to pursue the family’s 
interests with greater efficiency than leadership invested in separate persons (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2003). Moreover, it would seem logical that family firms maintain a close 
locus of control for external discipline mechanisms. The coalition among family members 
through the family’s presence and representation via the duality of the CEO and the chair 
could decrease family tensions and align interests among family members (Le Breton-
Miller and Miller, 2013). When CEOs chair the board of directors, their power to 
influence capital structure decisions increases. This increased authority allows them to 
choose the decisions that do not put the firm in a long-term period of risk, such as 
experiencing financial distress or takeover threats from creditors. Thus, the hypothesis is 
that duality and leverage has a negative relation.    
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The results shown in Table 5.4 demonstrate no significant relationship between duality 
and leverage, either for long-term debt or short-term debt. The duality position, in which 
the CEO is also the chairperson of the board, is evident in around 35 percent of family 
firms in Indonesia. Family firms view that when a member of the family is both the CEO 
and a member of the board of directors, the position does not significantly impact capital 
structure decisions. When the position of manager and controller converge in one person, 
it is expected that the impact is supposed to be stronger than a founder CEO or founder 
as a chairman. However, the regression results show no significant impact on leverage 
for either long-term debt or short-term debt.  Accordingly, the result rejects Hypothesis 4 
that when a member of the family is both the CEO and a member of the board of directors, 
this role duality results in less leverage. 
 
 
5.6.3. Evidence on Capital Structure and Renewal of Family Bonds through 
Dynastic Succession   
 
Hypothesis 5. If a descendant of the family firm’s founders acts as the CEO, this role 
leads to a lower level of leverage.    
 
Succession is the process during which managerial control of the business is transferred 
from one generation to the next generation. Family succession, as one of the SEW 
dimensions, can be marked by a founder’s descendant acting as a CEO. As the family 
business is passed to the next generation, the SEW priorities might change. SEW priorities 
depend on the dimension of socio-emotional wealth that families desire to preserve. It 
could be different from the founder stage that might endeavour to ensure the business 
survives and is passed to the next generations.  
 
When it comes to the next generation, what the founder developed seems to be harvested 
by the next generations and they enjoy the rewards for family members, including family 
harmony and using the firm as a family financial resource (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 
2013). If most of the descendants are involved in a family business for a long time, the 
more they are likely to maintain control under a dominant founder descendant or family 
members (sibling or cousin) in aiming to preserve SEW. Thus, the hypothesis is that a 
CEO descendant has a positive relation to leverage.  
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However, the results shown in Table 5.4 of renewal of family bonds through dynastic 
succession, where a descendant succeeds as the CEO, indicate no significant impact on 
capital structure decisions for both long-term debt and short-term debt. This ‘no impact’ 
condition applies even if a CEO is hired from outside at the descendant stage. With 
regards to family influence, an average of about 34.5 percent of family firms had 
descendants as CEOs during the research period. Regardless of CEO status, their 
positions do not impact on the capital structure decisions taken by family firms in 
Indonesia. Even when family firms hire a professional as a CEO, that position and 
initiative has no significant influence on capital structure decisions. Seemingly, once 
family firms enter the post-founder stage, a desire to maintain the firm within the family 
future generations has insignificant effect on capital structure decision-making. 
   
As the family’s engagement with their business declines as a result of the dispersion of 
ownership among generations, the demand to keep control and preserve SEW also 
declines. This finding indicates that destructive agent behaviour, stemming from 
opportunism and asymmetric altruism, will cause the family and independent board 
members to monitor those agents’ activities. A board can connect the younger family 
members and has the ability to reduce family tensions, preserve the vision of the founder 
and resolve conflicts. Thus, agency governance and agent managers tend to be more 
evident under the descendant stages of a family firm’s life.  
 
In this context, differences in family involvement at different stages of the life cycle of 
family firms may shape SEW priorities (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2013). In turn, the 
differences of involvement can influence the degree of family involvement when making 
a capital structure decision. It is acceptable that a family’s status stage reflects the stage 
during which the family control of the business is transferred from one generation to the 
next generation. Ownership could be dispersed amongst successive generations of family 
members and/or the placement of managerial and controller positions with the next 
generation. Both agency theory and stewardship theory highlight that once the 
continuation of the organisation and employment of managers in the company is 
threatened by the possibility of takeover, managers react to protect their own self-interest. 
In particular they will be motivated by the prospect that the organisation may have no 
benefits for them personally. Thus, when the coalition or alignment among family 
members is jeopardised for the long run, this becomes a critical situation.  
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For instance, the firm ‘PT HM Sampoerna Tbk’ had been in existence almost 90 years in 
2005 and was Indonesia’s third-largest cigarette maker by sales when it was taken over 
by the US tobacco giant, ‘Phillip Morris International Inc.’ for $5.2 billion. This purchase 
was equal to buying a 40 percent stake in HM Sampoerna, as listed in the IDX. Sampoerna 
at that time was under a cousin’s consortium with a family CEO, Putera Sampoerna. The 
descendant generation of Sampoerna gave up control because they did not share the 
founder’s interest cigarette and tobacco production. The descendant generations had 
different priorities, with a focus on agribusiness. Thus, the probability of the descendant 
selling the business increased, although the descendant was on the position as a CEO. 
This example is an illustration of the statistical result that I obtained regarding the 
relationship between the change of generations and leverage. Thus, these findings may 
not necessarily reflect the determinants of capital structure of family firms in Indonesia. 
These results reject Hypothesis 5.     
 
 
5.6.4. Evidence on Capital Structure and Binding Social Ties  
 
Hypothesis 6. Board independence increases the level of leverage in a family owned 
firm 
 
Independent board members can help a company to improve its relations with 
organisations outside the family firm, such as creditors. The independent board helps 
family firms to enhance the sustainability of the company and resolve conflicts, since the 
potential for conflict at the post-founder stage may be very high. Their independent 
presence could mitigate the family altruism in hiring unprofessional expertise that lacks 
fresh ideas, has limited skills or making overly centralised decisions. Thus, an 
independent board plays a role in moderating the family’s power and alleviating conflicts 
among shareholders. Correspondingly, Harford et al. (2008) found that a stronger board 
is often a more independent board that will require the firm to hold more debt as a result 
of the decreasing cost of debt financing. So, there seems to be a positive relationship 
between board independence and leverage.   
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The results shown in Table 5.4 show the percentage of independent directors on firms’ 
boards are significant for long-term debt, but not for short-term debt. The proportion of 
independent directors increases with increasing long-term debt. This result is significant 
at 0.01 level. Interestingly, on average, 38.9 percent of firms’ directors are independent 
non-family hires. Board independence is associated with: a) monitoring effectiveness 
(Corbetta and Salvato, 2004), b) dealing with smaller agency problems that help to 
mitigate conflicts between shareholder groups relative to general shareholders (Yeh and 
Woidtke, 2005), c) providing information as an expert or experts (Wilson et al., 2013) 
and d) as a useful source for a conflict resolution among family members (Ward, 2004). 
Thus, family firms may select an independent board member to provide professional 
expertise or has expert.  
 
In addition, in Indonesia, having an independent board has been mandatory, rather than 
voluntary, for listed companies since 2014, based on the regulation of Indonesia Financial 
Services Authority (OJK) No. 33/POJK.04/2014 article 20, verses 2 and 3. The regulation 
states that listed companies must have at least 30 percent of its board members are 
independent board members. However, the findings indicate that some family firms still 
have no independent boards, with the maximum 75 percent of board members that are 
independent as shown in Table 5.1.  
 
This dissonance is because the research coverage is from 2011 – 2015, thus having no 
independent board members happened before 2014. Family firms may select an 
independent board member that provides professional expertise or has an expert 
knowledge. This finding is in line with the research by Setia-Atmaja et al., (2009), who 
observed that board independence seems to have a positive significant impact on long-
term debt. The presence of independent board members appears likely to reduce the 
excessive family involvement that potentially could harm SEW and threatens relational 
trust, especially with fund providers. These results are consistent with the study by 
Anderson and Reeb (2002), who found that independent boards are associated with the 
lower costs of debt financing. Thus, the preference to use more debt seems likely when 
there is an independent board member, or from 2014 members, on the firm’s board of 
directors.   
 
However, others studies find different results regarding the relationship between board 
independence and leverage. Anderson and Reeb (2003) failed to find any significant 
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relationship between board independence and leverage. Others verify that board 
independence can substitute the effect of debt in reducing free cash flows (Alves et al., 
2015). Thus, family firms with a larger fraction of independent board members have a 
capital structure composed of more equity than long-term debt, but with more long-term 
debt than short-term debt. This ratio indicates rather tentatively that a capital structure 
decision is considered as a rank of priority in which monitoring is important for long-
term debt decisions.     
 
Regarding preserving SEW, the intensity of family influence across the firm can hamper 
the family business from being efficient. Excessive family involvement leads to overly 
centralised decisions. Thus, excessive family involvement potentially harms SEW and 
threatens relational trust. On the one hand, the independence of family firms is the way 
to preserve SEW by excluding non-family members from key managerial and board 
positions. On the other hand, the reciprocal bond seen within a family business is not 
exclusively between family members but is likely to be extended to a wider set of non-
family members. Therefore, independent directors have a significant role to play in 
protecting outside family shareholders from self-dealing families; in particular, 
incompetent family members in positions of authority.  
 
These findings confirm the survey of Price Water Cooper (2014), which noted non-family 
board members made up about 80 percent of Indonesian firms’ directors. This figure 
indicates that the role of independent boards is significant in mitigating problems that 
potentially arise from the issues of trust and social bonds with the stakeholders. One 
particularly difficult issue is when the goals of owner-managers or family members and 
non-family shareholders begin to diverge.  With respect to a board’s independence it 
seems that the presence of independent directors is associated with giving a fair 
impression to the market that family firms mitigate opportunistic behaviour by 
independent board monitoring. Since the creditors perceive that family firms are not 
detrimental to their wealth, the lender’s yield requirement will decrease. Thus family 
firms are more likely to enjoy using more debt. Accordingly, the results support the 
hypothesis that board independence exhibits a positive relation with long-term debt, 
which provides support for Hypothesis 6. 
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5.6.5. The Impact of Firm’s Characteristics 
 
Hence, to minimise specification error and increase the asymptotic efficiency of the SEW 
dimension to determine capital structure decisions in family firms, there are several 
control variables included in context of financial factors that may affect a firm’s capital 
structure decisions. Specifically, in the analysis firms’ characteristics have been chosen 
as control variables that are known from the previous literature. In this study the firms’ 
characteristics are identified as a) the asset structure or tangibility, b) profitability, c) a 
firm’s size, d) non-debt tax shield, e) a firm’s age, f) liquidity and g) growth opportunities.     
 
As a developing country, Indonesia is an interesting case study of capital structure, an 
issue highly relevant to the predominance of family businesses because mostly emerging 
markets such as Indonesia provide an excellent laboratory to test the governance potential 
of debt. Specifically, shareholders of emerging market firms often suffer ineffective legal 
protection and underdeveloped markets for corporate controls (Oxford Business Group, 
2018; Harvey et al., 2004; La Porta et al., 1998). As a result, firms financing options prior 
to loan funds and allocation of credit from fund sources will consider a firm’s 
characteristics as determinants of capital structure as well.   
 
The results presented in Table 5.4 show these with regards to a firm’s characteristics; in 
what follows I discuss those variables which are thought to control the capital structure 
decisions of family firms.  
 
 
a. Asset structure 
 
The results in Table 5.4 demonstrate that the asset structure of TANG has no significant 
relationship with leverage for both long-term debt and short-term debt. Firms with a high 
ratio of tangible assets to total assets are more likely to use debt to fund the business. The 
tangibility of the firm’s assets is also associated with agency costs of debt. Family firms 
unable to provide collateral may have more opportunities to expropriate creditor interest 
by substituting safer projects for riskier projects (Booth et al., 2001). However, the 
findings show that assets as collateral do not significantly influence capital structure 
decisions.  
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TANG is defined as the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. It is collateral that companies 
may use when they seek to raise credit. Collateral usually increases debt capacity and 
therefore makes it easier for the firm to raise new debt capital (Almeida and Campello, 
2007). In other words, the possibility of that family firms cannot provide collateral. Firms 
which are unable to provide collateral may have an asset substitution problem which 
develops because of the wish of the company to substitute safer projects, or high quality 
assets, for riskier projects or low quality assets. The asset substitution could expropriate 
creditors’ interest and make them suffer credit risks. Thus, collateral plays an important 
role in terms of offering creditor protection, especially in countries with a weak legal 
environment (La Porta et al., 1998). Agency theory suggests that creditors see asset 
tangibility as a monitoring mechanism applicable to borrowers which thus tends to 
mitigate agency conflict between lenders and borrowers. The expenditure to monitor 
family firms with large asset tangibility seems likely to reduce compared with family 
firms with less asset tangibility. In other words, firms with a high ratio of tangible assets 
to total assets are more likely to prefer debt.  
 
However, the results shown in Table 5.4 indicate that the asset structure of tangibility has 
no significant relation to leverage, either long-term debt or short-term debt. Even though 
TANG has an average of 52.13 percent, which is more than half is tangible assets, 
suggesting that family firms are able to provide collateral for both short-term lenders and 
long-term lenders, but asset tangibility does not significantly affect decision-making. The 
insignificant effect of asset tangibility can be explained by the tight family holdings and 
concentrated ownership and the close relationship of firms with their lenders (Deesomsak 
et al., 2004); as a result the demand for collateral in order to borrow is less important to 
many lenders. In addition, this situation could be due to the relatively high level of family 
ownership in the banking and finance sector. As mentioned above, approximately 70 
percent of the banks in Indonesia are owned by families. Thus, family firms in Indonesia 
limit to use tangible assets as a commitment strategy in order to prevent family firm’s 
self-destruction against financial risk by using more debt.   
 
This result is consistent with Wiwattanakantang (1999) and Deesomsak et al. (2004), who 
find that in Asian countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, the relationship 
between leverage and asset tangibility is not significant. This result might be explained 
by the relatively high concentration of family ownership, that is attributed to preserving 
SEW and is characterised by a reputation for keeping a good relationship with creditors. 
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Therefore, an intangible asset such as the reputation of the family’s name might be more 
relevant as collateral, than a physically tangible asset. Regardless of the availability of 
tangible assets as collateral, family firms might be calculating the interaction between the 
pleasure of getting funds from creditors and the pain of paying for it. It leads to the 
tendency of family firms to value assets more, just because they equate collateral as out 
of pocket costs, representing an ‘instant endowment effect’ to not giving up any of those 
assets.   
 
Moreover, keeping a good reputation in front of creditors also becomes a concern of 
family firms to preserve SEW. Lenders contemplate some features of family firms when 
it comes to the collateral requested to acquire debt. This behaviour supports Ang (1991) 
who found that the motivation to pass the business to the next generation makes family 
businesses a non-diversified investment portfolio with concern for their long-term 
survival. Thus, family firms tend to avoid damaging the owner family’s reputation to 
prevent the loss of their assets in case of their loss of capacity to repay.  
 
 
b. Profitability 
 
The results of the impact of profitability show that PROF is negatively related to long-
term debt. However, when leverage is measured as short-term debt, as shown in Table 
5.4, there is a positive impact of profitability to leverage. The results for long-term debt 
and short-term debt are significant at the 0.01 level and 0.05 level, respectively. This 
finding suggests that family firms with a high profit use a low level of long-term debt. In 
other words, Indonesian family firms reduce their long-term debt as they become more 
profitable. This strategy point to the family’s desire to avoid financial distress and 
minimise any risk that can potentially damage their reputation. Maintaining profit as a 
source of internal funds may deter the family firm from using free cash flows to pay off 
the interest payment of creditors, thus providing a commitment against the risk of 
financial distress.  Such a strategy is preferred to the family firm getting added value from 
using more debt, but suffering a loss in utility from using debt which is often extremely 
expensive. The excessive long-term debt decreases the profitability of family firms and 
increase financial distress costs. Since family firms generally have long-term orientations 
to preserve SEW, and the founding family identifies with the business, they strive to 
maintain their firm’s good reputation.  
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Family firms with a profitable operating performance have a lower probability of 
experiencing financial distress. There is a tendency to use retained earnings from profit 
rather than taking on external funds, such as debt. Financial distress can damage a 
family’s reputation as intangible assets whose value is in the long run, thus the more 
profitable the family firms are, the more they avoid long-term debt. However, family 
firms in Indonesia are more likely use short-term debt due to the limited capacity of banks 
to finance long-term debt. In this situation, a profitable firm has a capability to repay 
short-term debt, suggesting that creditors will be willing to provide more short-term debt 
for a profitably run family firm.  
 
Profitability is an indicator that firms are better managed and thus expected to be efficient. 
The more profitable the family firms, the greater the probability that internal resources 
will be available for investment. Thus, less urgent is the need for external financing 
(Mishra and McConaughy, 1999). From the side of fund supplies, creditors will expect 
that profitable family firms have a capability to repay debt. In line with this, they will 
provide more debt to family firms that have an interest to avoid the potential dilution of 
family ownership. By way of comparison, almost all empirical studies have found the 
relationship between profitability and leverage is negative (Ampenberger, 2013; 
Aggarwal and Kyaw, 2010; Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010; Frank and Goyal, 2009). The 
negative relationship results from the cost of debt; a company’s exhausted debt capacity 
means no more debt can be raised (Lemmon and Zender, 2010).  
 
However, there may be another reason for the negative relationship, which is to avoid 
underinvestment problems, where a highly leveraged firm foregoes valuable investment 
opportunities. For the long term, creditors probably want to capture the returns from the 
project, thereby leaving insufficient returns for the shareholders. In this situation, family 
firms may follow a decision rule to not issue more debt. Thus, the firm financed with 
risky debt might be obliged to pass up the valuable investment opportunity, which could 
result in high profit, due to the firm’s debt overhang problem. Therefore, family firms 
might set the optimal combination on capital structure to avoid underinvestment and a 
debt overhang problem. This study confirms previous empirical studies in developing 
countries which noted that Asian countries, such as Singapore and Thailand, have a 
negative relationship between leverage and profitability (Booth et al., 2001; 
Wiwattanakantang, 1999).  
157 
 
 
By way of comparison, this current study found that there is a positive relationship 
between short-term debt and profitability, suggesting that the more profitable the family 
firms are, the higher their preference to use short-term debt. These figures are normal 
results for the firms sampled in this study, where most family firms in Indonesia are 
largely rely on banking, rather the bond market, for their funding. Since the bond market 
in Indonesia is underdeveloped, banks are the fund source for short-term debt. Moreover, 
due to the OJK conservative credit policies, Indonesian banks usually offer debt to less 
risky firms at lower rates of risk premium (10.48 percent pa). Since the most profitable 
Indonesia family firms may be less likely to experience bankruptcy costs, this situation 
will increase their ability to reduce costs by increasing short-term debt. In this case 
profitability is an important determinant in Indonesian banks’ decisions to grant short-
term loans to family firms in Indonesia. Thus, highly profitable firms indicate that firms 
are well managed and can be expected to be efficient than low profitable firms. As a 
result, creditors will anticipate that a profitable firm has a capability to repay their short-
term debt and therefore end up providing more short-term debt for those profitable family 
firms.  
 
c. Firm Size        
 
The impact of SIZE on leverage is insignificant, both for long-term debt and short-term 
debt. Therefore, the expectation of large family firms carrying more debt is refuted. The 
findings show that SIZE might be used as a proxy for an inverse probability of default. 
This probability of default is not significantly related to leverage in a country such as 
Indonesia where the bankruptcy costs are low, since the legal system is incomplete with 
the relevant finance laws yet to be implemented.  
 
Hooks (2003) finds that SIZE affects the amount of debt capital available to a firm. A 
firm’s size is found to be an important determinant of leverage (Santos, 2014; Setia-
Atmaja et al., 2009). Moreover, Huang and Song (2006) support the idea that size can be 
used as a proxy for information asymmetries. The effect of size toward disclosure is that 
the larger the firm the more information is provided to creditors. As the information is 
open to the public, the probability that the firm will hide the information regarding the 
possibility of a default will be less likely. Thus, this perception enables large firms to 
obtain a greater amount of leverage (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 2002; 
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Frank and Goyal, 2003). To a large extent, the bigger firms face fewer information 
problems and their size might also increase their bargaining power to creditors (Degryse 
et al., 2012).  
 
The findings shown in Table 5.4 reveal that the expectation of large family firms carrying 
more debt is refuted. This study found no evidence that large firms provide more 
information than do smaller ones, thus increasing the availability of capital provided by 
creditors. This finding indicates that there are no differences between large or small 
family firms toward disclosure issues, if firm size is seen as a proxy for information 
asymmetries. Thus, family firms in Indonesia can be presumed to share similarities in 
transparency and maintaining their reputations, so making them less prone to bankruptcy 
risks.  
 
This result is in line with Chen (2004), who concluded that in China, the relationship of 
firm size and leverage is not statistically significant. In this respect family firms in 
Indonesia are likely to be owned by the founding families, who still own a significant 
proportion of the companies’ shares. The CEO could be the founder, or a family member, 
or a professional manager selected by the family. Then, if size proxies for relative dilution 
of control, as agency theory posits, the Indonesian family firms would appear likely to 
have similarities in protecting their SEW, both for small and large firms.  
 
If large firms are more likely to diversify their financial sources, and firm size may be a 
proxy for the probability of default, larger firms may be more difficult to liquidate. This 
situation occurs in firms with large dispersed ownerships, in which the rationale of the 
argument is very likely to be economic.  However, Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that 
they do not really understand why size is correlated with leverage. It appears likely that 
empirical research has not attempted so far to investigate the size effect, since the facts 
that have been observed appear to be inconsistent. The fixed costs of financing could be 
a reason to connect firm size and leverage. Nevertheless, the considerations of Indonesian 
family firms in capital structure are not controlled by firm size, since family firms are 
typically undiversified financial resources, a status that leads them to be perceived as less 
likely to default than smaller businesses. Also, as Diamond (1989) suggested, a good 
family reputation is a ticket to gain access to creditors; the reputation is used to maintain 
a relationship with lenders in the long run because a family’s reputation will also pass to 
the next generations.      
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d. Non-Debt Tax Shield  
 
The results shown in Table 5.4 demonstrate a positive and significant relationship 
between non-debt tax shield (NDTS) and leverage, when leverage is measured by long-
term debt (LTD). The result is significant at the 0.10 level. However, when leverage is 
measured as short-term debt (STD), as shown in Table 5.4, there is a negative relationship 
between non-debt tax shield and short term-debt. This result is significant at the 0.10 
level. These outcomes are not surprising, since the non-debt tax shield (measured as 
tangible assets depreciation to total assets) has an impact in the long term, rather than in 
the short term. This result is consistent with the argument of Barclay and Smith (1995), 
Moh’d et al. (1998) and Santos et al. (2014) who suggested that if firms have more NDTS, 
they will also have higher depreciation ratios. The higher depreciation ratios are more 
likely to have relatively fewer growth options in firms’ investment opportunity sets and 
relatively more tangible assets. This outcome indicates that family firms with relatively 
high tangible assets signal their high debt capacity to fund providers. Thus, this finding 
can be attributed to a large tangibility in their asset structures, more than 50 percent on 
average, for the long run.  
 
However, NDTS is utilised as a substitute for tax benefits for short-term debt, since in 
Indonesia tax facilities have been regulated as a stimulus for investment, based on 
government regulations. The tax facilities entitle a corporate tax payer to income tax 
benefits up to 30 percent of the amount invested in tangible assets and charged at 5 percent 
per annum. Thus, the higher the tax benefit, the lower the short-term debt.   
 
e. Firm’s Age 
 
The firm age, measured by the number years since incorporation, significantly influences 
leverage in both measurements. However, the relationships are different between long-
term debt, short-term debt and AGE. The coefficient estimates for AGE is negative and 
significant at the 0.01 level for long-term debt. Established family firms prefer to use a 
lower level of long-term debt. It appears likely that mature family firms prefer a lower 
level of leverage to avoid financial distress. By contrast, as shown in Table 5.4, when 
leverage is measured as short-term debt there is a positive and significant impact of the 
AGE on leverage at the 0.05 significance level. Established family firms prefer to use a 
lower level of long-term debt; mainly because avoiding financial distress is significant 
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for mature family firms that achieve this goal by using lower levels of leverage. Mature 
family firms with a good reputation and a long-term satisfactory relationship with 
creditors, prefer a higher level of short-term debt rather than long-term debt. These results 
are consistent with Schmid (2013) who found that the relationship between a firm’s age 
and leverage levels is negative.  
 
The firm’s age should play a role in capital structure decisions because it may be 
interpreted as a measurement of default risk (Chua et al., 2011). Also, established family 
firms or older family firms have longer track records, therefore they have a reputation 
regarding creditworthiness with creditors. A family firm’s reputation is the standard 
model of the age structure of the capital measure that in turn has a contribution to increase 
the debt capacity because of reducing the level of asymmetric information. Moreover, 
empirical studies find that capital sources depend on whether a business is developing or 
maturing (Dollinger, 1995), with different financing arrangements being linked to 
business life cycles (Berger and Udell, 1998). The interaction between lenders and 
borrower over time makes creditors able to alleviate the information asymmetry that 
causes the financial distress of family firms. 
 
Further, following the assumptions that older family firms have: i) lower information 
asymmetries between all stakeholders (Santos et al., 2014), ii) more collateral value and 
cash flows (Croci, et al., 2011) and iii) longer track records (Moosa and Li, 2012) that 
increases the borrowing capacity, those assumptions fail to support the findings for 
decision making. In fact these assumptions suggest the possibility of family firms using 
more debt because they have larger borrowing capacity, but they do not use it. These 
findings are consistent with the result above, regarding the relationship between firm sizes 
and leverage levels.  
 
The average family firm has an age of approximately 30 years, with the maximum age of 
104 years. These data confirm that 29 of the family firms in this research population have 
already passed to the third generation, with 72 companies under the second generation. 
The second generation is the biggest number, the third generation is the smallest and the 
founder stage is in the middle, with 59 companies. A rationale behind these findings is 
the fact that as the duration of ownership increases, founders place a higher value on an 
object that they have owned, so the levels of loss aversion also increase. As long as people 
hold the object, the consequence of forgoing gains is less painful than perceived loss. 
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Time and duration become important factors to control the fear of losing. Thus, as family 
firms mature, they are more prudent in using more long-term debt, since reputation and 
good track records with creditors are used to preserve SEW and pass it to the next 
generation.   
 
However, research evidence suggests that if leverage is measured by short-term debt 
(STD), that measurement will be positively related to the leverage ratio (Croci et al., 
2011). In fact the average of short-term debt is double that of long-term debt: 15.53 
percent and 31.62 percent, respectively. It therefore appears likely the long track records 
of family firms are most likely regarding short-term debt. Bank loans provide short-term 
financing for working capital; equity might be the main source of finance for capital 
investment of family firms in Indonesia. Thus, it would seem logical that the well-
established family firms, or older family firms, have longer track records; therefore, they 
have a good reputation regarding creditworthiness of short-term debt with creditors. This 
positive perspective makes the direction of the relationships between long-term debt and 
short-term debt different, depending on the firm’s age.  
 
f. Liquidity 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.4 in Chapter 5, LIQ is applied for short-term debt and not for 
long-term debt. This discrimination is because the ratio is a measure of the ability of the 
firm to cover its short-term financing commitments. The result demonstrates that LIQ is 
negative and significant at the 0.01 level when related to short-term debt. A negative 
relationship between short-term debt and LIQ is expected, simply because using more 
short-term debt means more lack of cash. The more liquid family firms are, the less they 
wish to finance their firms with debt and may use those assets to provide sources of 
financing in case of sudden need. This finding supports the studies of Deesomsak et al., 
(2004) and Moosa and Li (2012) who concluded that firms with greater liquid assets may 
use those assets to finance their investments. In addition, family firms in Indonesia, 
especially in the retail sector (sector 9), commonly hold significant liquidity. It would 
seem logical since the retail sector generally has more working capital than other 
industries.  
 
Firms tend to use their liquid assets to finance their investment in preference to raising 
external debt (Deesomsak et al., 2004). Using more debt means more liabilities, which 
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implies fewer current assets remaining after covering liabilities. Moreover, managers can 
manipulate liquid assets in favour of shareholders against the interest of bond holders 
(Prowse, 1990). As a result, such an arrangement might increase the agency cost of debt, 
thus there is a negative relationship between leverage and liquidity. When family firms 
face illiquid conditions, they have limits in attracting debt because financial distress will 
be indicated as relatively high. Even though creditors could act as liquidity providers to 
their important customers who are in distress (Oliveira et al., 2017), the family firms’ 
long track records and good reputations relief that these are only temporary because 
providing additional debt to lenders can also increase creditors’ current liabilities. 
Consistent with this reasoning, illiquid family firms induce financial constraints and 
increase the monitoring costs of the creditors.      
 
Moreover, the negative relationship between short-term debt and liquidity might be due 
to potential conflicts between shareholders and creditors. As noted earlier, liquidity can 
be taken as evidence to show the extent to which the assets can be manipulated by 
shareholders, at the expense of creditors. However, I would not go so far as to say that 
family firms may use liquidity to manipulate creditors, since family firms are concerned 
to preserve SEW and maintain their family’s good reputation with their creditors. 
Manipulation by using the liquidity of firms’ assets might destroy trust from creditors and 
increase the agency cost of debt; thus, in the long run it could be a problem for family 
firms regarding additional leverage. Therefore, the negative effect of the liquidity position 
of the family firm on its leverage level seems to demonstrate that such firms tend to use 
their liquid assets to finance their investments, in preference to raising external debt. This 
conclusion is in-line with the fact that family firms in Indonesia use almost two times 
more short-term debt (the average is 31.62 percent) compared with long-term debt (the 
average is 15.53 percent).   
 
g. Growth opportunities 
 
Agency theory predicts that firms with a high market-to-book ratio have higher costs 
when experiencing financial distress. The relationship between growth opportunities and 
leverage is therefore negative. The negative impact of GROW on leverage might reveal 
several features of the borrowing behaviour of family firms. This negative impact may 
give support to the prediction that family firms with relatively high intangible assets 
cannot support high leverage levels. Moreover, Deesomsak et al. (2004) argued that 
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negative relations due to the fear of creditors may cause firms to pass up valuable 
investment opportunities. However, some argue that if firms hold more tangible assets, 
they tend to borrow more debt, since growth opportunities cannot be collateralised. 
Therefore, creditors are willing to assign higher valuations to highly leveraged firms, as 
well as issuing more long-term debt to finance the firm’s growth opportunities (Chen, 
2004).  
 
However, Table 5.4 implies that GROW have a significant impact on capital structure 
decision-making, but the results will be different depending on the measurement 
parameters used. When leverage is measured with long-term debt, the finding shows that 
the relationship is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. Therefore, the higher the 
growth opportunities for the firm, the more likely it is that the firm will exhaust its internal 
funds and require more long-term debt. By way of comparison, when leverage is 
measured as short-term debt, there is an insignificant relationship between a firm’s 
growth and its leverage. Thus, family firms with greater growth rates have higher long-
term debt, due to the less probability of default and lender risk. Firms with higher growth 
opportunities may be less likely to default than the firms growing more slowly. 
 
This finding is consistent with Jung et al. (1996), who showed that if management pursues 
growth objectives, management and shareholders’ interests tend to coincide in those firms 
with strong investment opportunities. Debt might not limit the agency costs of managerial 
discretion (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). In other words, if family firms need additional 
capital to finance their positive investment opportunities, they may raise more long-term 
debt. It may be interpreted that family firms will follow the matching principle, which is 
to finance long term investment with long term debt. Moreover, empirically, previous 
studies regarding both firm’ and country-specific determinants of capital structure in 
developing countries found that Malaysia and Thai firms (Booth et al., 2001) have a 
positive relationships between long-term debt and growth opportunities. The highest 
value of growth opportunities in Indonesia comes from agriculture (sector 1), which is 
dominated by the high growth of palm oil plantations in Indonesia over the last 30 years. 
Palm oil and its derivative products form the most important prominent commodity in 
Indonesia. This product is the most valuable after coal and oil, so the growth opportunities 
associated with this commodity significantly contribute to the agriculture sector in 
particular, and Indonesia in general.  In addition, these findings indicate that as debt 
market in Indonesia is still underdeveloped, the expansion of the business will require a 
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large amount of funds that may not be sufficiently funded by internal operations. Hence 
growth opportunities have a positive association with long-term debt.  
 
In addition, the results show that the firm’s age has a negative relationship with long-term 
debt but growth opportunities have a positive relationship with long-term debt. Such 
relationships are significant at the 0.01 level, for both the firm’s age and growth 
opportunities. Therefore, it appears likely that mature family firms need more working 
capital than younger family firms. Younger family firms normally have founder 
involvement such as a founder-CEO. Such firms are driven to grow and are characterised 
by a long-term strategic horizon, thus they need less short-term debt than mature family 
firms. These findings also confirm that the more growth opportunities are available to 
firms, the more they tend to finance their investment by long-term financing.  The most 
important aspect of capital structure decisions is the choice between internal and external 
financing. It might be assumed that financial constraints lead family firms to have to rely 
more heavily upon internal financing. With regards to financial constraints, I use firm 
size and market to book value to classify firms as financially constrained (Frank and 
Goyal, 2009). Here, I maintain financial constraints do not bias the results of my research.  
 
 
5.7. Additional Robustness Checks 
 
Several additional analysis were conducted to test the robustness of the results. First, I 
tested all the models with another dependent variable: Total Debt. This test is to examine 
whether the prior results are sensitive to alternate measurements, I re-estimated the 
equation using alternate proxy for leverage. The leverage calculated use total debt to total 
asset (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). The fixed effects results are statistically significant and 
indicate that the dimensions of socio-emotional wealth impact to capital structure 
decisions. Family ownerships, a founder CEO, family board representation and board 
independence have relationship with leverage. The results ‘are presented in Table 5.5 
panel (1).  
 
Second, to examine whether the prior results are sensitive to the fact that family firms can 
be actively managed or passively managed, for this reason the term of family roles as a 
CEO, a board members or a duality position, I re-estimated the equation using a binary 
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variable that equals one for actively managed family firms and zero otherwise. The results 
are consistent with earlier analyses (panel 2). While, to examine whether this study is 
sensitive to the fact that proportion of independent directors in family firms may be bias 
since this study require family members on the board as well as family CEO, thus I follow 
Setia-Atmaja  et al., (2009) to measure of board independence that exclude family 
members in the denominator. The results are not different from previous analyses (panel 
3).  
 
Table 5.5. Estimation Methodology I 
 
Variable 
 
Total Debt 
(1) 
LTD 
(2) 
LTD 
(3) 
LTD 
(4) 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
         
OWN 
 
0.7666 (1.81)* 1.3161 (5.01)*** 1.2704    (4.82)***    1.4375 (5.45)*** 
OWN2 
 
-0.0853 (-0.94) -2.2530 (-3.88)*** -2.1653     (-3.70)***    -24837 (-4.23)*** 
OWN3 
 
0.1032 (0.86) 1.0336 (2.75)*** 0.9962    (2.60)***    1.1752 (3.06)*** 
CEO founder 
 
-0.0636 (-3.30)***   -0.0180    (-1.38)    -0.0191 (-1.50) 
Family board 
representation  
 
0.0320 (1.92)**   -0.0217    (-1.77)*   -0.0274 (-1.06) 
Duality 
 
    0.0001    (0.01)    0.0050 (0.44) 
CEO descendant 
 
0.0105 (0.518)   0.0009    (0.83)    0.0133 (1.20) 
FF Active   0.0140 (1.26)     
         
Board independence 
 
0.2284 (3.29)*** 0.1913    
 
 (0..46)***          0.1832 (3.79)*** 
Board Size 
(Exclude Family) 
 
    0.0789 (3.45)***   
TANG 0.0111 (0.36) 0.0287   
 
 (1.28)       0.0456    (2.03)**    0.0333 1.50 
PROF 
 
-0.1150 (-1.48) -0.1889  (-3.93)***         -0.1676        (-3.52)***    -0.1853 (-3.89)*** 
SIZE 0.0027 (1.17) 0.0025    
 
 (1.30)    0.0028         (1.46)    0.0025 (1.32) 
NDTS 
 
-0.0146 (-0.09) 0.1876 (1.61)*      0.2267   (1.64)*    0.2077 (1.79)* 
AGE -0.0003 (-0.55) -0.0011  (-2.23)**   
        
-0.0011    (-2.29)**    -0.0012 (-2.58)*** 
LIQ -0.0651 (-13.7)***    
 
   
GROW 0.0019 (0.50) 0.0068 (2.71)***    
 
0.0063    (2.47)**    0.0074 (2.97)*** 
Family-Bank 
Relations 
 
      0.0350 (1.97)** 
Intercept 0.3190 (4.12)*** 0.0750 
 
(1.97)**       -0.0962     (-1.82)*    -0.1445 (-2.78)*** 
Adjusted R Square   0.274  0.1366  0.1343  0.1518  
Prob > F 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Number of 
observation 
800  800  800  800  
Legend: significant at * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
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 In addition, to anticipate family-bank relationships since the fact that in Indonesia almost 
70 percent of banks are owned by family firms, I construct a control variable family-bank 
relations using a binary variable that equals one for family firms that own a bank and zero 
otherwise. The result indices that family firms that have a relationship with bank in as a 
holding company tend to use more leverage than family firms that do not have a bank in 
their holding company (panel 4).        
  
Table 5.6. Estimation Methodology II 
 
Variable 
 
LTD 
(1) 
LTD 
(2) 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
     
OWN 1.3385 (5.02)*** 1.3070 (4.83)*** 
     
OWN2 -2.255 (-3.79)*** -2.1828 (-3.59)*** 
     
OWN3 1.0298 (2.65)*** 0.974 (2.43)*** 
     
CEO founder -0.021 (2.65)*** -0.0263  (-2.03)** 
    
Family board representation  
 
-0.0169 (-1.42) -0.0100   
 
 (-0.83)        
Duality 0.0062 (0.55) 0.0063  
 
 (0.55)        
CEO descendant 
 
0.0113 (1.03) 0.0067    
 
 (0.59)        
Board independence 
 
0.2138 (4.66)*** 0.2015    
 
 (4.47)***        
TANG 0.0234 (1.06) 0.0095   
 
 (0.40)       
PROF 
 
-0.1664 (-3.76)*** -0.1919  (-4.01)***         
SIZE 0.0020 (1.08) 0.0027    
 
 (1.45)    
NDTS 
 
0.2472 (1.98)** 0.2267 (1.81)*      
AGE -0.0011 (-2.43)** -0.0015 (-2.89)***   
        
GROW 0.0090 (3.70)*** 0.0068 (2.65)***    
 
DPR -0.1208 (-6.42)***   
     
Industry   0.0357 (3.65)*** 
     
Intercept -0.1237 (-2.31)** -0.1424 
 
(-2.69)***       
Adjusted  R- Squared   0.1782  0.1586  
Prob > F  0.002  0.0000  
Number of observation 800  800  
 Legend: significant at * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
 
Third, another important aspect is the choice between internal and external financing. 
Frank and Goyal (2009); Schmid (2013) use the dividend paying status, firm size, and 
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market-to-book ratio to classify family firms as financially constrained. Firms with high 
growth opportunities may have lower dividend payout due to their larger investment 
requirements and a tendency to retain funds to avoid external financing with its attendant 
costs (Fama and French, 2001; Setia-Atmaja, et.al., 2009). Thus, I employ dividend 
payments to serve as additional control variable. The results do not change the principal 
findings (Table 5.6 panel 1). Hence, I maintain that financing constraints do not bias this 
study’s results. In addition, highly capital intensive firms such as the infrastructure, 
transportation, construction, property and manufacturing industries may be more likely 
to be candidates for bank loans. On the other hand, trade and service firms are less likely 
to use external capital because they often lack tangible assets that can be used as collateral 
(Santos et al., 2014). Thus, the additional industry, which is be classified as highly capital 
intensive sectors and less capital intensive, is to serve as a control variable. The findings 
lead to similar results with principal findings that highly capital intensive sectors are tend 
to use more leverage (Table 5.6 panel 2).     
 
Fourth, this study could potentially suffer from reverse-causality. While it is possible that 
family ownership leads to higher leverage, the same factors may also induce families to 
maintain their holdings. To address this potential problem, I use the instrumental variable 
(IV) procedure to estimate the equation. Following Setia-Atmaja et al., (2009), I create a 
lagged family ownership variable (lagged by one year) and use it as an instrument for 
measuring family ownership. The estimation which include this instrumental variable is 
consistent with previous results presented in Table 5.7 (panel 1), providing similar results 
with previous results. Lagged ownership has a significant influence on leverage. 
Moreover, as the last variation, I include lagged leverage as an additional right-hand side 
variable in the base equation. This allows me to capture the dynamic nature of capital 
structure decision. Following Schmid (2013), I employ the system-GMM estimator 
proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with lagged values of the right hand side variables 
as instruments. The results are presented in Table 5.7 (panel 2). As expected, lagged 
leverage has a positive and significant influence on leverage.      
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Table 5.7. Estimation Methodology III – Reverse Causality Test 
 
Variable 
 
LTD 
Instrumental variable 
(1) 
LTD 
System-GMM 
(2) 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
     
OWN   2.1377 (1.65)* 
     
OWN2 
 
  -4.2272 (-1.65)* 
OWN3 
 
  2.3676 (1.55) 
Lag (OWN) 1 year -0.0404 (-1.87)*   
     
CEO founder -0.0173  (-1.32) 
    
  
Family board representation  
 
-0.0089   
 
 (-0.74)        0.0399 (0.41) 
Duality 0.0052  
 
 (0.45)          
CEO descendant 
 
0.0169    
 
 (1.52)        0.3161 (123) 
Board independence 
 
-0.2284    
 
 (3.27)***        0.2138 (4.66)*** 
Leverage (LTD (1-t)) 
 
  7.0116 (2.30)** 
TANG 0.0111   
 
 (1.88)*       0.0202 (0.36) 
PROF 
 
-0.1737  (-3.73)***         -0.0821 (-1.11) 
SIZE 0.0010    
 
 (0.48)    -0.0106 (-1.87)* 
NDTS 
 
0.2198 (1.84)*      -0.1324 (-1.01) 
AGE -0.0015 (-3.13)***   
        
0.0053 (1.67)* 
LIQ -0.0651 (-13.69)***   
 
GROW 
 
0.0068 
 
(2.65)***    
 
 
-0.008 
 
(-0.01) 
Intercept -0.1227 
 
(3.19)***       -0.3450 (-1.41) 
Adjusted R- Squared   0.0818    
Prob > F / Prob > chi2 0.0000  0.002  
Number of observation 800  800  
  Legend: significant at * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 5.8 summarises the capital structure determinants of Indonesian family firms and 
Table 5.9 presents the result summary of hypothesis testing.   
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Table 5.8. Determinants of Family Firms’ Capital Structure in Indonesia 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Model 1 – Long-term debt 
(Relationship) 
Model 2 – short-term debt 
(Relationship) 
Family Control and Influence   
Family ownership Non-linear (N-curve) Not significant 
CEO founder Negative Not significant 
Family board representation  Not significant Positive 
Duality  Not significant Not significant 
   
Renewal of Family Bonds 
through Dynastic Succession 
  
CEO descendant Not significant Not significant 
   
Binding Social Ties   
Board independence Positive Not significant 
   
Control Variables 
 
  
Firms’ Characteristics   
Asset structure (TANG) Not significant Not significant 
Profitability (PROF) Negative Positive 
Firm Size (SIZE) Not significant Not significant 
Tax shield effect (NDTS) Positive Negative 
Firm Age (AGE) Negative Positive 
Liquidity (LIQ) ---- Negative 
Growth opportunity (GROW) Positive Not significant 
 
 
Table 5.9. Result Summary of Hypothesis Testing 
 
Hypotheses Result 
(Long-term Debt) 
Result 
(Short-term Debt) 
Dimension SEW 1: 
Family control and influence   
 
  
Hypothesis 1. 
Concentration of ownership in the hands of 
family members has a non-linear 
relationship with leverage over the life 
period of the family.  
Accept Reject 
Hypothesis 2. 
If the firm founder acts as the CEO, the 
family firm will have low leverage levels.  
Accept Reject 
Hypothesis 3. 
If family members are represented on the 
Board of Directors, this increases leverage 
of family owned firms.   
Reject Accept 
Hypothesis 4. 
In a family owned firm, when a member of 
the family is both the CEO and a member of 
Reject Reject 
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the Board of Directors, this results in less 
leverage. 
Dimension SEW 2: 
Renewal of family bonds through dynastic 
succession. 
 
Hypothesis 5. 
If a descendant of the family firm’s founders 
acts as the CEO, this leads to a lower level 
of leverage.    
Reject Reject 
Dimension SEW 3:  
Binding social ties. 
 
Hypothesis 6. 
Board independence increases the level of 
leverage in a family owned firm. 
Accept Reject 
 
 
5.8. Summary of this Chapter 
 
This chapter presents the findings and results of my research into the issue of capital 
structure decisions in the context of Indonesian family firms. A model has been developed 
to explain the determinants of capital structure of such family firms. In addition to the 
pooled data model, the panel data which are usually estimated using either fixed or 
random effect techniques were used. The fixed effects specification was found to be the 
preferred model for LTD and the random effects is the appropriate estimation model for 
STD.    
 
The estimated model indicates that capital structure decisions made by Indonesian family 
firms can be explained by the dimensions of the socio-emotional wealth. Those 
dimensions may constitute a mechanism for family firms to determine their strategic 
objectives and the related strategic behaviour of capital structure, thus preserving socio- 
emotional wealth for the long run. Moreover, these findings indicate that the borrowing 
capacity of Indonesian family firms is mainly affected by avoiding the risks of financial 
distress, as well as the expected costs of asset substitution problems. This avoidance is 
most often achieved by using more short-term debt. Accordingly, the relative low level 
of leverage is due to maintaining the family firm for the long run.  Thus to avoid financial 
distress, family firms may keep the leverage in a low level.   
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It is generally accepted that traditionally finance literature has had little to say about the 
dimensions of socio-emotional wealth as the distinctive form of the family as an 
enterprise affect such firms’ capital structure decisions. Previous studies show that family 
firms differ from non-family firms (Mishra and McConaughy, 1999; Anderson et al., 
2003; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). Nonetheless, little theoretical and empirical research has 
been done to support the premise that dimensions of SEW determine the capital structure 
behaviour of family firms. Thus, to fill the knowledge gap and complete the study of 
family business and capital structure decisions, this research clarifies the determinants of 
capital structure of family firms.       
 
Justification of agency theory and stewardship theory is that principals and managers 
become more aligned, but ownership concentration is more dispersed, and friction among 
family members is more likely when control of family firms passes from one generation 
to the next. Thus, the connectivity between them is on the risk attitudes between owners 
and agents that result in dynamic perspectives. In other words, both might have the same 
risk preferences, which could change over time.  
 
Moreover, the challenge of agency based models of capital structure through corporate 
governance is to set up a supervisory and incentive alignment mechanism that alters the 
risk orientation of agents, to align them with the interests of their principals (Tosi and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This model 
also restricts the categorisation of agents’ risk taking behaviour as either risk aversion or 
risk neutral. There is a tendency to neglect any changes in the risk preferences of the 
agents (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Relaxing the assumption regarding the 
possibility of changing the risk preferences of agents can improve the explanatory power 
of the capital decision structure in family firms, in the context of dissimilar risk bearing 
levels and risk preferences between managers and principals.  
  
Alternatively, a dynamic perspective of both theories highlights that agents’ risk 
preferences do not remain constant or stable in their attitudes to risk (uncertainty); agents 
do not always demonstrate consistent behaviour. The decision makers are driven by the 
desire to avoid losses (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998); decisions are not based on or 
shaped by the potential final wealth sum, but are informed by the gains and losses relative 
to a specific reference point (Chua et al., 2015). As a consequence, the divergent 
tendencies of interests result not from the individual’s motivation or interest that 
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conventional agency models presume to be a source of agency problem, but from the risk 
preferences under uncertain conditions.  
 
Under uncertain conditions for the future, managers exercise their authority to make a 
decision based on their experiences, traditions, habits, customs and other constituted 
practices of the formation process. This approach is especially true for decisions relating 
to the outcomes of a series of decisions over time, such as a firm’s capital structure. The 
leverage may be interpreted as the possibility of growth in size or in profit, which is short-
term. Also involved is the capability of managers to accumulate the noneconomic 
outcomes or socio-emotional wealth (SEW) in the long-term, together with the 
accumulation of stocks of family resources, such as the reputation of the family. Agent 
behaviour tends to predict performance outcomes based on the agent’s risk preferences 
(McGuire, 1988; Rees, 1985) or their assumptions about expectations in the future (Baker 
et al., 2004). Therefore, it is reasonable that agents will decide to use the level of leverage 
depending on how they compare the anticipated outcomes from the available options of 
capital structures.  
 
However, these static perspectives fail to move beyond the dichotomous treatment of 
agency and stewardship theories, such as the difference between individual reference 
points that potentially can generate agency conflicts among family members. Or there are 
individual level preferences that might well be different with firm-level preferences. 
Thus, the relationship between governance, behaviour and capital structure decision-
making is dynamic, rather than static. Moreover, in family firm decision-making it 
appears likely that a decision with uncertain outcomes gives the possibility of a mixed 
gamble, involving both gain and loss outcomes (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014). In other 
words, family firms will proceed with capital structure decisions that preserve family 
SEW when the prospect of SEW gains, such as keeping family control and influence or 
passing the family business to the next generation, exceeds any prospective SEW losses.      
 
To fill the gap of agency theory/stewardship theory regarding how capital structure is 
decided in family firms, based on the dimensions of SEW, the implications of hypotheses 
outlining the relationships between leverage and SEW dimensions are explained below. 
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1. Family control and influence over the firm’s operation  
 
Family control and influence over the firm could be attributed to several roles of 
involvement, such as: a) through ownership or b) family participation in management and 
governance. Agency theory suggests that in closely held firms such as family-owned 
businesses, debt can allow principal owners to control more resources, such as capital, 
without diluting their voting rights (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Harris and Raviv, 1991; 
Faccio et al., 2001). This situation represents a control mechanism and arranges the 
compensation based on the structure and fairness of the situation with the respect to agents 
in similar contexts. On the other hand, stewardship theory assumes that agents act in the 
best interest of their principals (Donalson and Davis, 1989; 1991). The steward places a 
higher value on cooperation than defection because they consider utility rationally. This 
conduct appears in line with the spirit of collectivism that is more profound in family 
firms than the spirit of individualism. Although stewardship theory states that the 
managers are pro-organisation in behaviour, as I mentioned previously there is a strata or 
a sequence in applying stewardship theory: the sequence of interest(s) but not risk 
preferences. This study found that under the ‘founder stage’, family firms tend to have a 
longer-term commitment to their business. Greater value is placed on noneconomic goals, 
due to the issue of sustainability and the family members are more embedded in the 
business system, since the family is willing to put the interests of the business first, 
suggesting that steward-type behaviour and stewardship governance are more prominent 
under founder stage.    
 
This study reveals that the relationship between family holdings and debt level is not 
uniform over the entire range of family ownership. The non-linear relationship is 
consistent with the hypothesis that ownership has a non-linear relationship with leverage. 
Moreover, the finding is consistent with empirical observations. Ellul (2011), Setia-
Atmaja et al. (2009) and Schulze et al. (2003) found that family ownership and debt form 
a non-linear relationship. Thus, family ownership addresses the impact of different levels 
of family holdings. The risk preferences also change when the level of ownership 
concentration changes.  The risk averse behaviour of family firms is evident in financial 
decisions when firms are subscribing to less diversified investment strategies. The risk 
reduction strategy of the firms is pursued through investment diversification with lower 
debt levels. The low levels of debt could decrease the risk of losing SEW (undiversified 
personal or family members), as well as family capital in the case of bankruptcy. This 
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outcome is in line with this study and consistent with the explanation above, that family 
firms perceive risk differently between short term debt and long term debt, particularly 
regarding their endeavours to preserve long term sustainability of the company.     
     
Next, the involvement in management by the presence of a founder CEO has a negative 
relationship with leverage. The family’s attachment to the business is highest when the 
firm is owned and managed by the founding family (Chua et al., 1999; Misra and 
McConaughy, 1999). A founder CEO is presumed to have a long-term commitment to 
the company and to be more attached to the firm they founded than a descendant-CEO.  
CEO founders would seem to be more risk averse as a consequence of those founder- 
owners investing most of their wealth in the firm. In addition, with the founder as CEO, 
the firm is considered as a life-time achievement and therefore enjoyment from the firm 
might be delayed until passed to the next generation. Thus, a CEO founder tends to avoid 
any risks that can diminish SEW. CEO founders tend to choose the safe option when 
making a capital structure decision, since the impact of the decision will influence the 
business in the future under uncertain conditions. Thus, a low level of leverage is 
considered as a commitment strategy.  
 
The related argument regarding this result is the board of director role will lead to a 
decrease of information asymmetry, with the consequent reduction of creditors perceiving 
the likelihood of a default in the repayment of short-term debt; such debt being the 
preferred option with Indonesia family firms. This finding is in line with some 
suggestions that short-term debt has a role in mitigating the debt overhang problem and 
lessening the negative impact of growth opportunities. Family board representation thus 
might be more concerned about leverage that could avoid financial distress. 
 
Next, the duality that allows the CEO and the chair-person’s roles to both be filled by the 
same person at the same time, does not specify decision making should be to preserve 
SEW in family firms, even when the family has direct involvement in management and 
monitoring. The perception of outside investors or creditors on duality may be that of a 
potential risk of misalignment of interests between family firms and fund suppliers 
(Poutziouris et al., 2015); such a perception could, I assume, increase the cost of capital. 
As consequence, a founder-CEO is probably in a position that is strong enough to 
influence the board’s strategic decisions, such as capital structure. In other words, a CEO-
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chair duality position could be more costly than a position as a CEO or involvement in a 
board position.  
 
2. Renewal of family bonds through dynastic succession 
 
There are two major issues of concern regarding perpetuating the family succession: i) 
future generations tend to be shorter-term oriented than the firm’s founder and ii) at the 
later family stages, identification with the business and emotional attachment both 
weaken. Firstly, short-term strategies could destroy family business, while long-term 
strategies tend to characterise founders, who have sacrifice sunk-costs since the very 
beginning of the business. Secondly, family’s life-cycle stage reflects the time during 
which family control of the business is transferred from one generation to the next 
generation. Ownership could be dispersed among successive generations of family 
members and/or superseded by the appointments of managerial and controller positions 
for the next generation. Thus, the founder’s descendants might to be prone to harvest what 
the founder built, rather than work hard for and in the organization (Schulze et al., 2001). 
It can be seen from this study that when a descendant is a CEO who is keen on 
perpetuating the family succession, as well as ensuring that the business is handed down 
to the next generation, there is no significant relationship between succession and 
leverage. Thus, it is difficult to accept that this dimension contributes significantly in any 
way to capital structure decision as one of the determinants of debt-equity choice.   
   
Both agency theory and stewardship theory highlight that once the continuation of the 
organisation and employment of managers in the company is threatened by the possibility 
of a takeover (Donaldson and Davis, 1991), or in a case of a family firm restructuring to 
accommodate a new life cycle of the company, managers will react to protect their own 
self-interest. The future prospects of the organisation may have no benefits for them 
personally. Energy devoted to preserving SEW might become weaker when the business 
is passed to the next generation. Since the family’s engagement with the business declines 
as ownership is dispersed among generations, the demand to keep control and preserve 
SEW also declines. The next generation’s perception of the value of the business is 
unlikely to be in line with that of the founder or the previous generations. This paradigm 
is probably why the next generations are less focused on preserving SEW through 
dynastic succession, than would be the case at the founder stage. Thus, examples of 
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agency governance and agent managers tend to occur and be most evident under the 
descendant stages.  
 
3. Binding social ties  
 
This dimension refers to the family members’ relationships with non-family members. 
SEW provides kinship ties with some of the same collective benefits that arise in 
networks, including relational trust (Coleman, 1990) and building relationships with 
professionals (Berrone et al., 2012). If the family involvement is too much, it can lead to 
an asymmetric altruism such as hiring family members who may not be, or should not be, 
considered for key roles in business. Equally, excessive family focus, prior to 2014, could 
serve to exclude independent, non-family members from filling board positions. Thus, 
the reciprocal bonds could be extended to a wide set of members outside of family 
membership. Sharing a feeling of belonging could promote the sense of stability and 
commitment to the firm and increase the perception of better corporate governance, 
suggesting a degree of mitigation in the decline of the family business.       
      
The desire to maintain binding ties among family members, by excluding non-family 
members from positions such as board membership, might impact on the negative 
perception of weak corporate governance and the decline of the family business from 
altruism. However, agency theory highlights that one of the main duties of an independent 
board chair is to control managerial opportunism. Meanwhile, stewardship theory stresses 
that while acting as stewards, the family may place outside directors on the board to 
provide expertise, objective advice or to commonly act as advocates or independent 
auditors for the well-being of the company (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Consequently, 
the relationship exists between the independent board and capital structure because of the 
counsel and advice independent board members are able to offer. Board independence as 
a counterbalance to family members’ influence will mitigate the problem that potentially 
arises from this issue. The presence of independent members / experts is associated with 
sending a fair perception to the market that family firms mitigate opportunistic behaviour 
of their family members and wish to maintain long-term sustainability of the business. 
This study supports the idea that independent boards have a positive relationship with 
long-term debt.   
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Overall, the results indicate that capital structure decisions will underlie the debt-equity 
choice on loss aversion relating to socio-emotional wealth. The capital structure decisions 
might be different since the dynamic of family firms and the preference of risks can 
influence the determinants of capital structure across generations due to the goal of 
preserving the long-term sustainability of the family business. In light of the above results, 
the next chapter will conclude the contributions to knowledge, implications, and 
limitations of the study decision makers and government of Indonesia as a policy maker 
and recommendations for the next research.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This study has investigated the determinants of capital structure in the context of 
publically listed Indonesian family firms. It examines these determinants using the 
dimensions of socio-emotional wealth (SEW). SEW extends agency and stewardship 
theories through a dynamic approach and suggests that both theories have contributing 
factors and resulting dynamic outcomes influencing the relationship between governance 
and behaviour in decision-making. SEW basically stems from the reality of family 
business that seems to be considered as one of the most characteristic features of family 
firms, differentiating them from other, non-family firms. Capital structure decisions could 
be a mechanism used by family firms to achieve certain strategic objectives, thus 
preserving SEW. This thesis focuses on Indonesian publically listed family firms, due to 
their significance in contributing to Indonesia’s economic development. 
 
The research answers the following research question: 
 
What are the determinants of capital structure decisions of Indonesian family firms? 
 
 
6.2. Key Findings 
 
The key findings of the thesis provide evidence of the determinants of the capital structure 
of Indonesian family firms across two debt measures.  These results have shown that a 
family firm’s capital structure decision-making is driven by non-financial goals designed 
to preserve SEW.  The three SEW dimensions are: (1) keeping control and influence over 
the firm’s operation and ownership; (2) renewal of family bonds through dynastic 
succession; and (3) binding social ties by excluding non-family members from key 
managerial and board positions. The general results indicate that SEW dimensions can 
explain capital structure decisions of family firms in Indonesia. A family’s influence on 
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a firm’s decisions represents the members’ long-term commitment to maintain the 
sustainability of the company across generations. The desire to pass the business to the 
next generation encourages the families to apply risk reduction strategies by avoiding 
exposing the business to risk so as to preserve SEW. The combination of loss aversion 
and control of motivation with the possibility of changing risk preferences in decision-
making are found to be more prevalent in this context.      
 
Generally, conventional economic theory, in the form of agency theory or stewardship 
theory, has sometimes assumed that agents/managers are selected as optimisers through 
some supposedly Darwinian process of ‘survival of the fittest’ resulting in a policy of risk 
avoidance at all times. Both theories describe managers’ actual behaviour as the result of 
the governance structure of the family firms. A manager can be an agent or steward who 
is deemed to be rational because individuals are presumed to be more efficient than 
irrational ones, and therefore are expected to have a greater capacity to survive. However, 
managers also survive because they are trusted by their employers. Managers’ risk 
preferences can change due, at least in part, to future prospects and expectations. 
Preferences will change based on the projection of gain or loss. A manager will be a risk 
taker for loss and a risk avoider for gain, indicating that their actions might be more 
prudent the possibility of both gain and loss outcomes calculation in decision-making. 
     
Agency theory suggests that using more debt levels will reduce total equity financing, 
which in turn can reduce the scope of conflict between managers and shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976).  From a stewardship perspective, capital structure decisions are a 
product of alignment of interests; thereby debt levels will be flexible depending on the 
best interests of the organisation (Zahra et al., 2008). Brought into the family firm, 
opportunistic agent’s behaviour possibly occurs with family managers, such as 
descendant CEOs. Similarly, family research assumes that stewardship behaviour is 
inherent in family members. However, this research demonstrates that an empowering 
environment and involvement of non-family-member managers can influence capital 
structure decisions at the founder stage. Taken together, family and non-family managers 
exhibit both agent and stewardship behaviours. However, founders tend to behave as a 
steward and are more embedded in the business system, because a firm’s founder will put 
the interest of their business, which is preserving SEW, as a priority. On the other hand, 
descendants tend to behave as an agent of the family firm and are more likely to be 
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embedded in the hierarchical nature of the family system, and also in the family’s self- 
serving interests.  
 
 
6.2.1. Family Control and Influence  
 
Family control and influence remain significant factors that determine the capital 
structure decisions of Indonesian family firms. The evidence suggests that there is a non-
linear N-curve relationship for long-term debt between ownership and leverage. This 
relationship suggests that risk preferences can change as the concentration of ownership 
change. The results can be explained with reference to two factors. First, capital structure 
decisions vary, depending on the ownership concentration due to the goal of preserving 
SEW. Second, behaviourally managers in a corporate governance context can have a 
variety of risk preferences. In this sense, the endowment effect could help explain why 
the firm’s ownership could influence debt levels and also why firms choose to be low 
debt oriented. Lastly, cash flow rights (ownership) could estimate the impact of family 
firms on capital structure decisions. This supposition is because in Indonesia, the major 
shareholder is allowed to enhance their control, in spite of holding less than 25% of the 
voting shares based on central bank of Indonesia regulation.   
  
When the founder of a family firm acts as its CEO, the founder-CEO prefers to use less 
debt than a hired CEO. In this sense, loss aversion could explain why founder-CEOs’ 
behaviour. The evidence illustrates the fact that a founder CEO has a long-term 
commitment strategy to maintain the family business and preserve SEW for the next 
generation. SEW involves both tangible assets and intangible assets; the latter include 
reputation and the good family name. Such commitment is driven by the founding 
family’s desire to maintain their business. In other words, the different low levels indicate, 
to an extent, that there are different risk preferences between founders and outside hire 
CEOs when considering debt as a control mechanism informing capital structure 
decisions. When the founders or owners are also CEOs, it would seem logical that they 
are not under pressure from monitoring. Capital structure decision might be motivated 
more by desire to reduce the risk of financial distress (Gosh et al., 2011). Moreover, 
pursuing SEW is stronger and more evident when in the hands of a founder CEO (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2007) because of personal attachment and self-identification with the firm.  
 
181 
 
Family board representation is associated with significantly higher level of short-term 
debt, compared to those family firms which do not have a family representation on board. 
A related argument regarding this result is that membership of the board of director leads 
to a decrease of information asymmetry, with the consequent reduction of creditors’ 
perceptions of the likelihood of default on loan repayment of short-term debt, the 
preferred debt option for Indonesia family firms. This finding is in line with some research 
suggesting that short-term debt has a role to play in mitigating the debt overhang problem 
and lessening the negative impact of growth opportunities (Croci et al., 2011; Johnson, 
2003). Thus, family board representation is associated with liquidity risk, since family 
firms prefer using short-term debt rather than long-term debt.     
 
Lastly, the duality position of CEO / chairperson does not indicate the involvement of 
family firms to secure family interests. The perception of outside investors or creditors 
on duality may be perceived as signifying a potential risk of misalignment of interests 
between family firms and creditors. As a consequence, a founder CEO is probably in a 
position that can have a strong enough impact to influence strategic decisions, such as 
those relating to capital structure. In other words, a duality position could be costlier than 
a position as a CEO or as a board member.  
 
 
6.2.2. Renewal of Family Bonds through Dynastic Succession 
 
The finding of this thesis has demonstrated that renewing family bonds through dynastic 
succession, with the proxy of descendants holding the position of the CEO, is not a 
significant influence on capital structure decisions. The argument is that the descendant 
could significantly diminish their effectiveness, because managerial competence and 
professionalism are processes and not stages-of-change in a firm’s management. 
Transferring tangible assets in the family’s succession politics seems to be less of a 
priority than the transfer of intangible assets to the next generation, such as the family’s 
good reputation. This circumstance allows the prediction that although the firm’s 
leadership is handed down to the next generation, the control motivation might still be 
under dispersed family members who hold board positions.   
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6.2.3. Binding Social Ties by excluding Non-Family Members from Key 
Managerial and Board Positions 
 
Excessive family involvement in the business can lead to overly centralised decisions. 
This will put too much emphasis on maintaining binding social ties within the firms and 
is likely to have negative effect upon firm performance. The reciprocal bond seen within 
family businesses is not exclusively between family members but is likely to be extended 
to a wider set of constituencies (Miller et al., 2009). Promoting a sense of stability and 
commitment to the firm is a part of developing family relationships, including trustworthy 
partners such as other shareholders who are outside family members. Therefore, board 
independence as a counterbalance to familial influence will mitigate the problem that 
potentially arises from this issue, especially weakening the problem of goal divergence 
between owners and managers or family and non-family shareholders. With respect to 
board independence it seems that independent board position is associated with sending 
a fair perception to the market that family firms mitigate opportunistic behaviour by the 
presence of independent board members doing appropriate monitoring. Thus, the 
presence of board independence is associated with monitoring effectiveness and smaller 
agency problems between shareholders groups, provide information as an expert and a 
useful source for a conflict resolution among family members. Their presences indicate 
increasing the level of leverage in family owned firm in Indonesia.    
 
 
6.3. Contributions to the Literature  
 
This study provides several important contributions to knowledge. Firstly, agency and 
stewardship theories follow the assumption of stable risk preferences (Holmstrom, 1979) 
that contradicts the dynamic perspective decision-making process. Consequently, this 
assumption limits agency and stewardship theories’ contributions to the explanation of 
how managerial risk taking related to strategic decisions can change over time.  Thus, 
relaxing the assumption of a stable perspective on risk preference provides a more 
realistic picture how family firms make capital structure decisions. The rationale for this 
dynamic perspectives may be found in the concept of socio-emotional wealth as a 
theoretical framework for testing the relationship between capital structures, corporate 
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governance, and the behaviour of family firms. Secondly, the thesis presents a developed 
framework that considers the characteristics of Indonesian family firms. This framework 
could be extended to other family firms with similar characteristics, such as family firms 
in the same developing countries in one region, such as South East Asia.   
 
Further, the thesis contributes to the literature on the determinants of capital structure by 
highlighting the role of socio-emotional wealth (SEW) in the context of family business. 
Capital structure decisions could be a mechanism for family firms to achieve non-
economic goals, thus preserving SEW. Moreover, this thesis contributes to the literature 
on capital structure decisions by indicating that family firms’ strategic decisions might be 
shaped by the need to consider preserving the accumulated endowment in the firm. The 
points of reference that family-controlled firms use to make a decision are gains or losses 
in SEW. The implementation of capital structure decisions depends on the degree of 
involvement of family members in the family firms. A noneconomic reference point for 
decision making related to preservation of SEW cannot be explained by applying a purely 
economic logic. Agency and stewardship theories follow the assumption of stable risk 
preferences that contradict the decision-making behaviour of managers (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). Thus, the evidence reported in this thesis demonstrates that the 
determinants of capital structure of Indonesian family firms are notably influenced by the 
SEW considerations. The results support the idea that debt may be seen as a proxy for 
risk reduction strategy due to maintaining the sustainability of the business. Nonetheless, 
a small amount of theoretical and empirical research has been done which supports the 
premise that dimensions of SEW determine the capital structure behaviour of family 
firms. Thus, this study clarifies the determinants of capital structure, based on SEW 
dimensions, to fill the altered predictions made about capital structure decisions in family 
firms. In addition, it verifies Berrone et al., (2010) and Gomez-Mejia et al., (2007) who 
argue that non-economic reasons are often likely to predominate in the financing 
decisions of family firms as the result of the choice between risk and preserve control 
(Motylska-Kuzma, 2017). 
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6.4. Limitations of the Study 
 
I acknowledge that there are certain limitations to this study. Unlike other developed 
countries, information regarding companies’ ultimate owners was not available in 
financial reports published by the Indonesian Stock Exchange during the period of studies 
(2011 – 2015). The regulation for family firms to declare the ultimate owners was only 
enacted in 2018, which is outside the research period. More specifically, the non-
availability of that vital information is a limitation to investigate the person(s) who 
ultimately owns or controls family firms. For this reason, I did not attempt to control for 
the use of pyramidal ownership and cross shareholding to increase voting power in which 
ownership/control is exercised through a chain of ownership or by means of control other 
than direct control.  
 
According to Berrone et al. (2012), there are five major dimensions of SEW and these 
are: (1) Family control and influence; (2) Family identification with the firm; (3) Binding 
social ties; (4) Family emotional attachment to firm; (5) Renewal of family bonds in the 
firm through dynastic succession. However, only three of them are used in this study, 
these being: i) Family control and influence; ii) Renewal of family bonds in the firm 
through dynastic succession and iii) Binding social ties. It is reasonable to presume these 
three dimensions could delineate the relationship of preserving SEW with the strategic 
behaviour of capital structure. The other two dimensions are: iv) Family identification 
with the firm and v) Family emotional attachment to firm are difficult to include since the 
approach of this study is quantitative method. The last two dimensions were omitted from 
this research because of the difficulty of identifying acceptable proxies to represent those 
dimensions in quantitative measurements.  
 
Moreover, there were limitations to how the dimension of family succession could be 
investigated in this thesis. This study uses founder descendants acting as CEOs as a proxy 
for this dimension, without distinguishing across second and third generations. Some 
authors argue that the dimension of family succession could be studies with the help of a 
number of proxies. Examples include: a) appointing a relative to succeed (Cruz et al., 
2012), b) employing family members from the younger generations (Lubatkin et al., 
2001), and c) favouring long term investments at the expense of short term financial 
objectives (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). However, these such proxies are a difficult to 
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construct and this researcher did not have resources to collect necessary data though 
surveys.   
 
Another limitation relates to the number of observations and the period of study. There is 
an inevitable trade-off between the number of observations and the length of period. A 
longer period would sacrifice the number of observations, since the trend of family firms 
to be listed on the capital market in Indonesia became more popular only in the last three 
to four years. However, more research time would have benefited the study by spanning 
a longer historical period. Extending this study to ensure greater data availability would 
lead to more robust results, especially after the 2018 requirement from the government to 
publish the firms’ ultimate owners in their financial reports. Moreover, the inclusion of 
other determinants of capital structure would provide a better view of the determinants of 
capital structure in family firms.  
 
Lastly, the focus on Indonesian family firms brings one other limitation. This is the fact 
that the findings become context specific. Extending this study to other countries, 
especially those in the same geographical regions such as South East Asia or Asia and 
with the same institutional contexts may result another perspectives. The Indonesian 
context presents its own typical situation in terms of family background ethnicities and 
cultures (Chinese, Malay, Indian and Arabic), institutional arrangements, stock market 
regulations and banking regulations which may influence the relationship between capital 
structure decisions and how family preserves social emotional wealth in a different way 
relative to family background. As a consequence, the findings from this study may have 
relatively little relevance or application to other national contexts.          
 
 
6.5. Implications and Recommendations for Future Research 
6.5.1. Implication for Investors 
 
The findings reveal that, as far as SEW is concerned, investments in family firms that 
have an independent board are prudent. I would like to suggest rather tentatively that 
family socio-emotional motives positively influence investors’ perceptions, as long as 
healthy corporate governance in family firms’ structure is evident. Healthy corporate 
governance means sharing the family values with individuals who are not family 
186 
 
members. Such individuals in positions of board independence could serve to encourage 
more independent directors onto boards. One can argue that as family firms become 
publicly listed companies, they are subject to scrutiny that limits how family owners can 
pursue SEW objectives at the expense of public shareholders (Le Breton-Miller and 
Miller, 2013). Public listing could be seen as a decision to enhance a firm’s legitimacy by 
relying on the presence of professional non-family members on the board. This can 
increase the business reputation of the family firm among investors and creditors and 
make access to capital easier. Family reputation is essential to preserve the family’s SEW, 
so these relationships may have both consequences and limitations. The ethos of the fund 
providers has been undergoing major changes; it is now imperative for fund seeking 
family firms to demonstrate transparency, fairness and the absence of cronyism or 
nepotism.  
     
Moreover, beside the reputation of family firms, the suppliers will consider assets and 
growth opportunities prior to investing in a company (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Smith 
and Watts, 1992; Hovakimian et al., 2001) as well as default risk (Hugoinner et al., 2015).  
The fact that growth opportunities have shown significant association with leverage, 
should be seen as a presentation of market signaling to investors from family firms. 
Higher growth opportunities present a signal that family firms have good quality long-
term investment. For the long-term debt, family firms with high growth opportunities 
appear likely to finance their positive opportunities by using long-term debt.  
 
 
6.5.2. Implication for Family Firm Decision Makers  
 
Indonesia is one of the emerging capital markets that are developing a well-regulated and 
transparent market to reduce governance and agency problems. I can conclude that with 
the degree of openness and capital access, listed family firms can add value to the business 
in several ways:  
 
Firstly, the results imply that family firms should consider several of the investor’s 
aspirations for healthy corporate governance which have an independent board as they 
are viewed to be a more effective mechanism in controlling agency problems. Moreover, 
the presence of independent board members could mitigate the conflict across generations 
that arise in the post-founder stage. This situation is already regulated by the Indonesia 
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Financial Services Authority (OJK) No. 33/POJK.04/2014 article 20, verses 2 and 3. It is 
now mandatory that a family firm’s board is made up of at least 30 percent of independent 
non-family members.    
 
Secondly, family firms ought to maintain strong corporate governance by hiring the best 
people for key roles, rather than exercising altruism in hiring family members. Excessive 
family involvement in business, unwillingness to hire professional CEOs and the 
continuing appointment of family members will almost certainly lead to overly 
centralised decisions and an inefficient business. Thus, reducing the degree of family 
involvement can decrease the cost of capital, since lenders might perceive there is 
efficiency in management. In fact, placing family members in management positions does 
not impact significantly on capital structure decisions, such as the CEO/chairperson 
duality position. The recognition of no relationship between capital structures and duality 
positions suggests that family firms should pay attention to the possibility of 
misalignment as an implication of a CEO and board in the hands of one person.  
 
Thirdly, family firms should consider the inherent strategic role and benefits of the 
founder as CEO in reducing agency costs and having powerful access to strategic 
decisions, especially both short-term and long-term loans. The close relationships with 
lenders might facilitate future access to funding. Moreover, founders ought to consider 
the implications of their role in influencing capital structure decisions, which might not 
be followed by the post-founder stage. The findings indicated that despite the presence of 
a founder descendant as the CEO, their position does not impact on the firm’s capital 
structure. This finding indicates the reputation and good relationship with lenders should 
be transferred, due to preserving SEW for the next generations.   
 
Fourthly, at the stage of descendants, continuing the family legacy and tradition is an 
important goal for a family business. A successful business transfer to the next generation 
may not be seen as only an asset transfer, but also of reputation, skill and competence. 
However, there is no significant evidence to support the idea that descendants influence 
capital structure decisions. It appears likely a family firm that failed due to conflict within 
the descendants suffers more reputation damage than a family firm that has failed due to 
macroeconomic events or natural disasters. An example of the latter is ‘PT. Indofood 
Sukses Makmur, Tbk’, one of Indonesia’s largest food company, whose factory was 
destroyed by tsunami Aceh in 2004. In other words, the descendants could significantly 
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maintain the family reputation and increase their effectiveness if they are always 
consistent in increasing their ability, because management and professionalism are 
processes and not stages of change in a firm’s management (Wright and Kallermanns, 
2011). Nonetheless, in many situations when manager-as-agent makes a poor choice, I 
presume that the person who is misbehaving is often the principal, not the manager. The 
misbehaviour is in failing to create an environment in which managers can take good risks 
and make an informed capital structure decision, rather than a constant prediction for the 
future that could result in inconsistent decision-making. However, the most important 
thing is the descendant as manager (agent/steward) should be capable of making a 
decision.    
 
Fifth, for non-family member CEOs, this thesis can give a feedback of evaluation in 
capital structure decision-making to help avoiding damaging behaviour of family 
members if the capital structure produce conflicts. Accordingly, non-family member 
CEOs must be prudent to observe capital structure issues that possible damage the relation 
within family firms. Moreover, family firms should not need to be concerned that they 
will lose their family bonds when they hire professional managers. Non-family managers 
can adopt a clearly set relations, responsibilities and competences in the decision-making 
processes of family firms. Their roles can contribute to increase the degree of 
competitiveness of family firms, especially in the more structured and complex business 
environment in Indonesia.    
 
6.5.3. Implication for Policy Makers  
 
Regulators should be strengthening governance practices of Indonesian issuers and public 
companies to bring them at least to the same level with the companies in the ASEAN 
region. This suggestion is made because since 2015, Indonesia has been a part of the 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). There is a sense of urgency and continued efforts 
to elevate Indonesian competitiveness through improvements in the quality of corporate 
governance practice as a way to spur financial performance and enhance investor 
confidence; in turn these positive initiatives could increase access to capital inflow. Here, 
the environment requires formal rules to prevail for publicly listed companies that will, 
ensure transparency, for example. Family firms will impose higher costs on pursuing 
SEW if family firms are filling their strategic decision making positions with non-
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professionals. Such individuals lack the competence, attributed authority and reputation 
that are needed to manage complexity, including multiple principal interests and access 
to funding resources.  
 
The implication of this study for the Financial Services Authority (OJK) policy makers 
in Indonesia is evidence of the need to strengthen the regulation No. 11/POJK.04/2017, 
14th March 2017, article 2, paragraph 2 regarding ownership reports, as well as every 
ownership change for publicly listed companies,. The regulation enforces the obligation 
of direct or indirect owners who hold at least a 5 percent shareholding to report their 
interest in the company, in order to trace the ultimate beneficial owners, as a part of the 
ownership chain leading to the real owners. The enactment of the regulation since 2018 
as an effort of OJK to protect the interests of public investors, and to be able to regulate 
public listed companies, including family firms, so they can become pillars of the national 
economy up to a level of global competitiveness. As entrepreneurial spirit is not 
necessarily inherited by successive generations of the controlling family (Chrisman et al., 
2005), it is much easier to pass on the family business by their wealth through political 
rent seeking, such as self-interested dealings between the political and business elites, 
rather than through entrepreneurship.  
 
There are several group of family firms in Indonesia that involved in political relationship 
as founders of political party such as the founder of Media Group is also the founder of 
National Democratic Party, the founder of MNC Group is also the founder of Perindo 
Party, the founder of Humpuss Group is also the founder of Berkarya Party and the 
founder of Nusantara Group is also the founder of Gerindra Party. The impact of 
business-political relations can indicate unhealthy business environment and reduced 
economic efficiency at the expense of public interest, indicating a crony capitalism may 
exist in Indonesia. For this reason, the Financial Services Authority (OJK) should 
encourage family firms to be more prudent in expensive involvements that can lead to 
nepotism or oligarchic behaviour. Being prudent and cautious are ways to avoid business 
failure when it comes to the next generations that sometimes lack capabilities. Family 
firms need to adopt the best practices of business innovation that can strengthen 
competitiveness.   
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6.5.4. Recommendations for Future Research  
 
At a more general level, these results respond to the call for more research into the 
variation of variables that could be characterised by dimensions of SEW. Nonetheless, 
many interesting research opportunities remain open. Future research could be directed 
towards exploring other dimensions of institutional environments: for example, the 
potential moderating effects of the specific institutional funding systems (banking-based 
or market-based) adopted, which are relevant to capital structure decisions. One might 
expect that the level of family involvement required to succeed in highly dynamic capital 
markets might not be achieved when the family firm is led by a founder descendant CEO. 
This possibility could be particularly likely if the firm is embedded in the next generation 
stages, where skill and professionalism are needed to preserve existing family 
relationships, due to capital access. The life cycle characterisations of family firms do not 
make clear the shaping of socio-emotional wealth priorities that can influence capital 
structure decisions. The underlying dimensions of public listings can help illustrate 
outcomes in different situations, since the ownership structures are widespread through 
numbers of family members and non-family members. Bearing this situation in mind it 
would seem logical to question whether SEW will reduce as it passes to the next 
generations. 
 
Secondly, future research may expect to develop a measure that captures more precisely 
every single dimension acting as proxies for the preservation of SEW and relating to 
capital structure decisions. It is possible to explore the debt-equity choices of family firms 
by including the five dimensions of SEW: (1) Family control and influence; (2) Family 
identification with the firm; (3) Binding social ties; (4) Family emotional attachment to 
firm; (5) Renewal of family bonds in the firm through dynastic succession. Why do 
founders’ descendants as CEOs have no significant impact on capital structure decisions? 
This sense of dynasty probably has implications for the time horizons in the decision 
making process, since the family’s heritage and tradition has become embedded in the 
next generation (Casson, 1999). Although the long-term view might foster other 
problems, such as conflict over succession, the roles of CEO descendants may not include 
sole powerful authority and access to make strategic financial decisions. The power 
allocation among siblings or cousins should be taken into account in the dimension of 
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succession. It is reasonable to suggest there is a need to improve the measurement of SEW 
in Indonesia’s family firms. Although this study uses proxies for SEW preservation that 
are a valid approximation of SEW, future research could extend this study’s orientation 
by developing and using qualitative instruments that can better understand the five 
dimensions of SEW as mentioned above.   
 
Finally, this study could be replicated in other settings, both in the same region in Asia or 
South East Asia; or other countries with similar institutional context. The empirical 
evidence from this study in favour of these hypotheses may not apply generally to other 
countries where the institutional environments are different with Indonesia. Admittedly, 
I would like to stress that what matters is the theoretical concept advanced here, in order 
to understand how family firms make decisions and therefore how to improve them. The 
issue that future research should be aware of is that family firms are owned and managed 
by humans who could potentially change their risk preferences, make a decision under 
uncertain conditions and sometimes be constrained by bounded rationality in decision 
making. Future studies to explore additional contexts and contingencies will eventually 
build a more comprehensive model of capital structure decisions based on SEW-
preserving strategies. The research presented in this thesis represents a first step in a 
process towards a focus on family firms’ studies that can raise other interesting questions 
worthy of being explored. This study leaves such an analysis for future researchers.  
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 1. 
List of Listed Family Firms Used in the Analysis  
 
No. Code Name of Company Family/Group of Business 
 
1. AALI 
 
PT. Astra Agro Lestari, Tbk Jardin Family/ 
The Jardin Group 
 
2. ABBA 
 
PT. Mahaka Media, Tbk Thohir Family/ 
The Mahaka  Group 
 
3. ABMM PT. ABM Investama, Tbk 
 
The Hamami Group 
4. ACES PT. Ace Hardware Indonesia, Tbk. Wibisono Family 
 
5. ADMG PT. Polychem Indonesia, Tbk Sjamsul Nursalim Family/ 
The Gajah Tunggal Group 
 
6. ADRO PT. Adaro Energy, Tbk Theodore Permadi/ 
The Triputra Group 
 
 
7. AIMS PT. Akbar Indo Makmur Stimec, Tbk Suharya Family 
 
8. AISA PT. Tiga Pilar Sejahtera Food, Tbk  Mogoginta Family/ 
The Tiga Pilar Group 
 
9. AKPI PT. Argha Karya Prima Industri, Tbk Henry Pribadi Family/ 
The Napan Group 
 
 
10. AKRA PT. AKR Corporindo, Tbk Adikoesomo Family 
 
 
11. ALDO PT. Alkindo Naratama, Tbk Lily Mulyadi Family & 
Sutanto 
The Golden Arista Group 
 
 
12. ALMI PT. Alumindo Light Metal Industry, 
Tbk 
Alim Markus Family/ 
The Maspion Group 
 
 
13. AMRT PT. Sumber Alfaria Trijaya, Tbk Djoko Susanto Family 
 
 
14. APLI PT. Asiaplast Industries, Tbk Agung Pranoto Family 
 
 
15. APLN PT. Agung Podomoro Land, Tbk  Trihatma Haliman Family/ 
The Agung Podomoro Group 
 
 
16. ARGO PT. Argo Pantes, Tbk  Tulolo Family 
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17. ARTI PT. Arona Bina sejati, Tbk Maras Family/ 
The Ratu Prabu Group 
 
 
18. ASGR PT. Astra Graphia, Tbk Jardine Family/ 
The Jardine Group 
 
 
19. ASII PT. Astra International, Inc Jardin Family/  
The Jardin Group 
 
 
 
20. ASRI PT. Alam Sutera Realty, Tbk The Nin King Family/ 
The Argo Manunggal Group 
 
 
21. BLTA PT. Berlian Laju Tanker, Tbk Hadi Surya Family 
 
 
22. BMTR PT. Bimantara Citra, Tbk Harry Tanoewidjaya Family/ 
The MNC Group 
 
 
23. BNBR PT. Bakrie and Brothers, Tbk Bakrie Family/ 
The Bakrie Group 
 
 
24. BRNA PT. Berlina, Tbk Tjiptobiantoro Family  
 
 
25. BRPT PT. Barito Pacific, Tbk Prajogo Pangestu Family/ 
The Barito Pacific Group 
 
 
26. BTEK PT. Bumi Teknokultura Unggul, Tbk Tjokrosaputro 
Family and Sutanto 
 
 
27. BTEL PT. Bakrie Telecom, Tbk Bakrie Family/  
The Bakrie Group 
  
 
28. BTON PT Betonjaya Manunggal, Tbk Gwie Family 
 
 
29. BUDI PT. Budi Acid Jaya, Tbk Widarto Family/ 
Sungai Budi Group 
 
 
30. BWPT PT Eagle High Plantation, Tbk Widodo Family/ 
The Rajawali Capital 
International Group 
 
 
31. BYAN PT. Bayan Resources, Tbk Dato'Leow Tuck Kwong 
Family/ 
The Bayan Group 
 
 
32. CEKA PT. Wilmar Cahaya Indonesia, Tbk The Wilmar International 
Group 
 
 
33. CLPI PT. Colorpak Indonesia, Tbk Pranatajaya Family 
 
 
34. CNKO PT. Eksploitasi Energi Indonesia, Tbk Andri Cahyadi Family 
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35. CSAP PT. Catur Sentosa Adiprana, Tbk Totong Family 
 
 
36. CTRA PT. Ciputra Development, Tbk Ciputra Family/ 
The Ciputra Group 
 
 
37. CTTH PT. Citatah, Tbk   Johannes Family 
 
38. DART PT. Duta Anggada Realty, Tbk Angkosubroto Family/ 
Gunung Sewu Group 
 
 
39. DILD PT. Intiland Development, Tbk Suhargo Gondokusumo 
Family/ 
Dharmala Group 
 
 
40. DNET PT. Indoritel Makmur International, Tbk Salim Family/ 
The Salim Group 
 
 
41. DOID PT. Delta Dunia Makmur, Tbk Sugito Walujo Family 
 
 
42. DPNS PT. Duta Pertiwi Nusantara, Tbk Eka Tjipta Widjaja Family/  
The Sinar Mas Group 
  
 
43. DSFI PT. Dharma Samudera Fishing 
Industris, Tbk 
, 
Sutjimidjaya Family 
 
 
44. DSSA PT. Dian Swastatika Sentosa Tbk Eka Tjipta Widjaja Family/  
The Sinar Mas Group 
  
 
45. DUTI PT. Duta Pertiwi, Tbk Eka Tjipta Widjaja Family/ 
The Sinar Mas Group 
 
 
46. EKAD PT. Ekadharma International, Tbk Leonardi Family 
 
 
47. ELTY PT. Bakrieland Development, Tbk Bakrie Family/ 
The Bakrie Group 
 
 
48. EMTK PT. Elang Mahkota Teknologi, Tbk Sariaatmadja Family/ 
The Emtek Group 
 
 
49. EPMT PT. Enseval Putera Megatrading, Tbk Boenjamin Setiawan 
Family 
 
 
50. FAST PT. Fast Food Indonesia, Tbk Galael Family 
 
 
51. FASW PT. Fajar Surya Wisesa, Tbk Wisesa Family 
Winarko Sulistyo 
 
 
52. FISH PT. FKS Multi Agro, Tbk Farhan Rio Gunawan 
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53. FORU PT. Fortune Indonesia, Tbk Abidin Family 
 
 
54. FREN PT. Smartfren Telecom, Tbk Eka Tjipta Widjaja Family/  
The Sinar Mas Group 
  
 
55. GDST PT. Gunawan Dianjaya Steel, Tbk Gunawan Family 
 
 
56. GGRM PT. Gudang Garam, Tbk Wonowidjojo Family/ 
The Gudang Garam Group 
 
 
57. GJTL PT. Gajah Tunggal, Tbk  Sjamsul Nursalim Family/ 
 The Gajah Tunggal Group 
 
58. GOLD PT. Visi Telekomunikasi Infrastruktur, 
Tbk 
 
Kenny Wirya Family 
 
 
59. GPRA PT. Perdana Gupura Prima, Tbk Margono Tambayong 
Family 
 
 
60. HDTX PT. Panasia Indo Resources, Tbk Hidjaja Family 
 
 
61. HOME PT. Hotel Mandarine Regency, Tbk  Michael Winata 
 
 
62. HRUM PT. Harum Energy, Tbk Barki Family/  
Harum Energy Group 
 
 
63. IIKP PT. Inti Agri Resources, Tbk Hidayat Family 
 
 
64. IKAI PT. Intikeramik Alamasri Industri, Tbk Lie Family 
 
 
65. IMAS PT. Indomobil Sukses Internasional, 
Tbk 
Salim Family/ 
The Salim Group 
 
 
66. INAI PT. Indal Alumunium Industry, Tbk Alim Markus Family/ 
The Maspion Group 
 
 
67. INCI PT. Intanwijaya International, Tbk Tanmizi Family 
 
 
68. INDF PT. Indofood Sukses Makmur, Tbk Salim Family/ 
The Salim Group 
 
 
69. INDR PT. Indo-Rama Synthetics, Tbk  Sri Parkash Lohia Family/ 
The Indorama Group 
 
 
70. INDS PT. Indospring, Tbk Nurhadi family 
 
 
71. INTA PT Intraco Penta, Tbk Halim Family 
 
 
72. INTP PT. Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa, Tbk Salim Family/ 
The Salim Group 
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73. JIHD PT. Jakarta International Hotel and 
Development, Tbk 
Tomy Winata/Sugianto 
Kusuma Family/ 
The Artha Graha Group 
 
 
74. JPFA PT. Japfa Comfeed Indonesia, Tbk Santoso Handoyo Family 
 
 
75. JTPE PT. Jasuindo Tiga Perkasa, Tbk Oei Family 
 
 
76. KBLI PT. KMI Wire and Cable, Tbk Sjamsul Nursalim Family/ 
The Gajah Tunggal Group 
 
 
77. KDSI PT. Kedaung Setia Industrial, Tbk Wibisono Family/ 
The Subur Group 
 
 
78. KICI PT Kedaung Indah Can, Tbk Wibisono Family/ 
The Subur Group 
 
 
79. KKGI PT. Resource Alam Indonesia, Tbk Adijanto Family/ 
The Rain Group 
 
 
80. KLBF PT. Kalbe Farma, Tbk Boenjamin Setiawan Family 
 
 
81. KONI PT. Perdana Bangun Pusaka, Tbk Kolim Family/ 
The Perdana Group 
 
 
82. KPIG PT. MNC Land, Tbk  Harry Tanoewidjaya Family/  
The MNC Group 
  
 
83. LAMI PT. Lami Citra Nusantara, Tbk Tjandranegara Family/ 
The Mulia Group 
 
 
84. LMAS PT. Limas Indonesia Makmur, Tbk Sally Landry Bachtiar 
 
 
85. LMPI PT. Langgeng Makmur Industri, Tbk Alim Markus Family/ 
The Maspion Group 
 
 
86. LMSH PT. Lionmesh Prima, Tbk Riady Family/  
The Lippo Group 
 
 
87. LPCK PT. Lippo Cikarang, Tbk Riady Family/  
The Lippo Group 
 
 
88. LPKR PT. Lippo Karawaci, Tbk Riady Family/  
The Lippo Group 
 
 
89. LPLI PT. Star Pacific, Tbk  Riady Family/  
The Lippo Group 
 
 
90. LTLS PT. Lautan Luas, Tbk Masrin Family/ 
The Lautan Luas Group 
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91. MAMI PT. Mas Murni Indonesia, Tbk Santoso Family 
 
 
92. MAPI PT. Mitra Adiperkasa, Tbk Sjamsul Nursalim Family/  
The Gajah Tunggal Group 
  
 
93. MBTO PT. Martina Berto, Tbk Tilaar Family/ 
The Martina Berto Group 
 
 
94. MDLN PT. Modernland Realty, Tbk Honoris Family/ 
The Modern Group 
 
 
95. MEDC PT. Medco Energy Internasional, Tbk Panigoro Family 
The Medco Group 
 
 
96. META PT. Nusantara Infrastructure, Tbk Aksa Family/ 
Rajawali Group 
 
 
97. MIDI PT. Midi Utama Indonesia, Tbk Djoko Susanto Family 
 
 
98. MIRA PT. Mitra International Resource, Tbk 
 
Pranoto Family 
 
 
99. MITI PT. Maharani Intifinance, Tbk The Saratoga Group 
 
 
100. MKPI PT. Metropolitan Kentjana, Tbk Murdaya Poo Family/ 
The CCM Group 
 
 
101. MLIA PT. Mulia Industrindo, Tbk The Mulia Group 
 
 
102. MLPL PT. Multipolar, Tbk Riady Family/  
The Lippo Group 
 
 
103. MNCN PT. Media Nusa Citra, Tbk Riady Family/  
The Lippo Group 
 
 
104. MPPA PT. Matahari Putra Prima, Tbk Riady Family/  
The Lippo Group 
 
 
105. MRAT PT. Mustika Ratu, Tbk Moeryati Soedibyo Family 
 
 
106. MTSM PT. Metro Supermarket Realty, Tbk 
 
Maruli Family 
 
 
107. MYOR PT. Mayora Indah, Tbk Atmadja Family/ 
The Mayora Group 
 
 
108. MYRX PT. Hanson International, Tbk  Benny Tjokrosaputro Family 
 
 
109. MYTX PT Asia Pacific Investama, Tbk  Benny Soetrisno Family 
 
 
 
110. OMRE PT. Indonesia Prima Property, Tbk Sjamsul Nursalim Family/  
The Gajah Tunggal Group  
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111. PANR PT. Panorama Sentrawisata, Tbk The Tirtawisata Group 
 
 
112. PBRX PT. Pan Brothers, Tbk The Pan Brothers Group 
 
 
113. PDES PT. Destinasi Tirta Nusantara, Tbk 
 
The Tirtawisata Group 
 
 
114. PICO PT. Pelangi Indah Canindo, Tbk Hammond / So Helen 
 
 
115. PKPK PT. Perdana Karya Perkasa, Tbk Soerjadi Soedarsono Family 
 
 
116. PLIN PT. Plaza Indonesia Realty, Tbk Eka Tjipta Widjaja Family/  
The Sinar Mas Group 
  
 
117. POLY PT. Asia Pacific Fibers, Tbk Busana Apparel Group 
Texmaco Group 
 
 
118. POOL PT. Pool Advista Indonesia, Tbk Bambang Gunawan Tanudjaja 
Budiman Tanjung 
 
 
119. PSDN PT. Prasidha Aneka Niaga, Tbk Tandiono Family 
 
 
120 PUDP PT. Pudjiadi Prestige, Tbk The Pudjiadi Group 
 
 
121. PWON PT. Pakuwon Jati, Tbk Tedja Family/ 
Pakuwon Group 
 
 
122. PYFA PT. Pyridam Farma, Tbk  Kosasih Family 
 
 
123. RALS PT. Ramayana Lestari Sentosa, Tbk 
 
The Ramayana Group 
 
 
124. RBMS PT. Ristia Bintang Mahkotasejati, Tbk 
 
Wiriahardja Family 
 
 
125. RDTX PT. Roda Vivatex, Tbk Widjaja Family 
 
 
126. RICY PT. Ricky Putra Globalindo, Tbk Gunawan Family 
 
 
127. RODA PT. Pikko Land Development, Tbk Setiawan Family/ 
The Pikko Group 
 
 
128. ROTI PT. Nippon Indosari Corpindo, Tbk Salim Family/  
The Salim Group 
  
 
129. RUIS PT. Radiant Utama Interinsco, Tbk 
 
Ganis Family 
 
 
130. SAFE PT. Steady Safe, Tbk Yopie Wijaya/ 
The Emtek Group 
 
 
131. SCCO PT. Supreme Cable Manufacturing & 
Commerce, Tbk 
Raharjo Family 
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132. SCMA PT. Surya Citra Media, Tbk Saratoga/Recapital 
Group 
 
 
133. SGRO PT. Sampoerna Agro, Tbk Sampoerna Family/ 
The Sampoerna Strategic 
Group 
 
134. SIPD PT. Sierad Produce, Tbk Budiardjo Tek 
Sri Lestari Anwar 
 
 
135. SMDR PT. Samudera Indonesia, Tbk Poesposoetjipto Family 
 
 
136. SMRA PT. Summarecon Agung, Tbk Nagaria Family/ 
The Summarecon Group 
 
 
137. SMSM PT. Selamat Sempurna, Tbk Hartono Family/ 
The ADR Group  
 
 
138. SRSN PT. Indo Acidatama, Tbk Setijo Family/ 
The Pan Brothers Group 
 
 
139. SSTM PT. Sunson Textile Manufacture, Tbk Suriadi/Sundjono 
Mariah 
 
 
140. STTP PT. Siantar Top, Tbk Shindo Sumidomo  
 
 
141. TBIG PT. Tower Bersama Infrastructure, Tbk 
 
Saratoga Group 
 
 
142. TBLA PT. Tunas Baru Lampung, Tbk Widarto Oey Family 
 
 
143. TKIM PT. Pabrik Kertas Tjiwi Kimia, Tbk Eka Tjipta Widjaja Family/  
The Sinar Mas Group 
  
 
144. TMAS PT. Pelayaran Tempuran Emas, Tbk 
 
Harto Khusumo Family 
 
 
145. TMPI PT. Sigmagold Inti Perkasa, Tbk The Artha Graha Group 
 
 
146. TOTL PT. Total Bangun Persada, Tbk Komadjaja Family 
 
 
147. TOWR PT. Sarana Menara Nusantara, Tbk Hartono Family/ 
The Djarum Group 
 
 
148. TPIA PT. Chandra Asri Petrochemical, Tbk Prajogo Pangestu Family/ 
The Barito Pacific Group 
 
 
149. TRIM PT. Trimegah Sekuritas Indonesia, Tbk 
 
Avi Y Dwipayana 
 
 
150. TRST PT. Trias Sentosa, Tbk The Panggung Group 
 
 
151. TSPC PT. Tempo Scan Pacific, Tbk  Muljadi Family 
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152. TURI PT. Tunas Ridean, Tbk Setiawan Family/ 
The Tunas Group 
 
 
153. ULTJ PT. Ultrajaya Milk Indty & Trading Co, 
Tbk 
 
Prawirawidjaja Family 
 
 
154. UNIC PT. Unggul Indah Cahaya, Tbk Masrin family 
 
 
156. UNSP PT. Bakrie Sumatera Plantations, Tbk Bakrie Family/  
The Bakrie Group 
  
 
157. UNTR PT. United Tractors, Tbk Jardin Family/ 
The Jardin Group 
 
 
158. VIVA PT. Visi Media Asia, Tbk Bakrie Family/ 
The Bakrie Group 
 
 
159. VOKS PT Voksel Electric, Tbk  Lius Family 
 
 
160. YPAS PT. Yanaprima Hastapersada, Tbk Alexander Tanzil Family 
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Appendix 2. 
Regression Results for the Dependent Variable Long-Term Debt 
 
A. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
 
 
      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       800 
-------------+----------------------------------   F(14, 785)      =      9.54 
       Model |  2.12662688        14   .15190192   Prob > F        =    0.0000 
    Residual |  12.4982539       785  .015921343   R-squared       =    0.1454 
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.1302 
       Total |  14.6248808       799  .018303981   Root MSE        =    .12618 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           LongTerm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                Own |   1.406564   .3137881     4.48   0.000     .7906008    2.022527 
               Own2 |   -2.42382   .6803994    -3.56   0.000    -3.759437   -1.088202 
               Own3 |   1.138504   .4411871     2.58   0.010     .2724575     2.00455 
         CEOFounder |  -.0221927   .0125947    -1.76   0.078     -.046916    .0025306 
    FamilySuccesion |   .0108317   .0117419     0.92   0.357    -.0122176     .033881 
BoardRepresentation |  -.0128942   .0114123    -1.13   0.259    -.0352964     .009508 
            Duality |   .0055245   .0121742     0.45   0.650    -.0183733    .0294222 
       PropBoardInd |   .1983628   .0421154     4.71   0.000     .1156906    .2810349 
        Tangibility |   .0295495   .0212026     1.39   0.164     -.012071      .07117 
      Profitability |  -.1907526   .0485874    -3.93   0.000    -.2861292   -.0953761 
               Size |   .0022137    .001616     1.37   0.171    -.0009585    .0053859 
               NDTS |   .2034348   .1070608     1.90   0.058    -.0067245     .413594 
            FirmAge |  -.0012245   .0003657    -3.35   0.001    -.0019423   -.0005067 
            MBRatio |   .0074627   .0022915     3.26   0.001     .0029646    .0119609 
              _cons |  -.1340301   .0528142    -2.54   0.011    -.2377039   -.0303562 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
B. Fixed Effect Model (FE) with LSDV 
 
Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       800 
-------------+----------------------------------   F(14, 785)      =      9.54 
       Model |  2.12662688        14   .15190192   Prob > F        =    0.0000 
    Residual |  12.4982539       785  .015921343   R-squared       =    0.1454 
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.1302 
       Total |  14.6248808       799  .018303981   Root MSE        =    .12618 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     LongTerm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          Own |   1.406564   .3137881     4.48   0.000     .7906008    2.022527 
         Own2 |   -2.42382   .6803994    -3.56   0.000    -3.759437   -1.088202 
         Own3 |   1.138504   .4411871     2.58   0.010     .2724575     2.00455 
_ICEOFounde_1 |  -.0221927   .0125947    -1.76   0.078     -.046916    .0025306 
_IFamilySuc_1 |   .0108317   .0117419     0.92   0.357    -.0122176     .033881 
_IBoardRepr_1 |  -.0128942   .0114123    -1.13   0.259    -.0352964     .009508 
  _IDuality_1 |   .0055245   .0121742     0.45   0.650    -.0183733    .0294222 
 PropBoardInd |   .1983628   .0421154     4.71   0.000     .1156906    .2810349 
  Tangibility |   .0295495   .0212026     1.39   0.164     -.012071      .07117 
Profitability |  -.1907526   .0485874    -3.93   0.000    -.2861292   -.0953761 
         Size |   .0022137    .001616     1.37   0.171    -.0009585    .0053859 
         NDTS |   .2034348   .1070608     1.90   0.058    -.0067245     .413594 
      FirmAge |  -.0012245   .0003657    -3.35   0.001    -.0019423   -.0005067 
      MBRatio |   .0074627   .0022915     3.26   0.001     .0029646    .0119609 
        _cons |  -.1340301   .0528142    -2.54   0.010    -.2377039   -.0303562 
 
C. Random Effect Model (RE) 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        800 
Group variable: Firms                           Number of groups  =        160 
 
R-sq:                                           Obs per group: 
     within  = 0.0058                                         min =          5 
     between = 0.0934                                         avg =        5.0 
     overall = 0.0804                                         max =          5 
 
                                                Wald chi2(14)     =      17.46 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.2324 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           LongTerm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                Own |   1.156794   .4098687     2.82   0.005     .3534665    1.960122 
               Own2 |  -2.169228    .852344    -2.55   0.011    -3.839792   -.4986648 
               Own3 |    1.22556    .536536     2.28   0.022     .1739685    2.277151 
         CEOFounder |  -.0164486   .0267117    -0.62   0.538    -.0688026    .0359055 
BoardRepresentation |  -.0137497   .0240619    -0.57   0.568    -.0609101    .0334106 
            Duality |   .0033267   .0256821     0.13   0.897    -.0470093    .0536627 
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    FamilySuccesion |   .0078795   .0247539     0.32   0.750    -.0406372    .0563962 
       PropBoardInd |   .1526079   .0859131     1.78   0.076    -.0157787    .3209945 
        Tangibility |    .021377   .0226045     0.95   0.344     -.022927    .0656809 
      Profitability |  -.0518283   .0316092    -1.64   0.101    -.1137812    .0101245 
               Size |  -.0000483   .0017879    -0.03   0.978    -.0035526     .003456 
               NDTS |   .0124143   .0645643     0.19   0.848    -.1141293    .1389579 
            FirmAge |   .0000105    .000688     0.02   0.988    -.0013379    .0013589 
            MBRatio |    .001384    .002153     0.64   0.520    -.0028358    .0056039 
              _cons |  -.0766561   .0774651    -0.99   0.322     -.228485    .0751728 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            sigma_u |  .11582471 
            sigma_e |  .05534493 
                rho |   .8141169   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
D. Heterokedasticity Test using White-Hubber corrected standard error 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        800 
Group variable: Firms                           Number of groups  =        160 
R-sq:                                           Obs per group: 
     within  = 0.0058                                         min =          5 
     between = 0.0934                                         avg =        5.0 
     overall = 0.0804                                         max =          5 
                                                Wald chi2(14)     =      18.37 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.1906 
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 160 clusters in Firms) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |               Robust 
           LongTerm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                Own |   1.156794   .3342206     3.46   0.001     .5017341    1.811855 
               Own2 |  -2.169228    .692506    -3.13   0.002    -3.526515   -.8119415 
               Own3 |    1.22556   .4771043     2.57   0.010     .2904526    2.160667 
         CEOFounder |  -.0164486   .0271165    -0.61   0.544    -.0695959    .0366987 
BoardRepresentation |  -.0137497   .0250911    -0.55   0.584    -.0629274    .0354279 
            Duality |   .0033267    .023646     0.14   0.888    -.0430186     .049672 
    FamilySuccesion |   .0078795   .0232292     0.34   0.734    -.0376488    .0534078 
       PropBoardInd |   .1526079   .0997186     1.53   0.126     -.042837    .3480528 
        Tangibility |    .021377   .0308876     0.69   0.489    -.0391617    .0819156 
      Profitability |  -.0518283   .0477142    -1.09   0.277    -.1453465    .0416898 
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               Size |  -.0000483   .0023416    -0.02   0.984    -.0046378    .0045412 
               NDTS |   .0124143   .0836551     0.15   0.882    -.1515467    .1763753 
            FirmAge |   .0000105   .0009094     0.01   0.991    -.0017719    .0017929 
            MBRatio |    .001384   .0027927     0.50   0.620    -.0040895    .0068576 
              _cons |  -.0766561   .0835564    -0.92   0.359    -.2404236    .0871115 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            sigma_u |  .11582471 
            sigma_e |  .05534493 
                rho |   .8141169   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
 
E. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test for Random Effects 
 
        LongTerm[Firms,t] = Xb + u[Firms] + e[Firms,t] 
        Estimated results: 
                         |       Var     sd = sqrt(Var) 
                ---------+----------------------------- 
                LongTerm |    .018304       .1352922 
                       e |   .0030631       .0553449 
                       u |   .0134154       .1158247 
 
        Test:   Var(u) = 0 
                             chibar2(01) =   966.56 
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000 
 
 
F. Hausman Test and Sargan-Hansen Test for Fixed Effects 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |       fe           re         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Own |    .8783598     1.156794       -.2784347        .3147442 
        Own2 |   -1.654316    -2.169228         .514912        .5988195 
        Own3 |    .9906827      1.22556       -.2348772        .3527392 
 Tangibility |    .0242167      .021377        .0028398        .0116249 
Profitabil~y |   -.0156691    -.0518283        .0361593         .006531 
        Size |   -.0010735    -.0000483       -.0010252          .00096 
        NDTS |   -.0048636     .0124143       -.0172779        .0049386 
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     FirmAge |    .0049976     .0000105        .0049871        .0012757 
     MBRatio |    .0016422      .001384        .0002582        .0009199 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
                  chi2(9) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       59.53 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000. 
Test of overidentifying restrictions: fixed vs random effects 
Cross-section time-series model: xtreg re    
Sargan-Hansen statistic 36.132 Chi-sq (9)    P-value = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
232 
 
Appendix 3. 
Regression Results for the Dependent Variable Short-Term Debt 
 
 
 
A. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
 
      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       800 
-------------+----------------------------------   F(15, 784)      =     14.99 
       Model |   4.8213775        15  .321425166   Prob > F        =    0.0000 
    Residual |  16.8072995       784  .021437882   R-squared       =    0.2229 
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.2080 
       Total |   21.628677       799  .027069683   Root MSE        =    .14642 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          ShortTerm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                Own |  -.5837765   .3643527    -1.60   0.110    -1.298999    .1314458 
               Own2 |   1.476595   .7898318     1.87   0.062    -.0738404    3.027031 
               Own3 |  -.9934641     .51204    -1.94   0.053    -1.998596    .0116675 
         CEOFounder |  -.0427764   .0146183    -2.93   0.004    -.0714721   -.0140807 
    FamilySuccesion |  -.0037813   .0136498    -0.28   0.782    -.0305758    .0230131 
BoardRepresentation |   .0480142   .0132632     3.62   0.000     .0219786    .0740498 
            Duality |   -.010256   .0141286    -0.73   0.468    -.0379903    .0174784 
       PropBoardInd |    .028473   .0488714     0.58   0.560    -.0674612    .1244072 
        Tangibility |   .0091755   .0254417     0.36   0.718    -.0407664    .0591174 
      Profitability |   .0400389   .0569977     0.70   0.483    -.0718473     .151925 
               Size |   .0009473   .0018789     0.50   0.614     -.002741    .0046357 
               NDTS |  -.1756972   .1246271    -1.41   0.159    -.4203395    .0689451 
            FirmAge |   .0010661   .0004251     2.51   0.012     .0002315    .0019006 
          Liquidity |  -.0482956   .0039533   -12.22   0.000    -.0560559   -.0405353 
            MBRatio |  -.0051991   .0026604    -1.95   0.051    -.0104215    .0000233 
              _cons |   .3900412   .0630436     6.19   0.000     .2662869    .5137955 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
B. Fixed Effect Model (FE)  
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        800 
Group variable: Firms                           Number of groups  =        160 
R-sq:                                           Obs per group: 
     within  = 0.0840                                         min =          5 
     between = 0.1076                                         avg =        5.0 
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     overall = 0.1033                                         max =          5 
                                                F(10,630)         =       5.77 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0505                        Prob > F          =     0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          ShortTerm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                Own |   .1615266    .697486     0.23   0.817    -1.208152    1.531205 
               Own2 |   .2516524   1.406999     0.18   0.858    -2.511322    3.014627 
               Own3 |  -.4265496   .8679565    -0.49   0.623    -2.130987    1.277888 
         CEOFounder |          0  (omitted) 
    FamilySuccesion |          0  (omitted) 
BoardRepresentation |          0  (omitted) 
            Duality |          0  (omitted) 
       PropBoardInd |          0  (omitted) 
        Tangibility |  -.0488092    .034127    -1.43   0.153    -.1158256    .0182072 
      Profitability |   .1245257    .043295     2.88   0.004     .0395056    .2095457 
               Size |  -.0029868   .0027283    -1.09   0.274    -.0083444    .0023709 
               NDTS |  -.1670254   .0871109    -1.92   0.056    -.3380883    .0040375 
            FirmAge |   .0032828   .0019459     1.69   0.092    -.0005384     .007104 
          Liquidity |  -.0248439   .0041507    -5.99   0.000    -.0329949    -.016693 
            MBRatio |  -.0033595   .0031428    -1.07   0.285    -.0095311    .0028121 
              _cons |   .2594587    .124761     2.08   0.038      .014461    .5044565 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            sigma_u |  .14170619 
            sigma_e |  .07423494 
                rho |  .78466162   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
F test that all u_i=0: F(159, 630) = 15.86                   Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
C. Random Effect Model (RE) 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        800 
Group variable: Firms                           Number of groups  =        160 
 
R-sq:                                           Obs per group: 
     within  = 0.0786                                         min =          5 
     between = 0.2211                                         avg =        5.0 
     overall = 0.1939                                         max =          5 
 
234 
 
                                                Wald chi2(15)     =      94.07 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          ShortTerm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                Own |  -.1422073   .5076436    -0.28   0.779     -1.13717    .8527559 
               Own2 |   .7008218    1.06265     0.66   0.510    -1.381934    2.783578 
               Own3 |  -.6051616   .6721036    -0.90   0.368    -1.922461    .7121373 
         CEOFounder |  -.0468459   .0299425    -1.56   0.118    -.1055321    .0118402 
    FamilySuccesion |  -.0118914   .0277872    -0.43   0.669    -.0663533    .0425706 
BoardRepresentation |   .0513769   .0270202     1.90   0.057    -.0015818    .1043356 
            Duality |  -.0121952   .0288125    -0.42   0.672    -.0686667    .0442763 
       PropBoardInd |   .0583229   .0966282     0.60   0.546    -.1310648    .2477106 
        Tangibility |  -.0219814   .0288501    -0.76   0.446    -.0785266    .0345637 
      Profitability |   .1012336   .0413863     2.45   0.014     .0201179    .1823494 
               Size |  -.0014453   .0022638    -0.64   0.523    -.0058823    .0029917 
               NDTS |  -.1694661   .0851108    -1.99   0.046    -.3362802   -.0026521 
            FirmAge |   .0016319   .0007964     2.05   0.040     .0000709    .0031928 
          Liquidity |  -.0302942   .0037595    -8.06   0.000    -.0376626   -.0229258 
            MBRatio |  -.0036024   .0027632    -1.30   0.192    -.0090182    .0018134 
              _cons |   .3054495    .093339     3.27   0.001     .1225084    .4883906 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            sigma_u |  .13023726 
 
D. Heterokedasticity Test using White-Hubber corrected standard error 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        800 
Group variable: Firms                           Number of groups  =        160 
 
R-sq:                                           Obs per group: 
     within  = 0.0786                                         min =          5 
     between = 0.2211                                         avg =        5.0 
     overall = 0.1939                                         max =          5 
 
                                                Wald chi2(15)     =      88.55 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000 
 
                                       (Std. Err. adjusted for 160 clusters in Firms) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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                    |               Robust 
          ShortTerm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                Own |  -.1422073   .5031562    -0.28   0.777    -1.128375    .8439608 
               Own2 |   .7008218   .9931927     0.71   0.480      -1.2458    2.647444 
               Own3 |  -.6051616   .6067037    -1.00   0.319    -1.794279    .5839558 
         CEOFounder |  -.0468459   .0338235    -1.39   0.166    -.1131388    .0194469 
BoardRepresentation |   .0513769     .02594     1.98   0.048     .0005354    .1022184 
            Duality |  -.0121952   .0301659    -0.40   0.686    -.0713194    .0469289 
    FamilySuccesion |  -.0118914   .0274534    -0.43   0.665     -.065699    .0419162 
       PropBoardInd |   .0583229   .1045545     0.56   0.577    -.1466002    .2632461 
        Tangibility |  -.0219814   .0370348    -0.59   0.553    -.0945682    .0506053 
      Profitability |   .1012336   .0413863     2.45   0.014    -.0516878    .2541551 
               Size |  -.0014453   .0026304    -0.55   0.583    -.0066008    .0037102 
               NDTS |  -.1694661   .0889339    -1.91   0.057    -.3437735    .0048412 
            FirmAge |   .0016319    .000717     2.28   0.023     .0002266    .0030371 
          Liquidity |  -.0302942   .0040727    -7.44   0.000    -.0382765   -.0223119 
            MBRatio |  -.0036024   .0028639    -1.26   0.208    -.0092156    .0020108 
              _cons |   .3054495   .0970929     3.15   0.002      .115151     .495748 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            sigma_u |  .13023726 
            sigma_e |  .07423494 
                rho |  .75477543   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
 
 
E. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test for Random Effects 
 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
        ShortTerm[Firms,t] = Xb + u[Firms] + e[Firms,t] 
        Estimated results: 
                         |       Var     sd = sqrt(Var) 
                ---------+----------------------------- 
               ShortTerm |   .0270697       .1645287 
                       e |   .0055108       .0742349 
                       u |   .0169617       .1302373 
        Test:   Var(u) = 0 
                             chibar2(01) =   834.38 
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000 
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F.     Hausman Test and Sargan-Hansen Test for Fixed Effects 
   
Test of overidentifying restrictions: fixed vs random effects 
Cross-section time-series model: xtreg re    
Sargan-Hansen statistic 16.401 Chi-sq(10)   P-value = 0.0887 
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Appendix 3. 
Additional Robustness Checks 
 
A. Total Debt 
 
xi: reg Aggregate Own Own2 Own3 i.CEOFounder i.FamilySuccesion 
i.BoardRepresentation i.Duality PropBoardInd Tangibility Profitability Size NDTS 
FirmAge Liquidity MBRatio, vce (ro) 
i.CEOFounder      _ICEOFounde_0-1     (naturally coded; _ICEOFounde_0 omitted) 
i.FamilySucce~n   _IFamilySuc_0-1     (naturally coded; _IFamilySuc_0 omitted) 
i.BoardRepres~n   _IBoardRepr_0-1     (naturally coded; _IBoardRepr_0 omitted) 
i.Duality         _IDuality_0-1       (naturally coded; _IDuality_0 omitted) 
 
Linear regression                               Number of obs     =        800 
                                                F(15, 784)        =      22.52 
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000 
                                                R-squared         =     0.2742 
                                                Root MSE          =     .17972 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
    Aggregate |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          Own |   .7666014   .4227342     1.81   0.070    -.0632234    1.596426 
         Own2 |   -.853162   .9118302    -0.94   0.350     -2.64308    .9367555 
         Own3 |   .1031544   .5833023     0.18   0.860    -1.041865    1.248174 
_ICEOFounde_1 |   -.063578   .0192622    -3.30   0.001    -.1013896   -.0257665 
_IFamilySuc_1 |   .0105456   .0162899     0.65   0.518    -.0214315    .0425226 
_IBoardRepr_1 |   .0319695   .0166376     1.92   0.055    -.0006901     .064629 
  _IDuality_1 |  -.0037379   .0162042    -0.23   0.818    -.0355468    .0280709 
 PropBoardInd |   .2284008   .0693258     3.29   0.001     .0923146    .3644869 
  Tangibility |   .0111136   .0312579     0.36   0.722    -.0502455    .0724726 
Profitability |  -.1150434   .0777114    -1.48   0.139    -.2675905    .0375037 
         Size |   .0026563   .0022695     1.17   0.242    -.0017987    .0071113 
         NDTS |  -.0145575   .1565751    -0.09   0.926    -.3219135    .2927986 
      FirmAge |  -.0002724    .000498    -0.55   0.585      -.00125    .0007052 
    Liquidity |  -.0651453   .0047594   -13.69   0.000     -.074488   -.0558025 
      MBRatio |   .0018939    .003803     0.50   0.619    -.0055713    .0093591 
        _cons |     .31904   .0774018     4.12   0.000     .1671007    .4709793 
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B. Active/Passive  
 
. xi: reg LongTerm Own Own2 Own3 i.AP PropBoardInd Tangibility Profitability Size 
NDTS FirmAge MBRatio, vce (ro) 
i.AP              _IAP_0-1            (naturally coded; _IAP_0 omitted) 
 
Linear regression                               Number of obs     =        800 
                                                F(11, 788)        =      11.10 
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000 
                                                R-squared         =     0.1366 
                                                Root MSE          =     .12659 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     LongTerm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          Own |   1.316089    .262791     5.01   0.000     .8002359    1.831942 
         Own2 |  -2.253006   .5809309    -3.88   0.000    -3.393361    -1.11265 
         Own3 |   1.033588   .3758199     2.75   0.006     .2958617    1.771315 
       _IAP_1 |   .0139654   .0110479     1.26   0.207    -.0077214    .0356523 
 PropBoardInd |   .1913662   .0462346     4.14   0.000     .1006086    .2821238 
  Tangibility |   .0286892   .0224093     1.28   0.201    -.0152997    .0726781 
Profitability |  -.1889011   .0480861    -3.93   0.000    -.2832932   -.0945091 
         Size |    .002479   .0019039     1.30   0.193    -.0012584    .0062164 
         NDTS |   .1875608   .1164362     1.61   0.108    -.0410011    .4161226 
      FirmAge |  -.0010858   .0004875    -2.23   0.026    -.0020427   -.0001288 
      MBRatio |   .0068371   .0025219     2.71   0.007     .0018867    .0117874 
        _cons |  -.1436071    .051271    -2.80   0.005    -.2442509   -.0429633 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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C. Board Size  (exclude family members)  
 
xi: reg LongTerm Own Own2 Own3 i.CEOFounder i.BoardRepresentation i.Duality 
i.FamilySuccesion BoardSizenofam Tangibility Profitability Size NDTS FirmAge 
MBRatio, vce (ro) 
i.CEOFounder      _ICEOFounde_0-1     (naturally coded; _ICEOFounde_0 omitted) 
i.BoardRepres~n   _IBoardRepr_0-1     (naturally coded; _IBoardRepr_0 omitted) 
i.Duality         _IDuality_0-1       (naturally coded; _IDuality_0 omitted) 
i.FamilySucce~n   _IFamilySuc_0-1     (naturally coded; _IFamilySuc_0 omitted) 
 
Linear regression                               Number of obs     =        800 
                                                F(14, 785)        =       9.30 
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000 
                                                R-squared         =     0.1343 
                                                Root MSE          =     .12699 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
               |               Robust 
      LongTerm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           Own |   1.270393   .2633095     4.82   0.000     .7535192    1.787267 
          Own2 |  -2.165272   .5859865    -3.70   0.000    -3.315558   -1.014986 
          Own3 |    .996224   .3833488     2.60   0.010      .243714    1.748734 
 _ICEOFounde_1 |  -.0180393   .0130515    -1.38   0.167    -.0436594    .0075807 
 _IBoardRepr_1 |  -.0217053   .0122748    -1.77   0.077    -.0458006    .0023899 
   _IDuality_1 |   .0001589   .0114562     0.01   0.989    -.0223295    .0226473 
 _IFamilySuc_1 |   .0093807     .01125     0.83   0.405    -.0127029    .0314642 
BoardSizenofam |   .0789756    .022915     3.45   0.001     .0339937    .1239575 
   Tangibility |   .0455877   .0224816     2.03   0.043     .0014566    .0897188 
 Profitability |  -.1676414   .0475777    -3.52   0.000    -.2610359   -.0742469 
          Size |    .002822   .0019337     1.46   0.145    -.0009739    .0066179 
          NDTS |   .2082001   .1270206     1.64   0.102    -.0411402    .4575404 
       FirmAge |   -.001081   .0004731    -2.29   0.023    -.0020096   -.0001524 
       MBRatio |   .0062634   .0025365     2.47   0.014     .0012843    .0112424 
         _cons |  -.0962115   .0528048    -1.82   0.069    -.1998669    .0074439 
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D. Family – Bank Relations  
 
xi: reg LongTerm Own Own2 Own3 i.CEOFounder i.BoardRepresentation i.Duality 
i.FamilySuccesion PropBoardInd Tangibility Profitability Size NDTS FirmAge MBRatio 
i.BankFamily , vce (ro) 
i.CEOFounder      _ICEOFounde_0-1     (naturally coded; _ICEOFounde_0 omitted) 
i.BoardRepres~n   _IBoardRepr_0-1     (naturally coded; _IBoardRepr_0 omitted) 
i.Duality         _IDuality_0-1       (naturally coded; _IDuality_0 omitted) 
i.FamilySucce~n   _IFamilySuc_0-1     (naturally coded; _IFamilySuc_0 omitted) 
i.BankFamily      _IBankFamil_0-1     (naturally coded; _IBankFamil_0 omitted) 
 
Linear regression                               Number of obs     =        800 
                                                F(15, 784)        =      10.41 
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000 
                                                R-squared         =     0.1518 
                                                Root MSE          =     .12579 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     LongTerm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          Own |    1.43753    .263801     5.45   0.000     .9196904     1.95537 
         Own2 |  -2.483748   .5874545    -4.23   0.000    -3.636918   -1.330578 
         Own3 |   1.175166   .3835483     3.06   0.002     .4222632    1.928069 
_ICEOFounde_1 |  -.0191391   .0127753    -1.50   0.135     -.044217    .0059387 
_IBoardRepr_1 |  -.0127403   .0120123    -1.06   0.289    -.0363204    .0108398 
  _IDuality_1 |   .0050408   .0113445     0.44   0.657    -.0172284    .0273099 
_IFamilySuc_1 |    .013314   .0110902     1.20   0.230     -.008456     .035084 
 PropBoardInd |   .1832114   .0483391     3.79   0.000     .0883219    .2781008 
  Tangibility |    .033286   .0221669     1.50   0.134    -.0102276    .0767996 
Profitability |  -.1852998   .0476116    -3.89   0.000    -.2787612   -.0918385 
         Size |   .0024948    .001884     1.32   0.186    -.0012034     .006193 
         NDTS |   .2077412   .1163552     1.79   0.075    -.0206633    .4361457 
      FirmAge |  -.0012206   .0004734    -2.58   0.010    -.0021498   -.0002914 
      MBRatio |   .0073997    .002491     2.97   0.003     .0025099    .0122895 
_IBankFamil_1 |   .0349588   .0177631     1.97   0.049     .0000899    .0698277 
        _cons |  -.1449474   .0521135    -2.78   0.006     -.247246   -.0426489 
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E. Dividend Payment 
 
xi: reg LongTerm Own Own2 Own3 i.CEOFounder i.BoardRepresentation i.Duality 
i.FamilySuccesion PropBoardInd Tangibility Profitability Size NDTS FirmAge 
MBRatio DPR , vce (ro) 
i.CEOFounder      _ICEOFounde_0-1     (naturally coded; _ICEOFounde_0 omitted) 
i.BoardRepres~n   _IBoardRepr_0-1     (naturally coded; _IBoardRepr_0 omitted) 
i.Duality         _IDuality_0-1       (naturally coded; _IDuality_0 omitted) 
i.FamilySucce~n   _IFamilySuc_0-1     (naturally coded; _IFamilySuc_0 omitted) 
 
Linear regression                               Number of obs     =        800 
                                                F(15, 784)        =      12.68 
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000 
                                                R-squared         =     0.1782 
                                                Root MSE          =     .12382 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     LongTerm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          Own |   1.338543   .2668427     5.02   0.000     .8147325    1.862354 
         Own2 |  -2.255068   .5948218    -3.79   0.000      -3.4227   -1.087436 
         Own3 |   1.029851   .3880081     2.65   0.008     .2681934    1.791509 
_ICEOFounde_1 |  -.0209946   .0126598    -1.66   0.098    -.0458457    .0038565 
_IBoardRepr_1 |  -.0168959   .0119402    -1.42   0.157    -.0403344    .0065426 
  _IDuality_1 |   .0062322   .0112978     0.55   0.581    -.0159454    .0284097 
_IFamilySuc_1 |   .0112752   .0109368     1.03   0.303    -.0101936    .0327441 
 PropBoardInd |   .2137914   .0458691     4.66   0.000     .1237506    .3038323 
  Tangibility |   .0234623   .0221884     1.06   0.291    -.0200934    .0670179 
Profitability |  -.1664521   .0442125    -3.76   0.000     -.253241   -.0796631 
         Size |   .0020651   .0019137     1.08   0.281    -.0016916    .0058217 
         NDTS |   .2471781   .1247025     1.98   0.048     .0023879    .4919684 
      FirmAge |  -.0011078   .0004563    -2.43   0.015    -.0020035    -.000212 
      MBRatio |   .0090446   .0024416     3.70   0.000     .0042517    .0138374 
          DPR |   -.120849    .018829    -6.42   0.000    -.1578102   -.0838879 
        _cons |  -.1237007   .0536106    -2.31   0.021     -.228938   -.0184634 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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F. Industry Classification 
 
xi: reg LongTerm Own Own2 Own3 i.CEOFounder i.BoardRepresentation i.Duality 
i.FamilySuccesion PropBoardInd Tangibility Profitability Size NDTS FirmAge 
MBRatio i.Industry , vce (ro) 
i.CEOFounder      _ICEOFounde_0-1     (naturally coded; _ICEOFounde_0 omitted) 
i.BoardRepres~n   _IBoardRepr_0-1     (naturally coded; _IBoardRepr_0 omitted) 
i.Duality         _IDuality_0-1       (naturally coded; _IDuality_0 omitted) 
i.FamilySucce~n   _IFamilySuc_0-1     (naturally coded; _IFamilySuc_0 omitted) 
i.Industry        _IIndustry_0-1      (naturally coded; _IIndustry_0 omitted) 
 
Linear regression                               Number of obs     =        800 
                                                F(15, 784)        =      10.29 
                                                Prob > F          =     0.0000 
                                                R-squared         =     0.1586 
                                                Root MSE          =     .12528 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
     LongTerm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          Own |   1.306978   .2705624     4.83   0.000     .7758654     1.83809 
         Own2 |  -2.182824   .6087698    -3.59   0.000    -3.377836    -.987812 
         Own3 |   .9746005   .4010538     2.43   0.015     .1873341    1.761867 
_ICEOFounde_1 |  -.0263439   .0129645    -2.03   0.042    -.0517932   -.0008946 
_IBoardRepr_1 |  -.0100296   .0120746    -0.83   0.406    -.0337319    .0136727 
  _IDuality_1 |   .0063468     .01149     0.55   0.581    -.0162081    .0289017 
_IFamilySuc_1 |   .0066768   .0114099     0.59   0.559    -.0157208    .0290745 
 PropBoardInd |   .2015124   .0450872     4.47   0.000     .1130065    .2900183 
  Tangibility |   .0095355   .0238675     0.40   0.690    -.0373163    .0563873 
Profitability |  -.1919733   .0479016    -4.01   0.000    -.2860038   -.0979427 
         Size |   .0027296   .0018853     1.45   0.148    -.0009713    .0064305 
         NDTS |   .2266982   .1252435     1.81   0.071    -.0191541    .4725506 
      FirmAge |  -.0013627   .0004719    -2.89   0.004     -.002289   -.0004364 
      MBRatio |   .0074276   .0024553     3.03   0.003     .0026079    .0122473 
 _IIndustry_1 |   .0357157   .0097817     3.65   0.000     .0165143    .0549171 
        _cons |  -.1423734    .052885    -2.69   0.007    -.2461865   -.0385604 
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G. Reverse Causality Tests 
a. IV – Lagged Ownership 
 
ivregress gmm LongTerm CEOFounder BoardRepresentation Duality FamilySuccesion PropBoardInd 
Tangibility Profitability Size NDTS FirmAge MBRatio ( Own = LagOwn1 ), wmatrix(robust) 
 
Instrumental variables (GMM) regression           Number of obs   =        800 
                                                  Wald chi2(12)   =      65.56 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
                                                  R-squared       =     0.0818 
GMM weight matrix: Robust                         Root MSE        =     .12956 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |               Robust 
           LongTerm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                Own |  -.0404146   .0215675    -1.87   0.061    -.0826861     .001857 
         CEOFounder |  -.0173051   .0131482    -1.32   0.188     -.043075    .0084649 
BoardRepresentation |  -.0089056   .0119994    -0.74   0.458    -.0324239    .0146127 
            Duality |   .0051507    .011419     0.45   0.652    -.0172301    .0275316 
    FamilySuccesion |   .0168787   .0110709     1.52   0.127    -.0048198    .0385772 
       PropBoardInd |   .1494215   .0456694     3.27   0.001     .0599112    .2389319 
        Tangibility |   .0436917   .0231921     1.88   0.060    -.0017638    .0891473 
      Profitability |  -.1736593   .0466092    -3.73   0.000    -.2650117    -.082307 
               Size |   .0009598   .0019939     0.48   0.630    -.0029482    .0048679 
               NDTS |   .2198134   .1195739     1.84   0.066    -.0145471    .4541738 
            FirmAge |  -.0014957   .0004784    -3.13   0.002    -.0024334   -.0005581 
            MBRatio |   .0068277   .0025775     2.65   0.008     .0017759    .0118796 
              _cons |   .1226556   .0383989     3.19   0.001     .0473951    .1979161 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instrumented:  Own 
Instruments:   CEOFounder BoardRepresentation Duality FamilySuccesion PropBoardInd 
               Tangibility Profitability Size NDTS FirmAge MBRatio LagOwn1 
 
b. GMM – System Model – Lagged Leverage 
 
xtdpdsys LongTerm LagLT Own Own2 Own3 CEOFounder BoardRepresentation Duality 
FamilySuccesion PropBoardInd Tangibility Profitability Size NDTS FirmAge MBRatio 
note: CEOFounder dropped from div() because of collinearity 
note: BoardRepresentation dropped from div() because of collinearity 
note: Duality dropped from div() because of collinearity 
note: FamilySuccesion dropped from div() because of collinearity 
note: PropBoardInd dropped from div() because of collinearity 
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System dynamic panel-data estimation            Number of obs     =        640 
Group variable: Firms                           Number of groups  =        160 
Time variable: Year 
                                                Obs per group: 
                                                              min =          4 
                                                              avg =          4 
                                                              max =          4 
 
Number of instruments =     20                  Wald chi2(14)     =      34.10 
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0020 
One-step results 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           LongTerm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           LongTerm | 
                L1. |   7.011634   3.053248     2.30   0.022     1.027379    12.99589 
                    | 
              LagLT |  -6.776046   2.890684    -2.34   0.019    -12.44168    -1.11041 
                Own |   2.137681   1.298177     1.65   0.100    -.4066982    4.682061 
               Own2 |  -4.227155   2.599373    -1.63   0.104    -9.321833     .867523 
               Own3 |   2.367638   1.529587     1.55   0.122    -.6302963    5.365573 
         CEOFounder |          0  (omitted) 
BoardRepresentation |    .039885   .0970286     0.41   0.681    -.1502876    .2300575 
            Duality |          0  (omitted) 
    FamilySuccesion |   .3160711   .2580071     1.23   0.221    -.1896136    .8217558 
       PropBoardInd |   .1112674    .348965     0.32   0.750    -.5726915    .7952263 
        Tangibility |   .0202291   .0561503     0.36   0.719    -.0898234    .1302816 
      Profitability |  -.0821599   .0743159    -1.11   0.269    -.2278164    .0634966 
               Size |  -.0105557   .0056449    -1.87   0.061    -.0216194    .0005081 
               NDTS |  -.1324268   .1306256    -1.01   0.311    -.3884483    .1235946 
            FirmAge |   .0053029   .0031839     1.67   0.096    -.0009373    .0115432 
            MBRatio |    -.00008   .0054214    -0.01   0.988    -.0107057    .0105458 
              _cons |  -.3450091   .2443943    -1.41   0.158    -.8240132     .133995 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instruments for differenced equation 
        GMM-type: L(2/.).LongTerm 
        Standard: D.LagLT D.Own D.Own2 D.Own3 D.Tangibility D.Profitability D.Size 
                  D.NDTS D.FirmAge D.MBRatio 
Instruments for level equation 
        GMM-type: LD.LongTerm 
